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Chapter 1
Introduction
”There is probably no concept in all of economics that is at once more fun-
damental and pervasive, yet less satisfactorily developed, than the concept of
competition.”
Paul J. McNulty (1968)
Our understanding of competition and the dynamics of competitive behaviour
has come a long way since McNulty’s (1968) critical statement. To a large ex-
tent, this can be accredited to the development of rigorous theory that departs
from the polar extremes of monopoly and perfect competition and studies im-
perfectly competitive markets (Einav and Levin, 2010). Tirole (1988) highlights
two significant theoretical developments that contributed to our understanding
of competition and industrial organisation. First, the adoption of noncooper-
ative game theory as a mainstream modelling tool, which allowed economists
to better capture the interdependency between rivals that is inherent to com-
petition and strategic conflict. Second, the progress in the areas of market
dynamics (Hopenhayn, 1992; Ericson and Pakes, 1995; Olley and Pakes, 1996)
and asymmetric information (Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Milgrom and Roberts,
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1987; Ordover and Saloner, 1989), which made it possible to model competi-
tion as a dynamic process of rivalry (i.e. where competition changes over time
and firms use information revealed by their competitors to determine future
actions) rather than a static construct (i.e. where firms behave myopically and
do not use information revealed by their competitors’ actions).
Despite the significant developments in the theory of industrial organisation,
McNulty’s (1968) critique is still to some extent applicable to the empirical
analysis of competition. The mismatch between the new theoretical under-
standing of the concept of competition and its empirical interpretation largely
stems from the di culty to distinguish it from the idea of market structure,
which is often conceived as (a combination of) the number of firms present in
a market and their relative market share or dominance. Identifying competi-
tion with market structure has in turn had large implications for the exercise
of economic regulation. In particular, antitrust policy often relies on static
tools (e.g., measures of market concentration) to asses market power and even
evaluate changes in competitive environments (e.g., due to firm entry, exit, or
a merger). Distinguishing competition from market structure is crucial espe-
cially if competition is to be perceived as a dynamic process of rivalry1. To
better understand the concept of competition, it is therefore necessary to study
the di↵erent forms of rivalry (i.e. the actions that firms engage in to fight
competitors), instruments of rivalry (i.e. the tools or strategic variables that
firms use against competitors), incentives for rivalry (i.e. the monetary and
non-monetary rewards from rivalry) and types of rivals (Vickers, 1995).
This thesis empirically examines the impact of di↵erent forms of rivalry on
market outcomes (e.g., price and quantity) in an attempt to distinguish the
concept of competition from market structure. The empirical strategy is to use
1Stigler (1987) defines competition as ”rivalry between individuals (or groups or nations),
which arises whenever two or more parties strive for something that all cannot obtain”.
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economic theory as a starting point in determining the incentives for rivalry
in order to measure the intensity of competition. For example, competition is
likely to be more intense when firms have reputation-building incentives (Chap-
ter 2), face threatening rivals (Chapter 3) or are positioned relatively close to
competitors (Chapter 4). The measured intensity is in turn used to determine
the impact of competition (primarily) on market price outcomes. A significant
part of this thesis (Chapters 2 and 3) focuses on forms and instruments of rivalry
that firms may deploy to maintain or expand their dominance and even restrain
competition, which would be deemed as anticompetitive (e.g., tacit collusion,
entry deterrence and predation). Anticompetitive behaviour is especially im-
portant to examine in this context due to the implications for antitrust policy,
which has traditionally viewed competition as a static construct rather than a
dynamic process of rivalry and has struggled to disassociate it from the market
structure (Schmalensee, 2000; Audretsch et al, 2001; Sidak and Teece, 2009).
1.1 The empirical setting
The setting of the empirical analysis is the U.S. airline industry. The motiva-
tion for choosing the airline industry is twofold. First, it presents a setting
with large variation in forms of rivalry and good conditions to empirically
identify them. This occurs because airlines simultaneously operate in multi-
ple distinct markets and interact regularly with competitors. In addition, the
absence of significant sunk costs and the relative ease of entry and exit led
to a large number of changes in the competitive environments in which air-
lines operate. This helps to observe how the same airlines react to changes in
di↵erent market contexts, which is insightful for drawing a link between the
incentives for rivalry, forms of rivalry and types of rival. Second, the airline
industry is significant in its own merit. It is a major economic force with re-
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gards to its own operations, having an estimated direct contribution to Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) of approximately 4.2% in North America, 4.1% in
Europe and 3.6% at a global scale (ATAG, 2016). Moreover, it has a large
impact on regional economic development and on many other industries (e.g.,
aircraft manufacturing, business services and tourism), and plays an integral
role in the creation of a global economy (Belobaba et al, 2016). The airline
industry is also interesting from a policy perspective since airlines have often
been accused of alleged anticompetitive behaviour.
The following subsection highlights the relevance of the airline industry
to the study of the dynamics of competitive and anticompetitive behaviour
by presenting a brief history of the U.S. airline industry and discussing the
evolution of airline competition as well as recent industry developments.
1.1.1 A brief history of U.S. airline competition
Airlines throughout the world were heavily regulated for many decades since
the foundation of commercial aviation in the 1920s. In the U.S., regulation
was formalised by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, which established an in-
dependent regulatory agency, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). The CAB
had many authorities, among others to control carrier entry into the industry,
control entry and exit of existing carriers into new or existing routes, regu-
late fares, control mergers and intercarrier agreements, and investigate alleged
anticompetitive practices (Bailey et al, 1985). During the regulated era, em-
pirical support was accumulating for the view that the industry’s economic
performance was deficient. For example, some studies compared regulated in-
terstate with unregulated intrastate airline routes to show that unregulated
airlines o↵ered significantly lower fares and better route service compared to
airlines that were subject to CAB regulation (Caves, 1962; Levine, 1965; Jor-
4
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dan, 1970; Keeler, 1972; Douglas and Miller, 1974). Other studies argued that
economies of scale and barriers to entry in the airline industry are low and
that the industry is relatively contestable, suggesting that economic regulation
is unnecessary (Koontz, 1951; Proctor and Duncan, 1954; Cherrington, 1958;
Gordon, 1965; Eads et al., 1969; Straszheim, 1969; Murphy, 1969; White, 1979;
Bailey and Panzar, 1981; Baumol et al., 1982). The combination of the above
empirical evidence and significant technological innovations that the CAB was
failing to cope with (e.g., the development of ”jumbo jets” in the 1970s) gradu-
ally led to a political consensus for the deregulation of the industry (Goetz and
Vowles, 2009). This process was initiated by the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, which proposed a gradual relaxation of the CAB’s authorities2. Airlines
were therefore able to make all decisions with regards to entry, exit and fares
as a result of the Airline Deregulation Act. Some of the remaining authorities
of the CAB, primarily regarding the control of mergers, acquisitions and in-
tercarrier agreements, and antitrust regulation were initially transferred to the
Department of Transportation and later to the Department of Justice.
Airline deregulation in the U.S. was widely perceived as a success, espe-
cially due to the resulting lower fares, higher output in terms of passenger
movements and increase in productive e ciency (Levine, 2006; Morrison and
Winston, 2008; Peltzman and Winston, 2011)3. This in turn led to increasing
pressure on governments around the world to follow the example of the U.S.,
which gradually prompted an airline deregulation/liberalisation movement at
the global scale. Following the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, the U.S. airline
industry experienced significant entry (and exit) waves, which can be organised
2The CAB’s authorities with respect to the control of entry and exit in routes ended in
December 1981 and its authorities with respect to fare regulation ended in January 1983.
The CAB ceased to exist in December 1984 and its remaining authorities were transferred to
other institutions, such as the Department of Transportation.
3For an extensive review of the positive and negative aspects of U.S. airline deregulation,
you may refer to Goetz and Vowles (2009).
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Figure 1.1 The genealogy of major U.S. airlines since the beginning of commercial aviation.
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into several phases (Goetz and Vowles, 2009). First, the period immediately
following the deregulation (1978-1983), which was characterised by significant
entry by existing regional carriers and newly established airlines into markets
that were previously protected by the CAB. Second, a decade of significant
industry consolidation (1983-1993), mainly due to mergers and acquisitions by
large incumbent airlines. Third, a new entry wave accompanied by the expan-
sion of low-cost carriers (1993-2001), a newly established airline business model
o↵ering primarily low-fare travel options. A significant event in the history of
the U.S. (and global) airline industry were the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, after which the industry experienced a short-term shutdown followed
by a prolonged period of low demand due to economic recession and negative
supply shocks (e.g., strict security restrictions and increased fuel costs). Ito
and Lee (2005) report a significant negative transitory and demand shock for
the industry as a result of the attacks. They also suggest that the demand
for and experience of air travel significantly changed after the attacks due to
adjusted passenger perceptions with respect to the risk of flying. In the fi-
nal phase (2001-2018), the airline industry experienced a long recovery period
from the September 11 attacks followed by several years of financial turbulence
(mainly as a result of rising fuel costs and an unstable demand for travel) and
a new wave of consolidation that reduced the number of U.S. legacy carriers
from eight to three (Carlton et al, 2019).
The deregulated era was not only characterised by significant changes to the
market structure due to entry and exit but also to changes in the strategic con-
duct of airlines. For example, several types of pricing strategies emerged under
deregulation: (i) o↵ering limited and restricted discount fares (e.g., advance
purchase discounts), which is a common legacy carrier practice, (ii) o↵ering
low restricted fares, which is a common low-cost carrier practice, (iii) other
7
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types of pricing strategies, such as peak load pricing, quantity discounts and
frequent flyer discounts. In addition, there was a significant rise in price disper-
sion largely due to the increasing use of price discrimination by legacy carriers.
Fares began to better reflect di↵erences in cost but also the quality of service
demanded (e.g., luxury service or ticket flexibility) in an increasing e↵ort by air-
lines to distinguish between di↵erent types of passengers and extract their full
willingness to pay (Bailey et al, 1985; Belobaba et al, 2016). Finally, increas-
ing competition from low-cost carriers and decreasing margins led to aggressive
strategic responses by legacy carriers in an e↵ort to protect their market share
and eliminate threatening competitors (Goolsbee and Syverson, 2008). This
often resulted in cases of alleged anticompetitive behaviour, such as collusion,
entry deterrence and predation, which are studied extensively in this thesis.
1.2 Thesis outline
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. The empirical study con-
sists of two parts. The first part (Chapters 2 and 3) studies changes in market
structure due to firm entry, exit or a merger to investigate the strategic be-
haviour of incumbent and entrant firms. This part focuses on three types of
anticompetitive practices that incumbent firms may deploy to maintain or ex-
pand their market dominance: tacit collusion, entry deterrence and predation.
The second part of the empirical study (Chapter 4) takes market structure as
given instead of examining changes in market structure as in the first part. For
a given market structure, I study the impact of the intensity of competition on
price outcomes in a dynamic pricing setting. Finally, Chapter 5 summarises
the most important findings in order to provide an overall conclusion together
with some recommendations for future research. A detailed description of the
work carried out in each chapter of the empirical study follows below.
8
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In Chapter 2, I provide an estimate of the price premium that consumers
pay as a result of anticompetitive behaviour in monopoly and duopoly mar-
kets by examining within-market changes in structure due to firm entry and
exit. The identification strategy entails distinguishing market structures based
on the competitive history of a given market and presents a novel framework
to identify firm engagement in anticompetitive behaviour. Using a rich panel
dataset of 6,298 routes from the U.S. airline industry between 1993 and 2014,
I find that quiet life duopolies price significantly higher than duopolies that
come about by entry in monopoly, and that quiet life monopolies price signif-
icantly lower than monopolies that come about by exit in duopoly (but still
significantly higher than both types of duopoly). The price di↵erences are
economically significant in both cases and provide an estimate of the price of
(tacit) collusion in duopoly and the price of entry deterrence (i.e. limit pricing)
in monopoly. These findings reveal the presence of significant price hetero-
geneity between homogeneous good markets that are seemingly identical when
viewed in terms of their market structure.
In Chapter 3, I empirically examine the post-entry price and capacity re-
sponse of incumbent monopolists in 256 incumbent-entrant fights with a winner
in the U.S. airline industry. The empirical analysis provides evidence for in-
cumbent behaviour that is consistent with predation, i.e. engagement in short-
term irrational actions that e↵ectively lead to competitor exit, restoration of
monopoly power and increased future profits. The novelty of the empirical
analysis in this chapter is to use incumbent capacity to identify predatory be-
haviour, which helps overcome the hurdles of standard predation tests compar-
ing price to cost. I exploit the fact that it is unprofitable to increase available
capacity after entry since quantities are strategic substitutes for competitors. I
show that incumbents who increase capacity after entry are more likely to elim-
9
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inate competition, restore their monopoly position and exploit market power
by raising prices after the exit of their rival. This chapter also studies preda-
tion motives to investigate why certain incumbents react predatory and others
do not. The empirical results reveal that pre-entry incumbent capacity is a
key determinant of the response to entry.
Finally, Chapter 4 builds on the extensive theoretical literature on advance
purchase discounts (APDs) in the dynamic pricing of perishable goods under
demand uncertainty to test the hypothesis that the discounts o↵ered by firms
to consumers who purchase tickets in advance increase with the intensity of
competition. This result is driven in theory by firms’ incentive to capture con-
sumers with more certain demands who are willing to purchase early and to
prevent losing them to their rivals in the future. For the empirical analysis, I
collect a unique panel dataset of airline fare quotes for more than 2,300 flights in
the 100 busiest U.S. domestic routes based on the number of yearly transported
passengers, which allows me to track the listed prices of all carriers operating
flights in those routes for 95 days prior to the departure. I develop a new mea-
sure of competition by using the proximity (in departure time) of a given flight
to its competitors to estimate the intensity of competition between firms. To
estimate the impact of competition on APDs and the dynamic pricing of air-
lines, I exploit plausibly exogenous changes in flight schedules due to departure
time changes or flight cancellations that occur during the booking period. The
econometric evidence provides strong support for the hypothesis that APDs (as
well as price dispersion) increase with the intensity of competition.
10
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Chapter 2
The price of anticompetitive
behaviour in the U.S. airline industry
”The best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life.”
John R. Hicks (1935)
2.1 Introduction
Hick’s (1935) quote generally applies to all firms with market power and markets
where the e cient scale of production is large in relation to the level of demand.
A good example is local markets in which consumers can only choose among a
limited number of firms. This limited choice can be the result of firms engaging
in anticompetitive behaviour, as it is to their benefit to devise strategies that
prevent or reduce competitive pressures. Examples from the economic literature
are (tacit) collusion and preemptive practices, such as limit pricing. These
practices are in most cases di cult to detect and can thus be under the radar
of competition authorities. In this chapter, we identify the price that consumers
†This chapter is based on the working paper titled ”The Price of Anticompetitive Behaviour:
Evidence from the U.S. Airline Industry” and is joint work with Enrico Pennings and Peran
van Revan.
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pay as a result of such anticompetitive behaviour. Our identification strategy
entails distinguishing market structures based on the competitive history of a
given market. This is done by examining changes in structure that come about
because of firm entry in monopoly markets and firm exit in duopoly markets.
In the case of duopoly, we distinguish between duopolies with a quiet life
(e.g., having the same market structure for a long time) and duopolies that
come about by firm entry in a monopoly. Based on theory, prices in a non-
collusive duopoly are lower than in a monopoly, ranging from the competitive
outcome (Bertrand competition) to the Cournot level. However, when firms
engage in (tacit) collusion, they can achieve higher price equilibria and even
reach a monopoly outcome. We anticipate di↵erent price outcomes for those two
types of duopolies due to the di↵erence in competitive conduct between firms.
The reason is that duopolists have incentives to live and let live in markets
in which they are present for a long time, while entry in a monopoly generally
leads to sustained aggressive competitive behaviour. Thus, comparing the price
outcome of quiet life duopolies to that of (new) duopolies resulting from firm
entry allows us to identify the price markup of (tacit) collusion.
In the case of monopoly, we distinguish between monopolies with a quiet life
and monopolies that come about by firm exit in a duopoly. Theory suggests that
established monopolists have incentives to engage in entry deterring actions,
such as limit pricing. However, a firm in a monopoly that occurs after the exit
of its rival has created a reputation of being a tough competitor and is thus
less likely to fear entry. Comparing the price outcome of quiet life monopolies
to that of (new) monopolies resulting from firm exit allows us to identify the
price discount that a monopoly applies in order to prevent entry. Actual entry
would likely lead to even lower prices, and our analysis also allows us to infer
the markup that consumers pay as a result of monopolists being successful in
14
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blockading entry. We do so by comparing the quiet life monopoly price to the
price outcome of a duopoly that comes about by firm entry in monopoly.
Using a rich dataset of 6,298 routes from the U.S. airline industry between
1993 and 2014, we test for the presence of significant price di↵erences between
route periods of identical market structure but di↵erent history. Our empirical
analysis exploits within market variation, where cost and demand functions are
likely to be una↵ected by entry and/or exit. As a result, changes in prices can
be assumed to result directly from changes in the exploitation of market power
by firms. In accordance with our hypotheses, we find that a quiet life duopoly
prices significantly higher compared to a duopoly that comes about by entry in
monopoly and that a quiet life monopoly prices significantly lower compared to
a monopoly that comes about by exit in duopoly, but still significantly higher
than both types of duopoly. The price di↵erence is economically significant in
both cases and provides an estimate of the price of (tacit) collusion in duopoly
and the price of entry deterrence in monopoly.
We correct our estimates for potential endogeneity in the determination of
market structure by estimating a market tightness control term a` la Bresna-
han and Reiss (1991). Our conclusions are robust after controlling for relative
market size and profitability, and market specific factors such as market growth
and decline. We also rule out that the estimated price di↵erences are driven
by firm adjustment behaviour after the change from monopoly to duopoly (and
vice versa). Both estimated price coe cients are not found to be decreasing
over time. This implies that (i) lower prices following entry in monopoly are
not driven by a short-lived price war between firms and that (ii) higher prices
following exit in duopoly are not due to a slow transition over time, as our
results show that new monopolists increase prices relatively fast and maintain
those at a higher level after the exit of their competitor.
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The airline industry is particularly interesting to examine in this context as
it presents an environment in which firms simultaneously operate in multiple
distinct markets and interact regularly with competitors. The large number of
markets o↵ers significant variation in market structure but also in competitive
conduct. Our sample includes many markets with a quiet life since a large
proportion of routes has not experienced changes in market structure since the
deregulation of the industry in 1978. In addition, the absence of significant
sunk costs and the relative ease of entry and exit led to a significant num-
ber of monopolies that experienced firm entry and duopolies that experienced
firm exit. Furthermore, U.S. airline markets have traditionally exhibited high
concentration rates, with the majority of routes being monopolies until today.
Bailey and Panzar (1981) report that nearly 70 percent of domestic routes were
monopolies in 1980; this is reduced to an average of 56 percent in the years
covered by our sample. Uncovering the price of anticompetitive behaviour is
particularly relevant in this context as the consequences for consumer welfare
can be significant given the degree of market concentration.
Our research contributes to the literature on detecting anticompetitive be-
haviour. Collusion has been examined in the economic literature mainly in
the context of laboratory experiments and in the form of case studies often
following the detection of a cartel (Porter, 2005). In addition, previous work
has attempted to identify collusion by means of structural analysis (for a recent
overview, see Ciliberto and Williams, 2014). Entry deterrence has only been ex-
amined indirectly, either by evaluating the impact of actual entry through com-
parison of pre- and post-entry prices (Simon, 2005) or by looking at the price
response of firms when they are threatened (Goolsbee and Syverson, 2008). As
a result, there is limited empirical evidence available to support the extensive
theoretical literature on both the occurrence and sustainability of collusive and
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entry deterring strategies. This is largely due to the fact that these strategies
are surreptitious and thus di cult to detect in practice. Our work contributes
to the empirical literature by presenting a novel strategy to identify potential
engagement in anticompetitive behaviour, which can also be applied to other
contexts where firms simultaneously compete in multiple markets and o↵er a
relatively homogeneous good. Finally, this chapter extends and has direct impli-
cations for the empirical literature on airline pricing (Brander and Zhang, 1990;
1993; Evans and Kessides, 1994; Kwoka and Shumilkina, 2010) and price disper-
sion (Borenstein and Rose, 1994; Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009; Dai et al, 2014).
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents
the theoretical motivation leading to the development of our hypotheses. Sec-
tion 2.3 introduces the data and empirical methodology, and Section 2.4 presents
the results of our main and robustness analyses. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Quiet and non-quiet life markets
Uncovering the price of anticompetitive behaviour requires identifying markets
of the same structure that di↵er only in terms of competitive conduct. We
distinguish between two types of markets: (i) quiet life markets that have not
(yet) experienced a change in structure and (ii) non-quiet life markets that have
been disrupted by firm entry and/or exit. A quiet life market o↵ers the right
conditions for anticompetitive conduct to arise, which allows us to quantify
the price of anticompetitive behaviour. We review the theory and empirical
evidence that shows these markets to be di↵erent below.
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2.2.1 Duopoly
Dynamic considerations in oligopoly led to the development of (tacit) collusion
theory in which firms with non-cooperative motives can achieve cooperative
equilibria. Under certain conditions, firms have incentives to collude by mutu-
ally increasing prices or decreasing output, as the fear of a price war prevents
them from reaping the short-term gains of non-cooperation. In a game theoretic
context, (tacit) collusion is more likely when firms interact repeatedly (Tirole,
1988). When the interaction between firms is limited or the frequency of price
adjustment is slow, firms may prioritise short term gains. Economic theory
has identified several other factors that may facilitate a collusive equilibrium,
which are usually descriptive of the industry or market structure. For example,
a lower number of firms and higher degree of market concentration, product
homogeneity and multimarket contact have been shown to facilitate collusive
practices in the theoretical literature (Ivaldi et al, 2003). Given that we exam-
ine a specific industry and market structure, we are interested in conditions that
may di↵erentiate firm conduct in otherwise identical markets. Holding the firm,
industry and product characteristics constant, we argue that collusive conduct
is more likely to occur in a quiet life compared to a non-quiet life duopoly.
A quiet life implies a stable market environment in which firms get to know
their competitors well. This may induce firms in a duopoly to employ a live
and let live attitude (Friedman, 1977; Ivaldi et al, 2003). Firms can then main-
tain higher prices by refraining from undercutting competitors and by tacitly
agreeing that any deviation from this collusive coordination would trigger some
form of retaliation. Collusion will then become sustainable when the short-term
deviation profits are lower than the net present value of the future cooperation
profits. The longer and more predictable the future is, the higher the chance
of collusion. In addition, the lack of change in market structure may limit
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the perceived prospect of future entry and increase the scope of retaliation.
Firms in a quiet life market develop a sort of mutual trust that motivates
them to maintain a (tacit) collusive agreement and have little incentive to act
in their short-term interest by breaking it.
On the contrary, a non-quiet life market does not present the right condi-
tions for firms to collude as entry disrupts firm interaction. Theory predicts
equilibria much closer to the competitive level because firms engage in tougher
competitive conduct. Firm entry may a↵ect competition and price outcomes, as
incumbents reduce prices post-entry to drive entrants out of the market and de-
ter future entry (Baumol et al, 1982). Firm entry can have significant impact
on competitive conduct, especially in concentrated markets. Bresnahan and
Reiss (1991) measure the e↵ect of firm entry in concentrated markets and find
that entry in monopoly is su cient to obtain close to competitive outcomes.
A sustained aggressive post-entry price response can be justified if firms place
importance on building a reputation of being a tough competitor. This repu-
tation may be valuable for firms because it reduces the expected profitability
of entry and may thus deter potential entrants.
Assuming that a non-quiet life market will yield normal duopoly price and
profit outcomes (i.e. somewhere between the Bertrand and Cournot equilib-
rium), identifying a significant di↵erence in prices between the two market types
would indicate firm engagement in (tacit) collusive practices. In turn, compar-
ing the two price outcomes gives an estimate of the price of (tacit) collusion
for consumers in those markets. The above framework leads to the following hy-
pothesis.
Hypothesis 1: A quiet life duopoly will exhibit a higher price outcome com-
pared to a non-quiet life duopoly.
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2.2.2 Monopoly
Contestable market theory motivates the use of entry deterrence strategies,
such as limit pricing, as a device against the threat of entry (Baumol et al,
1982). An established monopolist in a quiet life market has strong incentives
to protect its market power by engaging in entry deterrence and may charge
a lower price to make entry appear less profitable to potential competitors or
to signal its capacity to fight in the case that entry does take place. Such a
monopolist is essentially willing to sacrifice profits in the short-run in order to
maintain its quiet life in the market. Empirical evidence has indeed confirmed
that monopolists do respond to the threat of entry. In the context of the airline
industry, Masson and Shaanan (1986) show that both lower prices and greater
excess capacity hinder entry in the airline industry. Peteraf and Reed (1994)
also provide indirect evidence of limit pricing by finding a positive relationship
between competitors’ cost and the price of the monopolist. Moreover, Goolsbee
and Syverson (2008) identify routes with a high probability of future entry and
find that incumbents cut fares significantly on these routes. They report further
that more than half of the total impact on incumbent fares occurs pre-entry.
On the contrary, a monopolist in a non-quiet life market has little incentive
to engage in entry deterrence. The incumbent in a market that came about
as the result of firm exit in duopoly benefits from its established reputation
and may not need to engage in costly actions intended to prevent entry. Being
the sole survivor, a monopolist in a non-quiet life market has demonstrated
its capacity to drive competitors out of the market. Since these past dealings
are observable by other firms that may be considering entry, the established
reputation is likely su cient as an entry deterring mechanism. In that case,
firms would not need to engage in strategies such as limit pricing to protect
their market share. This implies that a monopoly in a non-quiet life market
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would exhibit a higher price outcome compared to a monopoly in a quiet life
market and identification of a significant di↵erence in the price outcome of the
two market types would indicate firm engagement in entry deterrence practices,
such as limit pricing. The above framework leads to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: A quiet life monopoly will exhibit a lower price outcome com-
pared to a non-quiet life monopoly.
2.3 Data and methodology
2.3.1 Sample
We test our hypotheses by using ticket price data from the U.S. airline indus-
try. Our full panel data set includes over 300,000 unique carrier-route-quarter
observations in 88 quarters between 1993 and 2014. We construct this by using
three main sources of data. First, we obtain airline ticket prices from the Air-
line Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B), which is collected by the O ce of
Airline Information of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS). DB1B is
a 10% random sample of airline tickets from reporting carriers and includes the
origin, destination and itinerary details of the passengers transported. Second,
we obtain supplementary characteristics for each route from the T-100 Domestic
Segment (T-100) database, which is also maintained by the BTS. T-100 con-
tains domestic non-stop segment data reported by U.S. air carriers on a monthly
basis. It includes information on all passengers transported by the reporting
carrier including origin, destination, aircraft type and service class, available ca-
pacity, scheduled departures, departures performed and load factor. Finally, we
obtain airport location and regional demographic information from the Regional
Economic Accounts (REA) database of the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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In accordance with previous literature on airline pricing (Borenstein and
Rose, 1994; Goolsbee and Syverson, 2008; Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009; Dai et
al, 2014), we create a sample that includes non-stop, domestic, one way or
round trip, economy class itineraries. We use the same principles employed by
previous literature in merging the di↵erent data sources and constructing our
final sample. Ticket prices are defined based on the one-way fare. In the case of
a round trip, we divide the total fare of the itinerary by two and drop the return
portion of the trip to avoid double counting. In our final panel dataset, the
unit of observation is a given carrier (the firm) in a specific route (the market)
and year-quarter (the time period). For example, a Delta Airlines (DL) flight
from New York Newark (EWR) to San Francisco (SFO) in the first quarter of
2014 represents one observation in our sample, while a DL flight from SFO to
EWR in the same quarter is a di↵erent observation. In our main results, we
define a route on an airport-to-airport basis. This implies that a flight from
New York Newark (EWR) and New York John F. Kennedy (JFK) to the same
airport destination represent di↵erent observations.
2.3.2 Methodology
We use within-market changes in structure as a result of firm entry and exit
in order to identify quiet and non-quiet life markets and to quantify the price
of anticompetitive behaviour. The airline industry presents a unique context
in which firms simultaneously operate in multiple distinct markets. This of-
fers significant variation in both market structure and competitive conduct
even with a small number of firms. We provide a description of the variables
employed in our empirical specifications below.
Our dependent variable is the logarithm of the median price of the distri-
bution of airline ticket prices at the carrier-route-quarter level. The correlation
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between the median and average price in our sample is high. We choose the
former to facilitate comparison with other price percentiles used in our panel
analysis to investigate whether the estimated e↵ects are also present at di↵er-
ent levels of the price distribution. We define three market structure groups:
monopoly (mono), duopoly (duo) and competitive. Following previous litera-
ture (Borenstein and Rose, 1994), we define a route as a monopoly if a single
carrier has a market share higher than 90%. We define a route as a duopoly
if the sum of market shares of the two largest carriers is higher than 90% and
the route is not a monopoly. Finally, if a route is neither a monopoly nor a
duopoly we consider it to be competitive, which is our reference category.
We create the following dummy variables to identify changes in market
structure: (i) monoduo for routes that change from monopoly to duopoly, (ii)
duomono for routes that change from duopoly to monopoly, (iii) compduo for
routes that change from competitive to duopoly, and (iv) compmono for routes
that change from competitive to monopoly. It is not necessary to include the
remaining two market structure change indicators (monocomp and duocomp)
as they concern competitive markets, which is our reference category. Monoduo
and duomono are the changes in market structure of interest and identify a non-
quiet life duopoly and a non-quiet life monopoly, respectively. Compduo and
compmono function as control variables in our empirical model. They identify
duopolies and monopolies that come about after firm exit in competitive mar-
kets, which would not classify as quiet life markets according to our definition.
Since changes in structure materialise through carrier entry or exit, we use
the quarter in which entry or exit takes place as the cuto↵ point for the iden-
tification. We define the period of all quarters before entry with no change
in market structure as the pre-entry period and the period from the quarter
of entry and after with no change in market structure as the post-entry pe-
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Figure 2.1 Illustrative example of a change from monopoly to duopoly as used in the main
and robustness analyses for the identification of monoduo.
riod. Similarly for the case of exit, we define a pre-exit and a post-exit period.
For a change to be identified, the pre-entry and post-entry periods (or pre-exit
and post-exit periods, equivalently) must be at least four quarters long. This
rule is meant to prevent small changes in carrier shares around the predefined
share thresholds from being identified as changes in market structure. The
dummy variables for changes in structure are equal to 1 in the post-entry (or
post-exit) period when the rule holds and equal to 0 otherwise1. An example
change from monopoly to duopoly is used to illustrate the construction of the
market structure change indicators in Figure 2.1.
1Note that the pre-entry/pre-exit period will be left-censored in routes that existed before
1993. Left censoring may lead to an underestimation of the price of anticompetitive behaviour
if entry/exit took place before our sample period and is therefore not likely to hinder our
identification. In addition, about 36% of the monoduo and duomono routes in our data
experience more than one change in market structure in the sample period, which implies
that mono and duo are not always left censored. An example is a monopoly that changes to
duopoly after carrier entry and returns back to monopoly after carrier exit (monoduomono).
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 Monopoly Duopoly Competitive 
Number of routes   173,126 97,557 35,714 
 (56%)  (32%) (12%) 
Ln(P10) 4.51 4.50 4.49 
 (0.478) (0.428) (0.444) 
Ln(P25) 4.77 4.75 4.75 
 (0.444) (0.401) (0.410) 
Ln(P50) 5.11  5.07 5.06 
 (0.458) (0.421) (0.410) 
Ln(PMean) 5.19 5.12 5.06 
 (0.478) (0.455) (0.432) 
Ln(P75) 5.50 5.47 5.42 
 (0.515) (0.497) (0.460) 
Ln(P90) 5.78 5.77 5.74 
 (0.551) (0.535) (0.510) 
    
 Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics per market structure group. Ln(P{i}) for i = 10, 25, 50, 75,
90 denotes the natural logarithm of the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th price percentile of the
route-fare distribution, respectively. Ln(PMean) denotes the natural logarithm of the mean
price of the route-fare distribution. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses (unless
otherwise indicated).
2.3.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.1 provides details on the di↵erent market structure groups in our sam-
ple and presents summary statistics on our dependent variable, the logarithm
of the median ticket price, and other price percentiles per market structure.
Out of a total of 306,397 unique route-carrier-quarter observations, approxi-
mately 56% are monopoly, 32% are duopoly and 12% are competitive markets.
Our choice to focus on market structure changes at high levels of concentration
is highly relevant, since the largest part of routes in our sample are monop-
olies and duopolies. Figure 2.2 shows the relative proportion of monopoly,
duopoly and competitive routes for the years covered by our sample. Except
from a small increase in the percentage of monopolies at the beginning of the
sample period and a slight downward trend in the proportion of duopolies,
we do not observe significant changes in the shares of the three market struc-
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Figure 2.2 Development of the relative share of the three market structure groups
(monopoly, duopoly and competitive) over time in our sample period.
ture groups. Our sample contains 19,502 observations where monoduo is 1
and 18,251 observations where duomono is 1. These are about 20% and 11%
of the total number of observations for duopoly and monopoly, respectively.
On average, the duration of monoduo in our sample is about 3.2 years, while
the duration of duomono is about 4.8 years.
We look for preliminary evidence in support of our hypotheses by exploring
potential price discrepancies between quiet and non-quiet life routes. Figure
2.3 presents the median fare for di↵erent distance groups in a (non-)quiet life
monopoly and duopoly. There are 20 distance groups on the horizontal axis
with distance increasing in the group number. The first distance group includes
all flights of less than 300 miles and the cuto↵ point for the rest of the groups
is set to 100 miles, i.e. group 2 includes flights of 300-400 miles, group 3 of
400-500 miles etc. As expected, the median fare is in both cases increasing in
distance, but we are interested in di↵erences between quiet and non-quiet life
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Figure 2.3 Average ticket price per distance group for quiet and non-quiet life monopolies
and duopolies.
routes. Indeed, we observe a clear di↵erence in median prices between quiet and
non-quiet life routes in monopoly. As we would expect based on our hypotheses,
median prices are consistently higher in a non-quiet life monopoly. However, we
observe no clear di↵erence in the median price between the two duopoly groups.
This is likely due to the di↵erentiation in the composition of duopolies, which
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are by definition less homogeneous. Nevertheless, additional econometric anal-
ysis to control for market, carrier and time characteristics is required to ensure
that the comparison between quiet and non-quiet life routes is meaningful.
2.3.4 Estimation
We exploit the panel structure of our data and estimate fixed e↵ects models
that allow us to control for time invariant carrier and route heterogeneity. We
additionally include carrier-quarter fixed e↵ects to all specifications to ensure
that our results are not driven by changes in unobserved factors that are time
and/or firm specific. This implies that we do not need to explicitly control for
factors such as type of carrier, firm financial performance and Chapter 7 or 11
protection filings as is usually the case in the airline pricing literature. In addi-
tion, the advantage of using carrier-quarter fixed e↵ects in our specifications is
that we can capture much more of the unobserved time and/or carrier variation
compared to using standard control variables. This is possible in our empirical
analysis because our dataset includes a large number of routes per operating
carrier and date. We use the within variation in the data for the estimation of
our coe cients by examining price changes in each market, with entry and exit
having an instrumental role in our identification. This ensures that the e↵ects
are not caused by unobserved variation at the cross-sectional level.
In addition, we control for potential market growth or decline by means
of the control variables defined in Table 2.2. These control variables were first
introduced by Borenstein and Rose (1994) and have been frequently employed in
the airline pricing literature in order to capture exogenous variation in market
size (Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009; Dai et al, 2014). Using these controls is
important since our coe cients are estimated by exploiting within-market price
variation. We therefore want to ensure that our identified coe cients are not
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Variable Definition Mean St. dev. Min Max 
 
ln(ameanpop) 
Logarithm of the average 
population at end-point 
airport metropolitan areas 
 
15.04 
 
0.705 
 
11.25 
 
16.63 
 
ln(ameanpop)2 
 
 
Square of ln(ameanpop) 
 
226.8 
 
21.12 
 
126.5 
 
276.5 
 
genp 
General enplanement index 
(Gerardi and Shapiro, 
2009) 
 
0.675 
 
0.327 
 
0 
 
1 
 
genp2 
 
 
Square of genp 
 
0.563 
 
0.403 
 
0 
 
1 
      
Table 2.2 Definition and summary statistics for the market size control variables (Borenstein
and Rose, 1994).
biased as a result of market growth or decline. For example, growth in market
size may result in firms enjoying higher price premia over time and is thus
likely to bias our estimated coe cients upwards.
We estimate the following reduced-form pricing equation:
Ln(P50)ijt =  1monojt +  2 duojt +  1monoduojt +  2 duomonojt
+  1 compduojt +  2 compmonojt +Xjt ⇣ + ↵ij + ⌘it + "ijt
(2.1)
where i indexes the carrier, j the route, and t the year-quarter. Ln(P50)ijt is
the logarithm of the median price of the fare distribution, monojt and duojt
are the monopoly and duopoly indicators, monoduojt, duomonojt, compduojt
and compmonojt are the market structure change indicators, Xjt is the vector
of market size controls, ↵ij and ⌘it denote the fixed e↵ects, and "ijt is an error
term. We are interested in the sign and significance of the coe cients  1 and  2.
By estimating coe cients that are significantly di↵erent from zero, we directly
show that monopoly and duopoly pricing is di↵erent in quiet and non-quiet
life markets. According to our hypotheses, we expect  1 to be negative and
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 2 to be positive. A negative  1 implies that a quiet life duopoly has a higher
price premium relative to a competitive market than a non-quiet life duopoly
( 2 +  1 <  2). Similarly, a positive  2 implies that a quiet life monopoly has
a lower price premium relative to a competitive market than a non-quiet life
monopoly ( 1 <  1 +  2). Compduojt and compmonojt explicitly control for
duopolies and monopolies that emerge from firm exit in a competitive market.
Using the four market structure change indicators we thus model all possible
ways in which a monopoly or duopoly can emerge. We correct our standard
errors by taking correlation within a given route into account. This is necessary
since the logarithm of the median price varies at the carrier and route level,
while our key independent variables are route specific2.
Another concern is that market concentration can be endogenously deter-
mined in relation to the extent of a given market. Highly concentrated markets
tend to have higher prices, but higher prices may at the same time signal that a
given market is profitable and thus attract firms to enter. A number of papers
in the airline pricing literature (Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009; Dai et al, 2014)
address this concern by means of instrumental variables (IV). Instruments that
are correlated with the extent of a market and uncorrelated with "ijt can be
used to estimate the coe cients  1,  2,  1,  2,  1 and  2 consistently. How-
ever, such instruments are di cult to find, and in many cases poorly related
to the market structure variables (a weak instrument problem)3. E cient es-
timation becomes particularly di cult in our application, which requires six
market structure variables to be estimated by means of IV.
2Clustering our standard errors takes potential heteroskedasticity into account but is also
helpful in eliminating potential problems caused by serial correlation at the carrier-route
level, especially given that N is significantly larger than T .
3In our application, the instruments proposed by Borenstein and Rose (1994), and Gerardi
and Shapiro (2009) can be statistically demonstrated to be invalid and weakly relevant, thus
leading to inconsistent estimation of Equation 2.1.
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We take an alternative approach to correct for endogeneity in our analysis.
This involves the estimation of an entry model that describes the determination
of the number of firms in a market. Bresnahan and Reiss (1990; 1991) empir-
ically analysed the determinants of market structure by specifying models in
which the observed number of competitors is the outcome of a strategic game
between firms considering whether or not to enter a market. In later appli-
cations, Berry (1992), Mazzeo (2002) and Manuszak and Moul (2008) showed
that such models can be used to create correction terms that account for non-
random variation in the regression of price on market structure. Given correct
specification of the market structure determination model, this approach leads
to more e cient estimation compared to IV (Manuszak and Moul, 2008).
This implies a two-stage approach similar to the standard selection model
of Heckman (1979). In the first stage, the probability of observing a certain
number of firms is estimated based on some market structure determinants us-
ing an ordered probit maximum likelihood routine. Using the linear prediction
of the first-stage regression, a correction term is created that is used to account
for potential correlation between the market structure indicators and the error
term in the second-stage price regression4. Intuitively, this correction term can
be seen as a measure of tightness of a given market. On the one hand, if a given
market is tight, i.e. if the observed number of firms is greater than the predicted
number of firms by the first-stage model, then the probability of additional en-
try is small and the conduct of competition can be collusive. On the other
hand, if a given market is not tight then the probability of entry is relatively
high, which implies that the conduct in that market may be more competitive.
4For more details on the derivation of the endogeneity correction term employed in our
analysis, please refer to the Appendix.
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Addition of the endogeneity correction term to Equation 2.1 leads to the fol-
lowing specification, which will be used for interpreting coe cients and testing
our hypotheses:
Ln(P50)ijt =  1monojt +  2 duojt +  1monoduojt +  2 duomonojt
+  1 compduojt +  2 compmonojt + ⇠ Zijt +Xjt ⇣
+ ↵ij + ⌘it + "ijt
(2.2)
where Zijt denotes the endogeneity correction term and the other terms are the
same as in Equation 2.1. If our intuition on the direction of the endogeneity
bias is correct, we expect coe cient ⇠ to be positive; that is, the higher Zijt
is, the higher the observed number of firms relative to the expected number
of firms, which implies that additional entry is less likely and that the mar-
ket is relatively less contestable. This implies that endogeneity would bias
our market structure coe cients downwards.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
2.4.1 Main results
Table 2.3 reports the main results of our panel estimation. In the first column,
we estimate Equation 2.2 by letting  1,  2 6= 0 and all other coe cients equal to
zero, as a baseline model. We find that monopolies and duopolies in our sample
exhibit approximately 10.4% and 4.6% higher market prices compared to com-
petitive routes, respectively. These prices refer to all monopolies and duopolies
in our sample and do not take into account the markets’ competitive history.
A distinction between quiet and non-quiet life markets is made by re-
estimating the baseline model after including the market structure change in-
dicators for monopoly and duopoly ( 1,  2 6= 0). We single out transitions
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Panel A: Estimation results (1) (2) (3) (4) 
mono 0.104*** 0.093*** 0.067*** 0.079*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
duo 0.046*** 0.053*** 0.041*** 0.049*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
monoduo  -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.030*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
duomono  0.036*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
compduo  -0.025*** -0.025*** -0.027*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
compmono  0.014 0.008 0.022 
  (0.074) (0.062) (0.042) 
Z    0.006*** 
    (0.001) 
Market size controls     
ln(ameanpop)   5.566*** 7.001*** 
   (0.546) (0.686) 
ln(ameanpop)2   -0.191*** -0.240*** 
   (0.019) (0.024) 
genp   0.539*** 0.533*** 
   (0.039) (0.045) 
genp2   -0.302*** -0.292*** 
   (0.030) (0.033) 
Carrier-route FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Carrier-date FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 306,397 306,397 306,397 262,622 
     
Panel B: Markups relative to the competitive market 
Non-quiet life monopoly - 0.128*** 0.099*** 0.109*** 
Quiet life monopoly 0.104*** 0.093*** 0.067*** 0.079*** 
Quiet life duopoly 0.046*** 0.053*** 0.041*** 0.049*** 
Non-quiet life duopoly - 0.024*** 0.012* 0.020*** 
     
Table 2.3Main results of quiet and non-quiet life market pricing. FE denotes the fixed e↵ects
and clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated
by: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
from competitive markets to duopoly and monopoly by means of the market
structure change indicators compduo and compmono. This implies that the
coe cients of mono and duo can be now interpreted as the markups of quiet
life monopolies and duopolies, respectively. The results are presented in the
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second column of Table 2.3. In accordance with our hypotheses, we find that
 1 < 0 and  2 > 0. Thus, quiet life duopolies exhibit significantly higher
prices compared to non-quiet life duopolies. In addition, quiet life monopolies
exhibit significantly lower prices compared to non-quiet life monopolies. Mon-
oduo (duomono) is equal to 1 in the entire post-entry (post-exit) period, so the
estimated coe cients can be interpreted as average markups for non-quiet life
duopolies and monopolies. We also find  1 < 0 (compduo), which shows it is
important to control for duopolies that come about after exit in a competitive
market. Firms are unlikely to adopt a live and let live attitude in this type of
duopoly, which also lacks a quiet life. As a result, the estimated price markup
is lower compared to a quiet life duopoly. Finally, the estimated coe cient for
compmono is not significantly di↵erent from zero, likely because our sample
contains few cases of a direct change from competitive to monopoly.
Our conclusions do not change when correcting for potential changes in mar-
ket size and the endogeneity in the determination of market structure. Addition
of the market size controls in the third column of Table 2.3 leads to statisti-
cally significant coe cients for the four included controls and a reduction in
the estimated markups of monopoly and duopoly, which could be explained
by market growth over time. Despite the overall reduction of the estimated
markups, the di↵erence between quiet and non-quiet life markets is significant
in both monopoly and duopoly. In the fourth column of Table 2.3, we report
the output of our full model with the market structure change indicators, the
market size controls and the endogeneity correction term (Equation 2.2). As
expected, we estimate coe cient ⇠ to be positive and significant. This implies
that unobservables related to the extent of the market and correlated with "ijt
induce a negative bias on our market structure coe cients. This can be seen
by comparing the estimated coe cients for  1 and  2 in the third and fourth
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column of Table 2.3. Overall, we find the endogeneity bias in our sample to
be significant but relatively small. This is likely the case because a large part
of the variation is already captured by the fixed e↵ects.
The lower panel of Table 2.3 summarises the estimated markup of each
market structure category relative to a competitive route. These markups are
calculated by simply adding coe cients  2 and  1, and  1 and  2 to distinguish
quiet from non-quiet life markets in duopoly and monopoly, respectively. The
market structure categories are sorted on basis of (expected) market power,
which implies the following order: non-quiet life monopoly, quiet life monopoly,
quiet life duopoly, non-quiet life duopoly. The di↵erence in the estimated
markups is significant. In the last column of Table 2.3, we see that a non-
quiet life monopoly charges a price premium of approximately 10.9% relative
to a competitive market, while a non-quiet life duopoly only charges a pre-
mium of approximately 2%. Quiet life monopolies charge a premium of ap-
proximately 7.9% relative to a competitive market, while quiet life duopolies
charge a premium of approximately 4.9%.
By estimating di↵erent markups, we provide evidence of anticompetitive
practices being deployed by firms in quiet life markets. We can directly in-
fer the price of anticompetitive behaviour from these results. Consumers are
likely to pay an average premium of about 3% because of collusive practices
being deployed in duopoly (i.e. the di↵erence in the estimated markup between
quiet and non-quiet life duopolies). The price that consumers are likely to
pay because of entry deterrence practices in monopoly, such as limit pricing,
is estimated to be much larger. We find that quiet life monopolists are will-
ing to reduce their prices by about 3% in order to prevent entry, on average
(i.e. the di↵erence in the estimated markup between quiet and non-quiet life
monopolies). Moreover, we find that consumers are likely to pay an average
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premium of about 6% due to entry deterrence (i.e. the di↵erence in the es-
timated markup between a quiet life monopoly and a non-quiet life duopoly).
That is, if entry would take place in a quiet life monopoly (and entry deterrence
practices were unsuccessful or not implemented) consumers would on average
pay approximately 6% lower prices. Firms in monopoly are thus willing to
forgo approximately 3% in order to enjoy a 6% premium.
2.4.2 Adjustment behaviour
The post-entry (exit) period in which monoduo (duomono) is equal to 1 varies
in length in the cases of market structure change examined. In this section, we
define a uniform period of fixed length for the identification of a potential price
premium (discount) in quiet life duopolies (monopolies). Our goal is twofold:
(i) to shed more light on the dynamics of market structure changes, and (ii) to
ensure that the average markups reported in our main results are consistent.
We thus want to rule out the possibility that the estimated e↵ects are driven
by short-term reactions to entry/exit (e.g., a short-lived price war after entry
in monopoly) and thus merely capture the adjustment behaviour of firms.
In order to do so, we split the post-entry (post-exit) period into three sub-
periods (see Figure 2.4 for an example): (i) period 1 consists of the first 2
or 4 quarters following the change in structure, (ii) period 2 consists of the 8
quarters following period 1, and (iii) period 3 consists of all remaining quarters
of the post-entry or post-exit period. We create period dummies and inter-
act those with monoduo and duomono. We thus obtain the following period
interactions: monoduo period 1 and duomono period 1 (equal to 1 in period
1 and 0 otherwise), monoduo period 2 and duomono period 2 (equal to 1 in
period 2 and 0 otherwise), monoduo period 3 and duomono period 3 (equal
to 1 in period 3 and 0 otherwise).
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Figure 2.4 Illustrative example of a change from monopoly to duopoly as used in the
adjustment behaviour analysis for the identification of monoduo.
Period 1 functions as an adjustment period after the change in market
structure. Given the relative ease of changing fare prices in the airline in-
dustry and the fact that the average duration of monoduo and duomono in
our sample is 3.2 and 4.8 years respectively, it is arguably reasonable to use
an adjustment period of 2 or 4 quarters. Period 2 is the fixed period that we
use for the identification of the new price markups of non-quiet life duopolies
and monopolies. This analysis therefore controls for both potential adjust-
ment behaviour of firms and potential selection bias as a result of the varying
length of the post-entry and post-exit periods.
The results of this estimation are reported in Table 2.4. The first column
reports the results of our full main specification (Equation 2.2) to facilitate
the comparison. In the second and third column, we add the period interac-
tions for monopolies that experience entry and duopolies that experience exit.
We use an adjustment period of 2 and 4 quarters in the second and third
column, respectively. The conclusions of our main analysis do not change.
We still find that quiet life duopolies (monopolies) charge significantly higher
(lower) prices than non-quiet life duopolies (monopolies). The estimated price
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Panel A: Estimation results Base 2 quarters 4 quarters 
mono 0.079*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
duo 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
monoduo period 1  -0.024*** -0.036*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) 
monoduo period 2 (monoduo) -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.026*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
monoduo period 3  -0.028*** -0.029*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) 
duomono period 1  -0.001 0.008 
  (0.007) (0.007) 
duomono period 2 (duomono) 0.030*** 0.026*** 0.030*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
duomono period 3  0.045*** 0.047*** 
  (0.010) (0.010) 
compduo -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.027*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
compmono 0.022 0.023 0.023 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
Z 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Carrier-route FE Yes Yes Yes 
Carrier-date FE Yes Yes Yes 
Market size controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 262,622 262,622 262,622 
    
Panel B: Markups relative to the competitive market  
Non-quiet life monopoly 0.109*** 0.106*** 0.109*** 
Quiet life monopoly 0.079*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 
Quiet life duopoly 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 
Non-quiet life duopoly 0.020*** 0.018** 0.024*** 
Table 2.4 Adjustment behaviour analysis results. Monoduo and duomono (in parentheses)
refer to the base specification in the first column. FE denotes the fixed e↵ects and clustered
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by: *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
premia are also similar in magnitude to the ones reported in the first col-
umn. We can thus safely interpret the latter as representative averages for
non-quiet life duopolies and monopolies.
38
The price of anticompetitive behaviour
Moreover, the dynamic dimension of this analysis provides additional in-
sights about these changes in structure. We find market prices to decrease
immediately after entry in monopoly. Our results provide preliminary evidence
of this reaction being greater in the first year. However, we find no evidence
of convergence to the quiet life duopoly price. The estimated markups are sig-
nificantly lower in the entire post-entry period and are relatively constant in
magnitude. In the case of exit in duopoly, we find similarly swift reactions as
the new monopolist increases prices to the quiet life monopoly level immedi-
ately after exit. Moreover, non-quiet life monopolists appear to exploit their
reputation gains by increasing prices further already within the first year after
exit. The estimated markups are estimated to increase even further in the re-
maining post-exit period. Although this additional premium is significant, it
should be interpreted with caution as it could be partially driven by a selection
of routes with an above average duration of duomono.
2.4.3 Extensions
A. Price level analysis
In this section, we examine the e↵ect of competitive structure on di↵erent
levels of the fare distribution of a route. We do this by performing a price-
level analysis in which we regress di↵erent price percentiles in a specification
similar to the one presented in Section 2.4.1. We thus estimate Equation 2.2
for a di↵erent set of dependent variables, namely the natural logarithm of the
10th, 25th, 75th, and 90th price percentile of the market fare distribution. The
results are reported in Table 2.5. As a reference, the table also includes our
main results in which we use the logarithm of the median price as a dependent.
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Panel A: Estimation results Price percentile  
 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
mono 0.078*** 0.088*** 0.079*** 0.099*** 0.106*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
duo 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.066*** 0.067*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) 
monoduo -0.010* -0.022*** -0.030*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) 
duomono 0.011* 0.017*** 0.030*** 0.038*** 0.035*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
compduo -0.016** -0.024*** -0.027*** -0.042*** -0.050*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009) 
compmono 0.045 0.009 0.022 -0.013 0.058 
 (0.033) (0.036) (0.042) (0.032) (0.038) 
Z 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Carrier-route FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Carrier-date FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Market size controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 262,622 262,622 262,622 262,622 262,622 
      
Panel B: Markups relative to the competitive market 
Non-quiet life monopoly 0.089*** 0.105*** 0.109*** 0.138*** 0.141*** 
Quiet life monopoly 0.078*** 0.088*** 0.079*** 0.099*** 0.106*** 
Quiet life duopoly 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.066*** 0.067*** 
Non-quiet life duopoly 0.037*** 0.026*** 0.020*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 
      
Table 2.5 Price level analysis results. FE denotes the fixed e↵ects and clustered standard
errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by: *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
With the exception of the 10th price percentile, we estimate significant co-
e cients of the expected direction for monoduo and duomono. We thus ob-
serve that the di↵erence in prices between quiet and non-quiet life duopolies
and monopolies is also present at di↵erent levels of the fare distribution. The
estimated coe cient of the non-quiet life duopoly indicator is largest at the
median price ( ˆ1 '  0.03), and lower for higher and lower price percentiles.
This indicates that collusive pricing in a quiet life duopoly is likely to be most
intense at the average fare level. In monopoly markets, we find that the pre-
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mium charged by non-quiet life monopolies is greater, the higher the price
percentile. For example, we find  ˆ2 ' 0.011 for the logarithm of the 10th and
 ˆ2 ' 0.035 for the logarithm of the 90th price percentile. This indicates that a
non-quiet life monopoly will exploit relatively more market power by increas-
ing high-valuation consumer ticket prices (e.g., no restriction or last minute
tickets) more than a quiet life monopoly.
As before, we estimate the markups of each market structure category rela-
tive to the average competitive route (see Panel B of Table 2.5). Interestingly,
we observe some structure in the price dispersion in the estimated results. We
measure price dispersion by looking at the di↵erence between the markup of
the 90th and 10th price percentile. In our results, price dispersion is positively
related to market power: the estimated di↵erence in markups is equal to approx-
imately 5.2% in a non-quiet life monopoly, 2.9% in a quiet life monopoly, 2% in
a quiet life duopoly and 0.8% in a non-quiet life duopoly. By distinguishing be-
tween quiet and non-quiet life markets, we essentially refine the classification of
market structure compared to previous literature. This reveals a linear relation-
ship between competition and price dispersion, which is what economic theory
predicts (as well as the findings of Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009) and contradicts
the findings of Dai et al (2014) who suggest a non-monotonic relationship.
B. Carrier type analysis
So far we have focused on the market level, but our empirical methodology
allows us to refine our analysis to the firm level. This can provide insight
on whether certain types of firms di↵er in their likeliness to engage in anti-
competitive behaviour. This is interesting given that previous literature in
airline pricing (Ciliberto and Tamer, 2009) shows that multiple equilibria can
arise depending on the market participants, for instance in the case of cost
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Markup relative to the competitive market NLC LCC 
Non-quiet life monopoly 0.121*** 0.019 
Quiet life monopoly 0.088*** 0.035*** 
Quiet life duopoly 0.055*** 0.026*** 
Non-quiet life duopoly 0.018** 0.022** 
Table 2.6 Estimated markups per carrier type. The markups are calculated using the carrier
type analysis estimation results reported in Table 2.11 in the Appendix. Significance levels
are indicated by: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
asymmetries (e.g., legacy or low-cost carriers). Our methodology allows us to
investigate the pricing strategies of individual carriers and see whether these
di↵er in quiet and non-quiet life markets. This can be highly valuable for
policymakers interested in detecting firm-market combinations in which anti-
competitive behaviour is most likely to occur.
We illustrate this by estimating the price markups of carriers with asym-
metric costs in quiet and non-quiet life markets, namely legacy carriers (NLCs)
and low-cost carriers (LCCs)5. This is done by interacting the market struc-
ture indicators (mono and duo), and the market structure change indicators
(monoduo and duomono) with a dummy variable indicating whether a certain
carrier is a low-cost carrier (LCC = 1 if carrier i is a low-cost carrier and 0
otherwise). The estimated markups for NLCs and LCCs in quiet and non-quiet
life markets are presented in Table 2.6. For the full estimation results, please
refer to Table 2.11 in the Appendix of this paper.
5The term NLC is used in the literature to refer to carriers that had established interstate
routes before the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, whereas the term LCC generally refers
to carriers that started operating in the deregulated industry with a di↵erent business model
rendering a lower priced (and sometimes lower quality) product. Our sample includes the
following LCCs: Air South, AirTran, Allegiant, America West, American Trans Air, Frontier,
Independence, JetBlue, Morris, National, Reno, Southwest, Spirit, Sun Country, Valujet,
Virgin and Western Pacific. The most prominent NLCs in our sample are (in order of relative
frequency in the data): Delta, US, United, American, Northwest, Continental, Alaska, Trans
World, Midwest and Hawaiian.
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We observe significant di↵erences in the estimated markups of the two types
of carriers. As expected, LCCs have significantly lower markups when com-
pared to NLCs6. More interestingly, the estimated markups highlight the dif-
ference in pricing strategies employed by the two types of carriers. In particular,
we find no evidence for LCCs to be engaged in anticompetitive behaviour as
the estimated markups do not di↵er between quiet and non-quiet life markets.
Moreover, the LCC markups are not significantly di↵erent between the four
market structure groups, which implies that LCCs implement a uniform pric-
ing strategy in every type of market they are present. In contrast, we find
significant di↵erences in the NLC markups, which indicates that these carri-
ers likely engage in (tacit) collusion and entry deterrence. In accordance with
our theoretical framework, this result highlights the fact that established car-
riers have greater incentives to engage in anticompetitive behaviour in order
to safeguard the quiet life in their market.
2.4.4 Robustness analyses
We perform a number of additional analyses to ensure the robustness of our
conclusions. First, we take into account mergers in duopoly in order to rule out
that the significantly higher non-quiet life monopoly price premium is the result
of a potential softening of the competitive environment in the airline industry
due to firm mergers. Second, we split our sample into two periods of 10 years
in order to compare potential changes in the estimated coe cients over time.
Third, we use a stricter definition of change in structure when constructing
our market structure change indicators and we use several alternatives for the
calculation of market shares (and in turn market structure groups) by using
di↵erent sources of data and defining routes on a city-to-city basis.
6LCC markups are significantly lower in all market structure forms except for non-quiet life
duopolies where the NLC and LCC markups are not significantly di↵erent.
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A. Mergers between firms
In our analyses, we have identified a change from duopoly to monopoly as the
result of firm exit from a given market. However, the same change in structure
may also be the result of a merger between firms in duopoly. This situation is
evidently di↵erent from the case of an exit, in which one of the two firms stops
being active in a given market. Note that a merger between competitors in a
duopoly would commonly not be permitted by competition authorities, which
makes it generally di cult to study the impact of a post-merger monopoly. The
airline industry provides a unique setting in which we can analyse the pricing
outcome of a post-merger monopoly as merger evaluation is conducted at the
industry level and airlines compete in multiple submarkets. Hence, competition
authorities may (conditionally) approve mergers that result in the creation of
post-merger monopolies in individual submarkets.
Merger cases are often contested by competition authorities as they present
a trade-o↵ between e ciency gains and increases in market power. As a result,
ex-post merger evaluation has been a popular topic in the empirical literature.
The evaluation of mergers has attracted much attention since the deregulation
of the airline industry because of a number of successful mergers between large
U.S. carriers (e.g., Delta and Northwest, United and Continental, American
and US Airways). Early work by Borenstein (1990) and Kim and Singal (1993),
and more recent work by Kwoka and Shumilkina (2010) found the impact of
e ciency gains on ticket prices to be o↵set by the exercise of increased market
power. This is commonly reflected by carriers being able to charge higher prices
after the merger. The increase in market power can come through multiple
channels, such as the increase in carrier size and market concentration, airport
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Panel A: Estimation results (1) (2) 
mono 0.079*** 0.079*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
duo 0.049*** 0.049*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
monoduo -0.030*** -0.030*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
duomono 0.030*** 0.028*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
compduo -0.027*** -0.027*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
compmono 0.022 0.022 
 (0.042) (0.042) 
Z 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
duomerger  0.084*** 
  (0.025) 
Carrier-route FE Yes Yes 
Carrier-date FE Yes Yes 
Market size controls Yes Yes 
Observations 262,622 262,622 
   
Panel B: Markups relative to the competitive market 
Post-merger monopoly - 0.191*** 
Non-quiet life monopoly 0.109*** 0.107*** 
Quiet life monopoly 0.079*** 0.079*** 
Quiet life duopoly 0.049*** 0.049*** 
Non-quiet life duopoly 0.020*** 0.019*** 
Table 2.7 Robustness analysis results on mergers between firms. FE denotes the fixed e↵ects
and clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated
by: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
dominance, and the elimination of potential competition. These market power
gains imply that a post-merger monopoly may experience significantly higher
price outcomes compared to an average monopoly.
We repeat the analysis of Section 2.4.1 after including an indicator for a post-
merger monopoly (duomerger). This is constructed by interacting duomono
with a dummy variable indicating whether a given change in structure was the
result of a merger between firms in duopoly. The results are presented in Ta-
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ble 2.7, together with the results of our main specification from Section 2.4.1.
Interpretation of the estimated coe cients in the second column of Table 2.7
leads to conclusions that are equivalent to the ones in our main analysis. In
fact, we observe that the estimated markups hardly change, which rules out the
possibility that the price di↵erence between quiet and non-quiet life markets in
monopoly is driven by mergers between firms. The explicit analysis of mergers
also provides additional insight into the competitive e↵ects of mergers in the
airline industry. Our results show that there are significant market power gains
associated with a merger between firms in a duopoly. In fact, we find a post-
merger monopoly to be charging a premium of approximately 19% compared
to a competitive market, on average. This is significantly higher than the esti-
mated premia of both quiet and non-quiet life monopolies. The results suggest
that competition authorities have good reasons for contesting those mergers.
B. Sample split
One of the advantages of our panel estimation is that the length of our sample
allows us to identify many changes in structure from monopoly to duopoly and
vice versa. Nevertheless, given that the period of 88 quarters between 1993 and
2014 is relatively long, we also analyse two subsamples in order to check the
stability of our estimated coe cients and estimate whether the relative price
premia have changed over time. The results of this estimation are reported
in Table 2.8, together with the results of our main specification. The second
column reports the estimates for the period from 1993 up to and including 2003.
The third column reports the estimates for the remaining years in our sample,
i.e. from 2004 up to and including 2014. The U.S. airline industry su↵ered
great economic damage from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which
led to a significant negative demand shock but also to structural changes (e.g.,
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Panel A: Estimation results Sample period 
1993-2014 1993-2003 2004-2014 
mono 0.079*** 0.063*** 0.053*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) 
duo 0.049*** 0.037*** 0.045*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) 
monoduo -0.030*** -0.034*** -0.025*** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) 
duomono 0.030*** 0.038*** 0.027** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) 
compduo -0.027*** -0.005 -0.032*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) 
compmono 0.022 -0.032 0.050*** 
 (0.042) (0.036) (0.013) 
Z 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Carrier-route FE Yes Yes Yes 
Carrier-date FE Yes Yes Yes 
Market size controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 262,622 132,614 130,008 
    
Panel B: Markups relative to the competitive market 
Non-quiet life monopoly 0.109*** 0.101*** 0.080*** 
Quiet life monopoly 0.079*** 0.063*** 0.053*** 
Quiet life duopoly 0.049*** 0.037*** 0.045*** 
Non-quiet life duopoly 0.020*** 0.003 0.020** 
Table 2.8 Robustness analysis results of a sample split. FE denotes the fixed e↵ects and
clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by:
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
stricter security requirements) that arguably made air travel more cumbersome
and time consuming (Ito and Lee, 2005). Our sample is split this way in order to
take that into account, which allows us to identify a potential structural break.
We perform a Chow test and find that there is a structural di↵erence be-
tween the early and later period of our sample. Nevertheless, we estimate
a negative and significant coe cient for monoduo and a positive and signifi-
cant coe cient for duomono in both subsample periods. Therefore, our con-
clusions remain the same as we find evidence for anticompetitive behaviour
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both in the early and later years in our sample. In addition, we observe that
the di↵erence between the price premia of the four market structure groups
(quiet and non-quiet life monopoly/duopoly) relative to the competitive mar-
ket becomes smaller in the later period.
C. Change-in-structure rule
We employ a stricter change-in-structure rule in order to eliminate small changes
in market structure around the defined thresholds. For instance, a route in
which a single carrier has a 90% share is defined as a monopoly. However,
the same market will be identified as a non-quiet life duopoly if the share of
that carrier drops to 89% (in four consecutive quarters). By means of the
stricter change-in-structure rule, we impose a minimum required change in the
carrier market share to exclude those cases that likely put a downward bias
on our estimated e↵ects. We expect a downward bias because we identify
markets to be experiencing a change in structure when they are essentially
not. In subsequent analyses, we require a 5, 10, 15 and 20% change in a car-
rier’s market share in order to identify a route as a non-quiet life duopoly or
monopoly. Despite the decrease in the number of identified markets, we still
find significant di↵erences in pricing between quiet and non-quiet life markets.
The estimated coe cients for monoduo and duomono both have the expected
direction. In the case of duomono, they also increase in magnitude as the
change-in-structure rule becomes stricter, confirming thus our intuition of the
downward bias. The results are reported in Table 2.9.
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Panel A: Estimation results Change-in-structure rule  
 Base >5% >10% >15% >20% 
mono 0.079*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.082*** 0.083*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
duo 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
monoduo -0.030*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.033*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
duomono 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.032*** 0.040*** 0.049*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) 
compduo -0.027*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.026*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
compmono 0.022 0.021 0.018 0.017 0.017 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) 
Z 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Carrier-route FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Carrier-date FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Market size controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 262,622 262,622 262,622 262,622 262,622 
      
Panel B: Markups relative to the competitive market 
Non-quiet life monopoly 0.109*** 0.108*** 0.112*** 0.122*** 0.132*** 
Quiet life monopoly 0.079*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.082*** 0.083*** 
Quiet life duopoly 0.049*** 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 0.048*** 
Non-quiet life duopoly 0.020*** 0.016** 0.017** 0.016* 0.015 
Table 2.9 Robustness analysis with a minimum required change in market share. The
change-in-structure rule specifies the minimum required percentage change in market share
for a change in market structure to be taken into account. The Base specification is spec-
ification 4 of Table 2.3 (Equation 2.2). The second, third, fourth and fifth columns report
the estimation results of a minimum change in market share of 5, 10, 15 and 20 percentage
points, respectively. FE denotes the fixed e↵ects and clustered standard errors are reported
in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
D. Construction of market shares
In order to eliminate concerns about competition between adjacent airports,
we perform robustness checks using a sample in which routes are defined on
a city-to-city instead of an airport-to-airport basis (see Morrison, 2001; Berry
and Jia, 2010; Dai et al, 2014). In addition, we repeat our main analysis by
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Panel A: Estimation results Market share calculation 
 Base City pair T-100 Pax T-100 Dep 
mono 0.079*** 0.067*** 0.050*** 0.052*** 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.006) 
duo 0.049*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
monoduo -0.030*** -0.015*** -0.022*** -0.026*** 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) 
duomono 0.030*** 0.047*** 0.045*** 0.034*** 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) 
compduo -0.027*** -0.016*** 0.008 -0.006 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
compmono 0.022 -0.021 -0.013 -0.065 
 (0.042) (0.034) (0.046) (0.061) 
Z 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.002** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Carrier-route FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Carrier-date FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Market size controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 262,622 229,447 262,622 262,622 
     
Panel B: Markups relative to the competitive market 
Non-quiet life monopoly 0.109*** 0.114*** 0.095*** 0.086*** 
Quiet life monopoly 0.079*** 0.067*** 0.050*** 0.052*** 
Quiet life duopoly 0.049*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 
Non-quiet life duopoly 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.015** 0.010 
Table 2.10 Robustness analysis with a di↵erent construction of market shares. The Base
specification is specification 4 of Table 2.3 (Equation 2.2) in which carrier market shares are
calculated on an airport-to-airport basis from DB1B ticket price data. Market shares are cal-
culated on (i) a city-to-city basis from DB1B ticket price data in the City pair specification,
(ii) an airport-to-airport basis from T-100 passenger data in the T-100 Pax specification,
and (iii) an airport-to-airport basis from T-100 departure data in the T-100 Dep specifica-
tion. FE denotes the fixed e↵ects and clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Significance levels are indicated by: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
using di↵erent data for the calculation of the carrier market shares. In our
main results, we use data on the number of tickets sold from DB1B to estimate
carrier market shares. In our robustness analyses, we use (i) the number of
passengers transported by the carrier and (ii) the number of departures per
route from the T-100 Domestic Segment database. The results of the city-to-
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city analysis and the two alternative data sources for the calculation of carrier
market shares are presented in Table 2.10. The results are similar to the ones
reported in the main results section. Note that the estimated coe cients for the
monopoly indicator are lower in the robustness analyses. This is likely due to
the smaller proportion of monopoly routes in the three robustness specifications.
First, smaller regional airports that are frequently serviced by a single carrier
become part of a larger metropolitan area market in the city-to-city approach.
Second, the T-100 database only covers large certified carriers with annual
operating revenues of $20 million or more (in contrast to the DB1B, which is
a 10% random ticket price sample). Nevertheless, the markups respective to
the competitive market are similar in relative terms and our conclusions are
consistent with the ones in Section 2.4.1.
2.5 Conclusion
Our findings reveal the presence of significant price heterogeneity between ho-
mogeneous good markets that are seemingly identical when viewed in terms of
their market structure. This is in accordance with economic theory of oligopolis-
tic and monopolistic competition, which shows that firms do not always com-
pete in the same way in comparable market settings. Our empirical findings
therefore indicate that changes in market concentration and market power do
not always go hand in hand. In our context, it is the conduct of competition
in the past that is important in determining the current competitive conduct
between firms and in turn market price outcomes. This highlights the fact that
market shares (and in turn indicators of market structure) may be imperfect
predictors of market power and thus lead to incorrect inferences when employed
to empirically study the e↵ect of competition on price outcomes.
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Our results also have important implications for policymakers. The econo-
metric analysis provides robust evidence of (tacit) collusion being likely to be
deployed in duopoly markets with a quiet life. Moreover, entry is found to yield
large competitive gains with respect to the prices charged by firms. Our findings
also suggest the omnipresence of entry deterring strategies in monopolies with
a quiet life. Firms that become monopolists as a result of firm exit or a merger
are finally found to enjoy significant gains in market power at the expense of
the consumer. These results are likely to hold in all contexts in which firms
compete for a market, as in the case of spatial competition with geographically
distinct markets (e.g., supermarkets or consumer good retailers). Moreover,
our methodology is straightforward to replicate in other contexts where firms
simultaneously compete in multiple markets and o↵er a relatively homogeneous
good in order to identify potential engagement in anticompetitive behaviour.
Finally, while it is out of the scope of this paper to investigate welfare e↵ects in
this context, this may provide interesting avenues for future research. Provid-
ing cost estimates next to our estimated price e↵ects would allow a complete
welfare analysis of the impact of firm engagement in anticompetitive behaviour.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Endogeneity correction term
The endogeneity correction term included in the second-stage price specification
(Equation 2.2) is calculated in the following manner:
E(uk |⇧⇤k) =
NX
c=1
ykc
  (⌧c 1  Vk  ˆ)   (⌧c  Vk  ˆ)
 (⌧c  Vk  ˆ)   (⌧c 1  Vk  ˆ)
where k denotes a route-carrier observation and c2 {1, 2, . . . , N} denotes the
ordinally defined market structure categories (e.g., based on the number of
carriers present). The term Vk  ˆ denotes the linear prediction of the ordered
probit model for the latent profit function ⇧⇤k = Vk   + uk. The letter ⌧ is
used to indicate the estimated thresholds by the ordered probit model for c
ordinally defined categories and ykc is a binary indicator function that is equal
to 1 if observation k is in the cth category and 0 otherwise.
The vector Vk contains the following variables that may influence firm prof-
itability and in turn the number of carriers in a given route. First, the follow-
ing variables to capture market extent and market growth: total passengers
transported in the route (and growth rate), market gravity of route end-point
metropolitan areas (and growth rate), average population change at end-point
airport metropolitan areas, growth rate of the average airport share of end-
point airports and potential competition (measured as a count of the number
of firms with presence at both end-cities of a route that are not incumbent in
the market). Second, the following variables to capture carrier e ciency, carrier
dominance and prior competitive experience: carrier load factor, percentage of
unperformed relative to scheduled flights, average carrier passenger share at
end-point airports, percentage of round trip tickets sold on the route and age
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Estimation results (1) (2) 
mono 0.079*** 0.088*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) 
duo 0.049*** 0.055*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
monoduo -0.030*** -0.036*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) 
duomono 0.030*** 0.033*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) 
compduo -0.027*** -0.027*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
compmono 0.022 0.016 
 (0.042) (0.042) 
Z 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Low-cost carrier interactions 
mono ´ LCC  -0.053*** 
  (0.011) 
duo ´ LCC  -0.028*** 
  (0.008) 
monoduo ´ LCC  0.032*** 
  (0.011) 
duomono ´ LCC  -0.049*** 
  (0.015) 
Carrier-route FE Yes Yes 
Carrier-date FE Yes Yes 
Market size controls Yes Yes 
Observations 262,622 262,622 
Table 2.11 Carrier type estimation results. FE denotes the fixed e↵ects and clustered
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by: *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
of the youngest rival. Most of these variables have been frequently used as con-
trols in the airline pricing literature. We additionally include growth rates to
capture the dynamics of entry/exit decisions that may a↵ect latent profitability.
To estimate latent profitability, we also include the instruments in Borenstein
and Rose (1994), Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) and Dai et al (2014). These are
the logarithm of the arithmetic mean of the population of the end-point cities
(and its square) and the general enplanement index (and its square). These
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variables are also included in the estimation of Equation 2.2 as market size
controls and are therefore not excluded. Finally, we use carrier-quarter fixed
e↵ects in the first-stage as well as in the second-stage price specification.
2.6.2 Carrier type estimation results
The full estimation results of the carrier type analysis are presented in Ta-
ble 2.11. The first column of Table 2.11 reports the results of the estima-
tion of Equation 2.2 to facilitate comparison. The low-cost carrier interactions
are added in the second column of Table 2.11. The estimated markups for
NLCs and LCCs in quiet and non-quiet life markets are presented in Table
2.6 and discussed in Section 2.4.3.
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Incumbent capacity responses to
entry: evidence of predation
in the U.S. airline industry?
”... American played by the traditional rules. It competed with the low fare
carriers on their own terms. It did not price its fares below cost; it did not
undercut the other carriers’ fares. There is no doubt that American may be a
di cult, vigorous, even brutal competitor. But here, it engaged only in bare,
but not brass-knuckle competition.”
United States v. AMR Corp. (2001)
3.1 Introduction
Incumbents have often been accused of anticompetitive predatory behaviour in
markets where they do not welcome new entry. Antitrust authorities and the
judiciary have greeted such cases with scepticism. The adverse e↵ects of mar-
ket monopolisation and the undermining of competition are often deemed small
compared to the risk of false positives, which could ”chill the very conduct the
antitrust laws are designed to protect” (Matsushita Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
†This chapter is based on the working paper titled ”Incumbent Capacity Responses to Entry:
Evidence of Predation in the U.S. Airline Industry?” and is joint work with Enrico Pennings
and Peran van Revan.
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1986). The reason is that distinguishing predatory behaviour from intensified
competition is a di cult task. This is evident in a well-known case against
American Airlines (AA), in which the airline was accused of driving competi-
tors out of its largest hub by undercutting fares and flooding the market with
additional capacity. The case was dismissed (mainly) because AA’s reaction
did not display a sacrifice of short-term profit by pricing under a reasonable
measure of cost. In many such cases, the identification of predation is hindered
by an overreliance on price-cost based tools and a general disregard towards
non-price predation tactics (Comanor and Frech, 2015). As a consequence, em-
pirical evidence of predation is scant despite the extensive theoretical literature
that shows predation to be a rational response in certain cases of entry.
This chapter fills this gap by providing empirical evidence of incumbent be-
haviour that is consistent with predation in a broad study of incumbent-entrant
fights from the U.S. airline industry, where allegations of predatory conduct
have been frequent. To overcome the hurdles of standard price-cost predation
tests, we focus on changes in capacity to identify predation. Adding capacity
after entry is irrational for incumbent monopolists under the expectation of
duopoly competition since quantities are strategic substitutes for competitors.
This implies that a post-entry capacity increase can be seen as a short-term
sacrifice of profit that can only be justified if firms expect future gains from
the exploitation of market power after eliminating competition.
Our empirical analysis is based on 256 instances of entry in U.S. airline
industry monopolies followed by a fight between the incumbent and entrant
that ends with a single survivor. We focus on fights that return to monopoly
to exclude growing markets that may be able to accommodate more carri-
ers over time. We find post-entry increases in the capacity of the incum-
bent to positively a↵ect the probability of the incumbent winning a fight. We
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also provide evidence of significantly higher revenues for incumbents that in-
crease capacity post-entry and manage to eliminate competition (in contrast
to incumbents who do not increase capacity). This can be seen as exploita-
tion of market power and an attempt to recoup the predatory investment
after the elimination of competition.
In our analysis of the incumbent winning probability, we take price changes
into account and thus control for possible increases in demand driven by lower
prices after entry. Our results are also robust to firm and market character-
istics, such as carrier type, size and financial performance and market extent
and demand, which previous literature shows to a↵ect the reaction to entry
(Simon, 2005). Finally, we empirically test several predation motives to inves-
tigate why certain incumbents react predatory and others do not, and use the
identified determinants in a two-stage model that yields similar conclusions.
Our study of predation motives reveals that pre-entry incumbent capacity is
a key determinant of the response to entry.
The airline industry provides a good setting for studying predation. An
airline ticket is a relatively homogeneous good, which restricts the types of
incumbent entry responses, and price and capacity are observable and straight-
forward to measure. Entry rates have been high since the deregulation of the
industry in 1978, which yields a large number of fights to be examined. More-
over, firms in the airline industry simultaneously operate in multiple distinct
markets and interact regularly with competitors. This allows us to observe how
the same carriers react to entry in di↵erent market contexts. Finally, preda-
tion is likely to be a feasible tactic for airline monopolists. The reason is that
reputation is important in the airline industry, which makes predation valu-
able as it both fights current entrants and creates entry barriers for potential
future competitors. Furthermore, predating through capacity is likely in this
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context. Significant increases in capacity demonstrate a commitment to ag-
gressive pricing in the future. Moreover, capacity adjustment is costly enough
to demonstrate commitment, but cheap enough to allow reallocation after the
exit of the rival, which is a unique feature of the airline industry compared to
other industries with capital investment (Snider, 2008).
This chapter contributes to the limited empirical literature on anticompeti-
tive predatory behaviour (Bamberger and Carlton, 2006; Genesove and Mullin,
2006) by being the first to provide large scale evidence for incumbent responses
to entry that are consistent with predation. This fills an important gap in
the predation literature, which consists of the seminal theoretical literature on
the rationality of predatory behaviour (Kreps and Wilson, 1992; Milgrom and
Roberts, 1982; Benoit, 1984; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986; Poitevin, 1989) and
more recent structural empirical work that focuses on a single market (Snider,
2008; Williams, 2012). Our identification strategy is novel in that it allows us
to make inferences about predation by only looking at capacity responses and
without the need to evaluate price reductions or estimate firm costs. This chap-
ter also extends the rich empirical literature on incumbent responses to entry
(Geroski, 1995; Simon, 2005; Goolsbee and Syverson, 2008; Prince and Simon,
2014) by studying the e↵ectiveness of di↵erent types of incumbent responses
to entry. This is a contribution to previous literature that mostly focuses on
documenting the extent to which incumbent responses are aggressive or not.
Our work is also relevant from a policy perspective. Despite predatory al-
legations against airlines being common, they do not often make it to court
and in the cases in which they did, predation did not prevail as an antitrust
violation. However, this chapter demonstrates that predatory tactics in the
U.S. airline industry not only occur but are also e↵ective in practice. This
is an important finding for an industry with a record of high entry but low
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survival rates and a dramatic increase in concentration in recent years due to
a series of mergers that reduced the number of network legacy carriers from
eight to three (Carlton et al, 2019).
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 3.2,
we define predation and present a framework for identifying predatory be-
haviour through capacity increase. In Section 3.3, we introduce the data
and describe the sample and methodology that is employed in our empirical
analysis. In Section 3.4, we present the results of our main and robustness
analyses. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Predation and how to identify predatory behaviour
3.2.1 Definition and motives of predation
Predation is defined as a costly action carried out by an incumbent that leads
to a short-term sacrifice of profit (the predatory investment), which can be
rational under the expectation of eliminating competition and restoring mar-
ket power (the predatory prize). In general, a firm will act predatory if the
value of the predatory prize is greater than the cost of the investment. The
predator must therefore have a reasonable expectation that the gains from ex-
ploitable market power after the elimination of competition are su ciently large
to compensate for the forgone short-term profits. We can therefore derive two
necessary conditions for predation, which together are su cient: (i) demon-
stration of predatory intent by means of engagement in a predatory tactic and
(ii) evidence for an attempt to recoup the predatory investment by exploiting
market power after successful elimination of competition.
The rationality of predation, although questioned in the past (McGee, 1958;
Selten, 1978), is now largely accepted among economists. Literature provides
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several motivations for why predation can be a plausible strategy. One such
motivation is that predation increases the exit probability of rivals by lowering
their expected profits (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986). This happens when infor-
mation is imperfect and entrants are deceived into thinking they are up against
a superior competitor. Another stream of literature focuses on deep pocket the-
ories of predation (Benoit, 1984; Poitevin, 1989). This research predicts that
incumbents with more or better access to financial resources have incentives
to engage in predation and outlast rivals who are not in the financial position
to prevent exit or bankruptcy. Predation may also yield reputation gains that
enable firms to maintain their market dominance (Kreps and Wilson, 1982;
Milgrom and Roberts, 1982). This is because predatory tactics can also be
seen as signals of aggression that create entry barriers for future competitors.
A parallel to the literature on incumbent responses to entry can also be
drawn to explain incumbents’ motives to engage in predation. Empirical find-
ings show that incumbents respond more aggressively to entry when their in-
centives to do so are greater, for example, when their stakes in markets are
high (Simon, 2005) or when they are facing a threatening entrant (Goolsbee
and Syverson, 2008; Prince and Simon, 2014). In the airline industry, carriers
may benefit from a predatory reputation, which can raise entry barriers in all
their markets of operation (Simon, 2005). Moreover, the restoration of mar-
ket share may increase industry dominance and lead to exploitation of market
power in many more markets than the market of the predatory episode (Boren-
stein, 1991). Finally, carriers may reclaim airport or hub dominance through
successful predation. This may lead to e ciencies through positive network
externalities, but also to favourable treatment at hubs (Borenstein, 1989). Pre-
dation is thus likely to lead to increases in profit in the predatory market, but
also to other material gains that may be harder to quantify.
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3.2.2 Identification of predation
The majority of research in predation focuses on predatory pricing, under which
incumbents o↵er (very) low prices after entry to drive competitors out of the
market. This led to the development of a number of tools that aim to identify
predation using price-cost based measures. Most notably, Areeda and Turner
(1975) designed a framework to identify predatory pricing that is still consid-
ered the golden standard of antitrust applications. This tool is based on the
comparison of price and (reasonable estimates of) short-term marginal and/or
average variable costs, since pricing below cost can only be rationalised under
the expectation of future gains. Williamson (1977), Baumol (1979) and Joskow
and Klevorick (1979) also contributed to the development of an appropriate
identification framework by focusing on the pricing strategy of incumbents and
whether this is consistent with short-term profit maximisation.
Little attention is paid to non-price predatory tactics and their identi-
fication. Incumbents are not limited to using price as a strategic variable
for predation, but could react to entry by increasing output, o↵ering higher
quality or taking actions that aim to push up rivals’ cost. The majority
of work focuses on raising rivals’ cost, for example, through the abuse of
government processes and legislation, or investment in advertising, innova-
tion and R&D (Bork, 1979; Ordover and Willig, 1981; Salop and Sche↵man,
1983; Krattenmaker and Salop, 1986). Despite non-price predatory tactics be-
ing regarded as plausible predatory reactions, they are not incorporated in
a predation identification framework.
This is also the case in the airline industry, despite predatory allegations
often including incumbents increasing capacity in response to entry. For in-
stance, the vast majority of predatory airline cases involve carriers matching
their rivals’ fares while increasing their available seats and/or number of de-
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partures (Forsyth, 2018). Previous literature finds robust empirical evidence of
competition through capacity expansion and price cutting (Snider, 2008; Cilib-
erto and Tamer, 2009; Williams, 2012; Ethiraj and Zhou, 2019). Competition
authorities and the judiciary also monitor capacity and argue that ”claims of
predation are more credible when they involve not only price cuts, but also
significant capacity increases” (USDJ, 1997). Nevertheless, capacity increase
by itself has not yet been utilised in order to identify predation. The pricing
strategy of firms remains the core subject of investigation and other practices
continue to play an insignificant role in distinguishing competitive from anti-
competitive conduct (Comanor and Frech, 2015).
3.2.3 Capacity increase as a predatory response
We posit that capacity increase can be seen as a predatory response by argu-
ing that it is not a short-term rational action for incumbents who face entry,
and that it is a tactic that may e↵ectively lead to the elimination of compe-
tition and the restoration of market power.
A necessary condition for predation is that the predatory tactic is only
profitable under the expectation of eliminating competition. This is true for
post-entry capacity increase by an incumbent monopolist. After entry takes
place the incumbent is better o↵ accommodating entry under the expectation
of duopoly competition. The reason is that quantities are strategic substitutes
for the two competitors (Bulow et al, 1985). An incumbent’s profit maximis-
ing response to capacity increase by the entrant is to decrease capacity, as
any other response would lower marginal profits. Increasing capacity can be
seen as a commitment to pricing low in the future resulting from o↵ering addi-
tional output in the market. It is a short-term sacrifice of the ex-monopolist’s
profit that can only be rational in the expectation of eliminating competi-
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tion. This makes it an appropriate indicator of predatory behaviour. Similar
to pricing below (marginal) cost, it defines a clear-cut threshold that singles
out predation from intensified competition.
In addition, post-entry capacity increase by an incumbent monopolist is an
e↵ective way to eliminate competition and restore market power. First, excess
capacity has a direct e↵ect on market prices through increasing supply and can
put downward pressure on prices without appearing predatory at first sight.
Second, capacity expansion increases the incumbent’s economic sunk cost and
can act as a commitment device to fighting entry. In the U.S. airline industry,
close to 70% of the aircrafts operated by airlines are owned rather than leased,
and operating leases are usually long term agreements that tie airlines for a
period of eight to ten years on average (Ethiraj and Zhou, 2019). This implies
that capital investment in capacity is not easily reversible. Investing in capacity
after entry can therefore be an impediment to entry the same way that capac-
ity expansion before entry can be a deterrent. As the preemption literature
highlights, capacity expansion, compared to a price reduction, is more likely to
be e↵ective against competition because its costly and more irreversible nature
make it a relatively credible threat (Spence, 1977; Dixit, 1979; Schmalensee,
1981). Incumbents may thus have incentives to signal their intention to fight
competition through excess capacity rather than price cuts.
The role of capacity increase as a mechanism for predation is highlighted
in the work of Snider (2008), who proposes a dynamic model of price and ca-
pacity competition in the airline industry. In the equilibrium of the game,
predation arises as a result of large hub incumbents trying to eliminate small
low-cost entrants that cut into their profitability by charging lower prices. In-
cumbents, who are more committed to the market as a result of earlier sunk
investments, are able to prey on their rivals by making costly capacity com-
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mitments. Furthermore, Williams (2012) estimates a dynamic model of airline
competition, in which forward-looking firms invest in capacity and compete
in prices with capacity constraints. He also finds dominant hub carriers to
be aggressively investing in capacity when facing low-cost carrier entry. In
his dynamic model of airline competition, investing in capacity significantly
increases the probability of exit of the entrant.
3.3 Data and methodology
3.3.1 Sample
We create a sample of fights between incumbent monopolists and new entrants
that took place between 1993 and 2014 in the U.S. airline industry. These are
episodes of entry in monopoly followed by exit (of the incumbent or entrant)
in duopoly. We only focus on fights that end with the return to monopoly
to exclude rapidly growing markets that may be able to accommodate more
carriers. The examined time span produces 256 fights. Our full sample consists
of 8,949 observations of panel data where the unit of observation is a given
carrier in a given route and year-quarter. We define routes on an airport-
to-airport basis, as is standard in the airline pricing literature (Gerardi and
Shapiro, 2009; Dai et al, 2014). This means that a flight from New York
Newark (EWR) and New York John F. Kennedy (JFK) to the same airport
destination represent di↵erent routes in our analysis. Our panel includes all
quarters of duopoly competition between the incumbent and entrant (the fight
period), 8 quarters of the incumbent monopoly (the pre-fight period) and 8
quarters of the post-exit monopoly (the post-fight period). This duration is
chosen as a representative sample of the pre- and post-fight periods1.
1We vary the examined duration of the of the pre- and post-fight periods in robustness
analyses and obtain similar results, which are available upon request. Based on empirical
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We construct our sample by using three sources of data that are provided
by the O ce of Airline Information of the Bureau of Transportation Statistics
(BTS). We obtain airline ticket prices from the Airline Origin and Destina-
tion Survey (DB1B). DB1B is a 10% random sample of airline tickets from
reporting carriers and includes the origin, destination and itinerary details of
the passengers transported. We obtain carrier capacity and departure data,
as well as supplementary characteristics for each route from the T-100 Do-
mestic Segment database (T-100). T-100 contains domestic non-stop segment
data reported by U.S. carriers on a monthly basis. It includes information on
all passengers transported by the reporting carrier including origin, destina-
tion, aircraft type and service class, available capacity, scheduled departures,
departures performed and load factor. In addition, we obtain carrier finan-
cial information, such as total assets, cash available and profitability from the
F-41 Form Financial Data dataset of the BTS. We also obtain regional demo-
graphic information, such as population and personal income from the Regional
Economic Accounts (REA) database of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Fi-
nally, we obtain information on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) for airline
fares from the Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED) of the Economic
Research department of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis to seasonally
adjust our examined airline fares for inflation.
research on the reaction to the threat of entry (Goolsbee and Syverson, 2008), an incumbent
is expected to react in the quarters close to the entry episode. By expanding the event
window to two years before entry we are more likely to capture a representative sample of
the monopoly period. Similarly, in the post-fight period we expect any attempt towards
recoupment to have materialised in the two years following the rival’s exit.
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Panel A: Fight characteristics 
Number of fights: 256 Fight duration (in years) 1st quartile: 2.5 
Incumbent wins: 181 (70.7%)  Median: 4 
Entrant wins: 75 (29.3%)  3rd quartile: 6.5 
 
Panel B: Carrier characteristics 
 Incumbent Entrant Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Available seat miles (bn.) 2.37 1.41 0.20 5.85 1.08 1.11 0.01 5.48 
Load factor 0.68 0.13 0.16 0.90 0.60 0.17 0.10 0.90 
Total assets ($ bn.) 13.2 8.95 0.15 47.9 4.88 6.92 0.01 26.9 
Cash-to-assets ratio 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.22 0.08 0.10 -0.21 0.34 
Carrier airport share 0.34 0.15 0.04 0.74 0.12 0.09 0.00 0.38 
Age (years) 60.8 15.8 7.75 82.4 30.6 22.6 1.00 80.4 
Low-cost 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 0.35 0.47 0.00 1.00 
 
 Table 3.1 Fight characteristics and summary statistics for incumbent and entrant carrier
characteristics from the fight period.
3.3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 3.1 presents details on the fights in our sample and summary statistics
for incumbent and entrant carrier characteristics from the fight period. The
fight characteristics are presented in Panel A. In the majority of these fights
(approximately 71%), the incumbent is the winner and thus manages to regain
their monopoly. An entrant is successful in capturing the market in approxi-
mately 29% of the cases examined. More than 50% of these fights last less than
4 years, while 3 out of 4 fights have a duration of less than 6.5 years.
Panel B of Table 3.1 displays summary statistics on a number of carrier
characteristics for the duration of the fight period. Comparing and contrast-
ing these values for incumbents and entrants provides additional insight on
the types of carriers involved in those fights. In particular, entrants have rel-
atively smaller networks compared to incumbents. We infer this by looking
at the mean of the available seat miles, a frequently used measure of airlines’
carrying capacity (2.37 bn. and 1.08 bn. for incumbents and entrants re-
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spectively, on average)2. Moreover, entrants are more likely to be startup or
smaller (regional) carriers compared to incumbents, which are more likely to
be established (legacy) carriers. This is evident by comparing the total avail-
able assets, which are significantly higher for incumbents ($13.2 bn. and $4.88
bn. for incumbents and entrants respectively, on average), the average airport
share of the two types of carriers (approximately 34% and 12% for incumbents
and entrants respectively, on average), and the average age since foundation
(approximately 60.8 years and 30.6 years for incumbents and entrants respec-
tively, on average). Finally, entrants are more likely to be low-cost carriers
(LCC) compared to incumbents. Approximately 35% of the entrants in our
sample are LCCs, while only about 13% are LCC incumbents. We do not ob-
serve significant di↵erences between the two types of carriers in terms of their
cash available (relative to assets) and their load factor, which can be interpreted
as a measure of e ciency. In general, entrants have many characteristics that
make them likely prey. They are smaller in size, often startup, less dominant
at airports and with fewer financial resources.
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics on the same firm characteristics for
predatory and non-predatory incumbents. Predatory incumbents are defined
as incumbents who increase average capacity (measured by available carrier
seats in a given route and year-quarter) during the fight period compared to
the pre-fight period. This happens in 118 fights in our sample, which is ap-
proximately 46% of the cases examined. In the remaining 138 fights, incum-
bents decrease capacity or keep capacity constant following entry. We do not
observe significant di↵erences between the two types of incumbents, i.e. preda-
tory and non-predatory incumbents appear to be similar with respect to those
2Available seat miles (ASM) per route are calculated by multiplying the total number of
seats available on a given route with the distance flown in miles. The total ASM of a given
carrier is the sum of the ASM per route for all routes flown. ASM is a good measure of both
network size (extent) and carrying capacity.
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 Predatory (N = 118) Non-predatory (N = 138) 
 Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
Carrier characteristics         
Available seat miles (bn.) 2.40 1.48 1.97 5.85 2.35 1.35 1.97 5.83 
Load factor 0.70 0.11 0.34 0.90 0.66 0.14 0.16 0.88 
Total assets ($ bn.) 12.5 8.14 0.15 26.8 13.8 9.57 0.15 48.0 
Cash-to-assets ratio 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.20 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.22 
Carrier airport share 0.35 0.15 0.04 0.74 0.33 0.15 0.04 0.74 
Age (years) 59.3 16.8 7.75 75.0 62.1 14.8 7.75 82.4 
Low-cost (%) 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Market characteristics                 
End-point population (m.) 4.27 3.24 0.30 12.6 4.38 3.10 0.52 12.6 
End-point income ($ k.) 34.8 7.26 21.5 51.8 34.8 7.46 21.5 58.2 
Airport passenger share 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.05 
 
 Table 3.2 Summary statistics of carrier and market characteristics for predatory and non-
predatory incumbents.
characteristics. Our defined predatory response (capacity increase) does not
seem to be directly related to these firm characteristics. In addition, Table
3.2 summarises market characteristics for routes in which incumbents increase
capacity after entry and routes in which they do not. These are the average
population and average regional income at end-point Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (MSA), and the average market share of end-point airports with respect
to other airports of the U.S. domestic market (in terms of passenger tra c).
Markets in which incumbents increase capacity after entry do not significantly
di↵er from markets in which incumbents maintained or reduced capacity. Sim-
ilar to firm characteristics, these market characteristics are highly comparable
for predatory and non-predatory incumbents.
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3.3.3 Variables and methodology
A. Predatory intent (logit model)
We demonstrate predatory intent by testing whether incumbents who increase
capacity following entry are more likely to be the winners of a fight. Capacity
increase in this case is unprofitable under the expectation of duopoly competi-
tion and falls under the definition of a predatory tactic. We expect post-entry
capacity increase by an incumbent to lead to a higher probability of winning
a fight, as it decreases expected profits for the entrant. Given that the two
groups of incumbents (predatory and non-predatory) are highly comparable in
terms of the type of firms involved and the market context, we believe this
e↵ect to be driven by engagement in successful predation.
We estimate the probability of an incumbent being the winner of a fight
by means of a logistic regression with the dependent variable incumbent wins.
This is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 in routes where the incum-
bent is the winner of the fight (N = 181) and equal to 0 in routes where the
entrant is the winner of the fight (N = 75). The two events are by defini-
tion mutually exclusive, i.e. it is only possible for either the incumbent or the
entrant to win a fight. For the purpose of this analysis we collapse our full
sample to the 256 observations of a fight episode. For each fight we record
the winner, the fight duration and averages of market and firm characteris-
tics from the fight period. Our logistic regression therefore only exploits the
cross-sectional variation in the data. For summary statistics on the variables
used in our logit specification, refer to Table 3.3.
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We regress the dependent variable on three key independent variables, i.e.
the capacity change ratio, the price change ratio and the predatory response
indicator. The construction of these variables is discussed in detail below:
– Capacity change ratio: This ratio is calculated by dividing the average
capacity of the incumbent carrier during the fight period by its average
capacity during the pre-fight period. Incumbents therefore increase (de-
crease) average capacity after entry if the ratio is larger (smaller) than 1.
Capacity is measured by the total number of seats that are made avail-
able in a route and year-quarter by a given carrier. We expect the e↵ect
of this variable on the incumbent winning probability to be positive and
significant. This would imply that the higher the capacity after entry, the
more likely it is for an incumbent to win a fight.
– Price change ratio: This ratio is calculated by dividing the average price
charged by the incumbent during the fight period by its average price dur-
ing the pre-fight period. Incumbents therefore increase (decrease) average
prices after entry if the ratio is larger (smaller) than 1. We expect the
e↵ect of this variable on the incumbent winning probability to be negative
and significant. This would imply that the lower the average prices after
entry, the more likely it is for an incumbent to win a fight. Controlling
for price changes after entry is important in order to correctly identify
predation through capacity increase. For example, lowering prices after
entry could create additional demand for flights and thus justify a capac-
ity increase by incumbents.
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– Predatory response indicator: This is an indicator variable that is equal
to 1 when incumbents increase capacity after entry and equal to 0 when
they maintain the same capacity or reduce capacity after entry. It is
therefore equal to 1 when the capacity change ratio is larger than 1. We
expect the e↵ect of this variable on the incumbent winning probability
to be positive and significant. This would imply that capacity increases
after entry (a predatory response according to our definition) increase the
likelihood of an incumbent being the winner of a fight.
We additionally control for characteristics of the incumbent and entrant
firm, relative characteristics of the two competing carriers and market char-
acteristics. This is important in order to ensure that the 256 fights used in
our analysis are comparable in terms of the firms participating and the market
conditions3. The firm characteristics examined are the relative size of carriers
(measured by the ratio of available seat miles of the incumbent with respect
to the entrant), the incumbent size (measured by the available seat miles of
the incumbent), the relative e ciency of carriers (measured by the ratio of the
load factor of the incumbent with respect to the entrant), the relative liquid-
ity of carriers (measured by the ratio of cash-to-assets of the incumbent with
respect to the entrant), the relative airport dominance of carriers (measured
by the ratio of average passenger share at end-point airports of the incumbent
with respect to the entrant), the relative experience of carriers (measured by
the ratio of years since foundation of the incumbent with respect to the en-
trant), and two indicator variables for low-cost carriers for the incumbent and
entrant (incumbent LCC and entrant LCC ).
3The selection of firm and market characteristics is based on previous research on incumbent
reactions to entry (Simon, 2005) and airline pricing (Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009).
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 Mean St. dev. Min Max 
Firm characteristics 
Relative size 15.67 61.37 0.117 643.2 
Incumbent size (bn.) 2.37 1.41 0.2 5.85 
Relative efficiency 1.313 0.812 0.367 7.214 
Relative liquidity 30.71 126.6 -199.1  829.5 
Incumbent LCC 0.129 0.336 0 1 
Entrant LCC 0.347 0.474 0 1 
Relative airport dominance 8.834 17.33 0.307  135.9 
Relative experience 5.448 9.135 0.108 60 
Market characteristics 
Average population (m.) 4.33 3.16 0.30 12.6 
Average personal income (k.) 34.8  7.35 21.5 58.2 
Average airport share 0.015 0.007  0.002 0.049 
Market extent 12.63 4.154 2.6 23.7 
Market demand 8.297 0.638 6.322 9.896 
Strategic variables 
Price change ratio 0.921 0.188 0.297 1.45 
Capacity change ratio 1.181 0.876 0.164 10.52 
Predatory response indicator 0.461 0.499 0 1 
 
 Table 3.3 Summary statistics of the firm characteristics, market characteristics and strategic
variables used in the predatory intent specifications.
The market characteristics examined are the average population and the
average personal income at end-point airport Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(MSA), the average airport share in passengers of the end-point airports with
respect to other airports in the U.S., a control for market extent measuring
potential competition in the route (measured by a count of firms with presence
at both end-points of a route that are not yet incumbent in the market), and
a control for market demand (measured by the average of the logarithm of the
passengers transported in a route). All firm and market characteristic variables
are averages of the fight period for each route. For an overview of these control
variables, together with summary statistics, refer to Table 3.3.
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B. Predatory intent (two-stage model)
Incumbents are more likely to react predatory when it is meaningful to do
so. A predatory response is an endogenous strategic choice of the carrier that
may be related to unobserved characteristics that are di cult or impossible
to measure. It is therefore important to identify predation determinants in
order to shed light on the motives of a predatory response, explain why cer-
tain incumbents react predatory and others not, and incorporate this in the
estimation of the probability of winning a fight.
We use a two-stage model (2SLS) in which the second stage remains the
same as in the analysis of the previous subsection. In the first stage, we anal-
yse the factors that make engagement in predation more likely by regressing
the predatory response indicator on potential predation determinants that fa-
cilitate as instruments in the two-stage estimation. Most of these determinants
are based on the literature discussed in Section 3.2.1 on the motives of preda-
tion and aggressive reaction to entry. First, we expect incumbents with more
assets and cash available to be more likely to engage in predation. We use pre-
fight average assets and pre-fight average cash-to-assets to measure the financial
size and liquidity of a carrier during the pre-fight period. Second, we expect
engagement in predation to be related to the type of entrant and the incum-
bent’s incentives to respond. We use entrant carrier fixed e↵ects to capture the
variation in the type of entrant, and the pre-fight route population (measured
by the logarithm of the average end-point population) and the pre-fight incum-
bent network extent (measured by incumbent available seat miles) to capture
incentives to respond. We expect incumbents to have more incentives to react
predatory in larger markets due to higher stakes and when they are active in
many routes due to higher reputation gains. All variables are averages of the
pre-fight period and thus more likely to be exogenous.
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Our descriptive statistics reveal that firm and market characteristics are
highly comparable for predatory and non-predatory incumbents. This does
not help uncover the underlying mechanism that makes capacity increase the
chosen response to entry in about half of the examined fights. We thus look
further than the firm and market characteristics used in previous literature.
We argue that reacting predatory is likely related to the pre-entry incumbent
capacity. If capacity before entry is low relative to market extent then there
is more room to predate by increasing capacity post-entry. This implies that
predating through capacity is an available strategy for the incumbent. To
investigate this, we construct the variable capacity di↵erence that measures
the di↵erence between observed and expected route capacity during the pre-
fight period. We calculate expected route capacity by regressing the logarithm
of total available capacity in a given route and year-quarter on the following
exogenous market characteristics of the pre-fight period: the logarithm of the
average end-point population and its square, the general enplanement index
and its square (Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009), carrier fixed e↵ects, year-quarter
fixed e↵ects and route-fight fixed e↵ects. Capacity di↵erence is then calculated
by subtracting the estimated expected route capacity from the observed route
capacity in each route and averaging over the pre-fight period. We expect
the likelihood of engaging in predation to be decreasing as capacity di↵erence
increases. A higher capacity di↵erence implies that observed route capacity
is higher than expected route capacity and that the incumbent may not have
enough room to further increase capacity after entry.
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C. Predatory recoupment
We also test for a second necessary condition for predation, namely the extent to
which recoupment of the predatory investment is likely to occur. This analysis
attempts to quantify the material gains of predation and to test the extent
to which these are realised after the exit of competitors. We estimate the
relative price premium and relative capacity of predatory and non-predatory
incumbents in the fight and post-fight periods with respect to the pre-fight
period. Recoupment of the predatory investment by predatory incumbents
would imply a significant increase in prices for given capacity in the post-fight
period. However, we should expect no change between the pre- and post-
fight period for non-predatory incumbents.
The relative price and capacity are estimated by exploiting the within-
market variation due to the entry and exit in each route. The panel structure
of our data allows us to control for time invariant carrier and route heterogene-
ity. We also include year-quarter fixed e↵ects to ensure that our results are
not driven by changes in unobserved factors that are time specific. Finally, we
control for potential market growth by means of the following variables: the
general enplanement index and its square, and the logarithm of the average
end-point population and its square. These control variables were first intro-
duced by Borenstein and Rose (1994) and have been frequently employed in
the airline pricing literature in order to capture exogenous variation in market
size (Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009; Dai et al, 2014). This way we ensure that our
identified coe cients are not biased as a result of market growth or decline.
For example, growth in market size may result in firms enjoying higher premia
over time and could bias our price coe cients upwards.
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3.4 Empirical analysis
3.4.1 Logit estimation
Table 3.4 reports the results of the first analysis on predatory intent, that is
the e↵ect of a predatory response on the likelihood of winning a fight. The first
and second column report the logistic regression estimates with the dependent
variable incumbent wins on three sets of variables: firm characteristics, market
characteristics and strategic variables in the disposal of the incumbent.
In the first column, all variables are included except from the predatory
response indicator. Incumbent size, relative e ciency and relative airport dom-
inance have a positive e↵ect on the probability of the incumbent winning the
fight. Moreover, the cost structure of a carrier appears to be important in the
determination of the winner. LCCs are more likely to win a fight irrespective
of whether they are incumbents or entrants. We find that the incumbent being
an LCC has a positive and significant e↵ect on the probability of the incum-
bent winning the fight, while the entrant being an LCC has a negative and
significant e↵ect on the probability of the incumbent winning the fight. Fur-
thermore, we find little evidence for market characteristics having a significant
e↵ect on the likelihood of the incumbent winning a fight. The coe cients of
interest with regards to predatory intent are the coe cients of the price and
capacity ratio. We estimate a negative and significant coe cient for the price
ratio (  2.978) and a positive and significant coe cient for the capacity ratio
(1.498). These are in accordance with our expectations. First, the lower the
average price of the incumbent after entry, the more likely it is for an incum-
bent to win, ceteris paribus. Second, the higher the capacity of the incumbent
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 (1) (2) Avg. marginal effect 
Firm characteristics 
Relative size -0.075 
(0.057) 
-0.089 
(0.066) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
Incumbent size 0.717** 
(0.301) 
0.729** 
(0.302) 
0.066*** 
(0.024) 
Relative efficiency 3.792** 
(1.630) 
3.643** 
(1.620) 
0.332*** 
(0.117) 
Relative liquidity 0.002 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
Incumbent LCC 2.276*** 
(0.887) 
2.100** 
(0.919) 
0.191*** 
(0.075) 
Entrant LCC -1.709** 
(0.766) 
-1.654** 
(0.750) 
-0.151** 
(0.060) 
Relative airport dominance 0.505*** 
(0.173) 
0.515*** 
(0.181) 
0.047*** 
(0.017) 
Relative experience 0.258 
(0.209) 
0.285 
(0.203) 
0.026 
(0.017) 
Market characteristics 
Average population -0.147 
(0.206) 
-0.122 
(0.224) 
-0.011 
(0.021) 
Average personal income -0.440* 
(0.261) 
-0.381 
(0.275) 
-0.035 
(0.024) 
Average airport share 0.423 
(0.358) 
0.516 
(0.375) 
0.047 
(0.036) 
Market extent 0.128 
(0.087) 
0.090 
(0.093) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
Market demand -0.894* 
(0.486) 
-0.929* 
(0.531) 
-0.085* 
(0.046) 
Strategic variables 
Price change ratio -2.978** 
(1.326) 
-3.033** 
(1.383) 
-0.276** 
(0.124) 
Capacity change ratio 1.498*** 
(0.448) 
0.399 
(0.481) 
0.036 
(0.043) 
Predatory response indicator  1.730*** 
(0.639) 
0.157*** 
(0.059) 
Observations 245 245  
Pseudo R-squared 0.509 0.532  
Table 3.4 Logistic regression estimates on the probability of the incumbent being the winner
of a fight. The dependent variable in all specifications is incumbent wins. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. Standardised coe cients are reported for incumbent size,
average population, average income and average airport size. Significance levels are indicated
by: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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after entry, the more likely it is for an incumbent to win, ceteris paribus. Con-
trolling for firm and market characteristics, but also for price changes after
entry, we find that incumbents with a higher capacity after entry are more
likely to win a fight against their new rival.
In the second column of Table 3.4, we estimate the same model as in the
first column and include the predatory response indicator. The estimated coef-
ficients for the firm and market characteristics are highly comparable and our
conclusions remain unchanged. The coe cient of the price ratio is also neg-
ative and significant (  3.033) as in the previous specification. However, the
estimated coe cient of the capacity ratio is now not significantly di↵erent from
zero at conventional significance levels. The capacity e↵ect is fully absorbed by
the predatory indicator, which has a positive and significant coe cient (1.730).
Incumbents that increase capacity after entry are more likely to win a fight.
Distinguishing predatory from competitive capacity changes is su cient in ex-
plaining why certain incumbents are more likely to win a fight than others. Our
results therefore provide evidence for e↵ective predatory capacity responses to
entry. In the third column of Table 3.4, we report average marginal e↵ects for
the logistic regression of the model specification in the second column, i.e. in-
cluding the predatory response indicator. We find that engaging in a predatory
capacity response increases the probability of incumbents winning a fight by
approximately 16 percentage points, on average. For comparison, this e↵ect is
similar in magnitude to the e↵ect of being an LCC. An incumbent being an
LCC increases the probability of winning a fight by 19 percentage points, while
an entrant being an LCC lowers the probability of the incumbent winning a
fight by approximately 15 percentage points, on average.
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3.4.2 Two-stage estimation
We use a linear two-stage model in order to avoid forbidden regression specifica-
tion issues due to the binary endogenous regressor (Hausman, 1983). Two-stage
least squares (2SLS) are preferred because only a least squares estimation of
the first stage is guaranteed to yield residuals that are uncorrelated with the
fitted values and covariates. An alternative for modelling a non-linear first
stage exists (e.g., Adams et al, 2009) but is not recommended when the depen-
dent variable in both stages is binary (Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Wooldridge,
2010). 2SLS estimates are consistent albeit less e cient than estimates that
take into account the non-linear nature of the dependent variables. This is less
important in our case as we are interested in average marginal e↵ects.
Table 3.5 reports the 2SLS estimates of our analysis on predatory intent.
The second stage estimates are presented in a similar manner to the logistic
regression estimates of Table 3.4. We also report the estimates of a linear
regression of the second specification in Table 3.4 for comparison. Both the
linear regression and 2SLS results are largely in line with the ones in our logit
estimation. Despite the loss of e ciency due to the linear model, we find com-
parable average marginal e↵ects for most firm and market characteristics. The
coe cients of the incumbent LCC indicator and relative airport dominance
are two exceptions, as they become insignificant in this specification. Some
market characteristics (population, airport size and market extent) are esti-
mated to be significant in contrast to the logit specifications, although they
maintain their sign and relative magnitude at means. The coe cients of all
strategic variables are also similar to the ones in the logit specifications and
yield comparable average marginal e↵ects. For example, a predatory response
to entry increases the probability of the incumbent winning a fight by approx-
imately 22 percentage points, on average.
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 Linear regression Second stage 2SLS 
Firm characteristics   
Relative size -0.001 (0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Incumbent size 0.055* (0.030) 
0.055* 
(0.029) 
Relative efficiency 0.143*** (0.040) 
0.143*** 
(0.039) 
Relative liquidity 0.001*** (0.000) 
0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Incumbent LCC 0.043 (0.092) 
0.043 
(0.089) 
Entrant LCC -0.166** (0.069) 
-0.165** 
(0.066) 
Relative airport dominance 0.000 (0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Relative experience 0.011** (0.004) 
0.011** 
(0.004) 
Market characteristics   
Average population -0.059** (0.029) 
-0.059** 
(0.028) 
Average personal income -0.052 (0.036) 
-0.052 
(0.034) 
Average airport share 0.055** (0.027) 
0.055** 
(0.026) 
Market extent 0.026*** (0.007) 
0.026*** 
(0.007) 
Market demand -0.045 (0.051) 
-0.045 
(0.051) 
Strategic variables   
Price change ratio -0.302** (0.152) 
-0.302** 
(0.147) 
Capacity change ratio 0.02 (0.019) 
0.021 
(0.033) 
Predatory response indicator 0.221*** (0.060) 
0.222** 
(0.105) 
Observations 245 245 
R-squared 0.347 0.347 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.5 Linear regression and two-stage least square (2SLS) estimates on the probability
of the incumbent being the winner of a fight. The dependent variable in all specifications
is incumbent wins. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standardised co-
e cients are reported for incumbent size, average population, average income and average
airport size. Significance levels are indicated by: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Instruments 
 
Pre-fight average assets -0.039  (0.089) 
Pre-fight average cash-to-assets -0.835  (0.880) 
Pre-fight route population -0.782***  (0.229) 
Pre-fight incumbent network extent -0.359  (0.236) 
Capacity difference -0.222*** (0.074) 
Entrant fixed effects Yes 
Observations 245 
F-statistic 3.691*** 
R-squared 0.546 
 
 
 
Table 3.6 Estimated coe cients for the instruments used in first stage of the two-stage
(2SLS) model on predatory intention. The dependent variable is the predatory response in-
dicator. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated
by: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
The estimated coe cients of the first stage instruments are presented in
Table 3.6. The explanatory power of the included instruments is good and our
model identifies a couple of predation determinants. We find no evidence for
deep pocket motives since the coe cients of the pre-fight asset and cash vari-
ables are both insignificant. In addition, we find no evidence for the incumbent
network extent having an e↵ect on the engagement in predation. Contrary to
our expectation, we find that incumbents are more likely to increase capacity
after entry in smaller routes. An explanation for this empirical finding may be
that reacting predatory in smaller markets is likely to be less risky for incum-
bents who want to stay under the radar of competition authorities. Another
explanation may be that smaller markets are less likely to maintain more than
one firm, so that a predatory response is more likely to be e↵ective. In accor-
dance with our expectation, we find that capacity di↵erence in the pre-fight
period has a negative e↵ect on the likelihood of engaging in predation. The
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higher observed route capacity is relative to expected route capacity, the lower
the chance of the incumbent responding predatory to entry. This suggests
that the decision to react predatory may depend on whether incumbents still
have room to increase capacity in the given market after entry, that is whether
predating through capacity increase is a feasible strategic response.
3.4.3 Predatory recoupment
The estimates of the price and capacity analysis of fights with predatory and
non-predatory incumbents are reported in Tables 3.7 and 3.8, respectively. The
dependent variable of the price specification is the logarithm of the median price
of the carrier-route-quarter price distribution. The dependent variable of the
capacity specification is the logarithm of the total available seats of a carrier
in a given route and quarter. The reported coe cients can be interpreted as
percentages with respect to our reference category, which is the pre-fight period.
All specifications include route-fight, year-quarter and carrier fixed e↵ects, and
the market controls described in Section 3.3.3.
Our results indicate that predatory incumbents are more likely to exploit
market power after the exit of their rival compared to non-predatory incum-
bents. Controlling for market size and unobservables that are route, carrier and
time specific, we find that predatory incumbents increase prices significantly in
the post-fight period (approximately 4% higher than pre-fight). However, the
post-fight prices of non-predatory incumbents remain below the pre-fight level
(approximately 3% lower). Furthermore, we estimate that the post-fight capac-
ity of predatory incumbents remains above the pre-fight level (approximately
34% higher), while the post-fight capacity of non-predatory incumbents is not
significantly di↵erent from their capacity in the pre-fight period. Maintaining
excess capacity in the post-fight period may indicate that predatory incumbents
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 Price Capacity 
Incumbent   
Fight period  -0.099*** (0.017) 
0.444*** 
(0.117) 
Post-fight period (winner) 0.036** (0.015) 
0.341***  
(0.101) 
Entrant   
Fight period  -0.180***  (0.027) 
0.241 
(0.171) 
Post-fight period (winner) 0.088 (0.072) 
0.659*** 
(0.197) 
Controls   
Route-fight FE Yes Yes 
Year-quarter and carrier FE Yes Yes 
Market controls Yes Yes 
Number of fights 118 118 
Observations 3.419 4.092 
 
 Table 3.7 Price and capacity analysis of predatory fights. The reference category is the
pre-fight period of the predatory fight. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Significance levels are indicated by: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
 Price Capacity 
Incumbent   
Fight period -0.071*** (0.017) 
-0.633*** 
(0.117) 
Post-fight period (winner) -0.031** (0.016) 
-0.055 
(0.100) 
Entrant   
Fight period   -0.095*** (0.027) 
-0.307*  
(0.174) 
Post-fight period (winner) -0.070 ** (0.031) 
0.392**  
(0.155) 
Controls   
Route-fight FE Yes Yes 
Year-quarter and carrier FE Yes Yes 
Market controls Yes Yes 
Number of fights 138 138 
Observations 3.572 4.857 
 
 
 
Table 3.8 Price and capacity analysis of non-predatory fights. The reference category is
the pre-fight period of the non-predatory fight. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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realise that their capacity was too low before entry. Furthermore, it may be
a way for the (now experienced) winner to prevent further entry to the mar-
ket (Spence, 1977; Dixit, 1980). Overall, we find that predatory incumbents
increase prices above the pre-fight level, while their o↵ered capacity is also sig-
nificantly higher in the post-fight period. Given that our empirical analysis
exploits within market variation, the cost structure of firms is unlikely to be
a↵ected by the entry and/or exit. Since the post-fight revenue of predatory
fights is estimated to be significantly higher, we can thus infer that profitabil-
ity also likely increases. This is not the case in non-predatory fights. This
can be seen as an attempt to recoup the predatory investment or as evidence
for material gains from successful predation.
3.4.4 Robustness analyses
We perform a number of additional analyses to ensure the robustness of our
conclusions. First, we use the number of departures instead of the total seat
capacity of the carrier to construct the capacity change ratio and the predatory
response indicator. We thus examine whether carriers respond to entry by
o↵ering additional flights or simply increase the carrying capacity of existing
flights. The new capacity change ratio is calculated by dividing the average
number of departures of the incumbent during the fight period by its average
number of departures during the pre-fight period. Similarly, the new predatory
response indicator is equal to 1 if carriers increase their average departures after
entry and 0 if they maintain the same average departures or reduce departures
after entry. We estimate using 2SLS and instrument the new predatory response
indicator as described in Section 3.3.3. The results are reported in Table 3.9
together with the output of our main 2SLS specification in which we use the
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 Seats (Base) Departures ≤ 4 years ≤ 3 years 
Firm characteristics     
Relative size -0.001 (0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Incumbent size 0.055* (0.029) 
0.060** 
(0.030) 
0.061 
(0.038) 
0.074* 
(0.039) 
Relative efficiency 0.143*** (0.039) 
0.135*** 
(0.041) 
0.091*** 
(0.031) 
0.082*** 
(0.030) 
Relative liquidity 0.001*** (0.000) 
0.000** 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Incumbent LCC 0.043 (0.089) 
0.043 
(0.089) 
0.153 
(0.096) 
0.173 
(0.112) 
Entrant LCC -0.165** (0.066) 
-0.175*** 
(0.068) 
-0.031 
(0.083) 
0.049 
(0.090) 
Relative airport dominance 0.000 (0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Relative experience 0.011** (0.004) 
0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
Market characteristics     
Average population -0.059** (0.028) 
-0.063** 
(0.027) 
-0.024 
(0.032) 
0.018 
(0.035) 
Average personal income -0.052 (0.034) 
-0.055 
(0.035) 
-0.048 
(0.044) 
-0.090* 
(0.046) 
Average airport share 0.055** (0.026) 
0.056** 
(0.026) 
0.089** 
(0.035) 
0.090** 
(0.035) 
Market extent 0.026*** (0.007) 
0.027*** 
(0.007) 
0.014 
(0.009) 
0.015 
(0.009) 
Market demand -0.045 (0.051) 
-0.035 
(0.051) 
0.004 
(0.054) 
-0.085* 
(0.051) 
Strategic variables     
Price change ratio -0.302** (0.147) 
-0.309** 
(0.147) 
-0.508** 
(0.216) 
-0.525** 
(0.242) 
Capacity change ratio 0.021 (0.033) 
0.017 
(0.026) 
0.001 
(0.022) 
-0.025 
(0.028) 
Predatory response 
indicator 
0.222** 
(0.105) 
0.212** 
(0.103) 
0.259** 
(0.101) 
0.352*** 
(0.102) 
Observations 245 245 129 101 
Pseudo R-squared 0.347 0.345 0.369 0.343 
 
 Table 3.9 Robustness analyses 2SLS estimates. In the second column, the capacity change
ratio and predatory response indicator are calculated using carrier departures instead of seat
capacity. In the third and fourth column, the selection of fights is reduced to fights with a
duration less or equal to 4 and 3 years, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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total seat capacity of the carrier (see Table 3.5). The estimated coe cients for
the firm and market characteristics are similar, as well as the coe cients for
the strategic variables. Our conclusions thus remain the same.
Second, we restrict the number of years between entry and exit to refine
the type of fight examined. As reported above, 50% of the examined fights last
less than 4 years and 25% of the examined fights last longer than 6.5 years.
We exclude stepwise longer fights from our analysis in order to ensure we are
studying real fights between incumbents and entrants. The potential bias that
is introduced by examining all fights is likely to be downward if a number of
those longer fights end with, for instance, a merger between firms and not an
exit. Table 3.9 also reports the results of repeating the 2SLS analysis and
restricting the fight duration to 4 and 3 years, respectively. Despite the loss of
observations, our conclusions remain the same when looking at shorter fights.
In fact, the estimated marginal e↵ects of the price ratio and the predatory
indicator are larger in magnitude the shorter the fight examined. Controlling
for firm and market characteristics, and for price changes after entry, we find
that a predatory capacity response increases the probability of the incumbent
winning a fight by approximately 26 and 35 percentage points in fights that are
shorter or equal to 4 and 3 years, respectively (on average).
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3.5 Conclusion
In an extensive ex-post analysis of 256 instances of entry in monopoly in the
U.S. airline industry, we find evidence of behaviour that is consistent with pre-
dation, i.e. engagement in short-term irrational actions that e↵ectively lead to
competitor exit, restoration of monopoly power and increased future profits.
The novelty of our work in the empirical examination of predation is to put
forward an identification framework that relies solely on capacity and not on
the traditional comparison of price and cost, but also to investigate and em-
pirically test predation determinants. Our empirical setting of 256 fights in
duopoly is unique, especially in the examination of responses to entry. Pre-
vious theoretical literature studies similar contexts under relatively specific
assumptions, while the empirical literature focuses on a limited number of
cases (e.g. Kwoka and Batkeyev, 2019).
Our research has significant implications for policymakers. Our empirical
evidence suggests that predation not only takes place but has also been suc-
cessful in the U.S. airline industry. This is alarming for an industry in which
concentration significantly increased in recent years. Exploring the motives of
predation reveals that engagement in predatory tactics is likely related to the
extent to which a market is saturated with respect to capacity in the pre-fight
period. This suggests that predation may be related to engagement in anti-
competitive conduct before the entry occurs. A trade o↵ between pre- and
post-entry responses, would imply that predation may be path dependent and
thus less likely to occur when the incumbent attempted to deter entry by pre-
emption. The calculation of expected capacity based on exogenous market
characteristics may therefore present an opportunity for identifying markets
where predation is more likely to occur in practice.
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Further research is necessary to support the predation identification frame-
work put forward in this chapter and examine its applicability and external
validity. A potential avenue for future empirical work would be to examine
fights that do not necessarily end with an exit. These may be fights in which
firms initially react aggressively or even predatory but eventually choose to
accommodate. These may also be fights that return to monopoly through a
merger between the two competitors. Looking at firm responses in these di↵er-
ent types of fight may reveal more about the reasons why certain incumbents
react predatory and others do not and can provide additional robustness to
the results presented in this chapter. Finally, while it is out of the scope of
this chapter to estimate firm costs, doing so would allow to demonstrate re-
coupment by means of profitability and not by relying on revenue and making
assumptions about the cost structure of firms.
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On the benefits of being alone:
scheduling changes, intensity of
competition and dynamic pricing
4.1 Introduction
Dynamic pricing strategies are commonly used by firms that sell a perishable
good and face aggregate demand uncertainty. Dynamic pricing enables these
firms to change prices based on available inventory and time to perishability, a
common practice in the pricing of airline tickets, hotel rooms, car rentals and
tickets for music or sports events. A frequently used form of dynamic pricing in
this context is to o↵er advance purchase discounts (APDs), where firms charge
lower prices at the beginning of the fixed period of time in which the good is
available for purchase. APDs can be an optimal pricing strategy for firms selling
a perishable good, mainly for two reasons. First, they can assist in covering the
large fixed costs of holding (potentially unused) inventories and in improving
†This chapter is based on the working paper titled ”On the Benefits of Being Alone: Schedul-
ing Changes, Intensity of Competition and Dynamic Airline Pricing” and is joint work with
Bas Karreman.
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capacity utilisation (Dana, 1999)1. Second, they can facilitate intertemporal
price discrimination when consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their
preferences to purchase and uncertain about their own demand. This is because
APDs induce consumers with weak preferences or low demand uncertainty to
purchase in advance and consumers with strong preferences or high demand
uncertainty to postpone purchasing (Dana, 1998).
An important concern in this context is understanding how the presence and
intensity of competition may a↵ect APDs. Previous theoretical literature shows
that o↵ering APDs can be an optimal pricing strategy both in the presence
and absence of market power (Gale and Holmes, 1992; Dana, 1998; Mo¨ller
and Watanabe, 2010), but finds that competition between firms a↵ects the size
of the discounts (Gale, 1993; Dana, 1999; Mo¨ller and Watanabe, 2016). These
studies predict that firms will o↵er higher APDs under oligopolistic competition
compared to a profit-maximising monopolist. This result is driven by firms
incentive to capture consumers with more certain demands who are willing to
purchase early and to prevent losing them to their rivals in the future. Dana
(1999) also shows that prices in this setting become more dispersed as a market
becomes more competitive, which may suggest that the size of APDs may
be positively related to the intensity of competition2. Despite the extensive
1Improving capacity utilisation in this context is also the subject of the extensive operations
research literature on revenue management initiated by Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) and
Bitran and Mondschein (1997) that considers the problem of dynamically pricing perishable
goods over a finite time horizon under di↵erent assumptions on market structure, demand
uncertainty, product homogeneity and strategic consumer behaviour (e.g., Zhao and Zheng,
2000; Su, 2007; Levin et al, 2009; Mart´ınez-de-Albe´niz and Talluri, 2011; Gallego and Hu,
2014).
2Dana (1999) views a rise in competition, similar to Arrow (1962), as a rise in the number
of firms in the industry and a decrease in market concentration. We use the term intensity of
competition in a similar way to Boone (2000; 2001) and Bonanno and Haworth (1998) to also
refer to a rise in competition given the market structure or number of firms. For example,
Aghion, Harris, and Vickers (1997) view a switch from Cournot to Bertrand competition as
a rise in the intensity of competition. This is because Cournot competition generally leads
to higher prices and lower output compared to Bertrand competition, so we can think of the
latter as a context where competition is more intense (see also Delbono and Denicolo, 1990;
Bester and Petrakis, 1993).
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theoretical predictions on the e↵ect of competition on APDs, empirical evidence
is still missing. This chapter attempts to fill this gap in the literature by
studying how competition a↵ects the dynamic pricing (in general) and APDs
(in particular) of carriers in the U.S. airline industry.
The airline industry arguably provides a good empirical setting since it
closely approximates the context in the models of Gale (1993), Dana (1998,
1999) and Mo¨ller and Watanabe (2016). First, airlines choose the number of
tickets they would like to o↵er in advance and any unsold inventory perishes at
the time of departure. Capacity, which is also chosen in advance, is relatively
costly to modify throughout the booking period. Second, there is individual
demand uncertainty and customers are heterogeneous and learn their prefer-
ences over time, which provides scope for (intertemporal) price discrimination.
Customers with weak time preferences and/or a more certain demand for travel
(leisure travellers) are more willing to purchase in advance, while customers with
strong time preferences and/or an uncertain demand (business travellers) are
willing to postpone purchasing until they can make a more informed decision.
Studying the e↵ect of competition on dynamic airline pricing is an important
topic since the vast majority of airline markets are oligopolistic, while previous
empirical work in the dynamic airline pricing literature focuses on markets in
which firms have monopoly power (Lazarev, 2013; Williams, 2018). Other re-
cent empirical work on airline pricing studies the e↵ect of changes in stochastic
demand and available seats on the temporal profile of fares, i.e. the development
of prices over time during the booking period (Escobari and Gan, 2007; Esco-
bari, 2012; Alderighi et al, 2015). This work provides evidence for two common
regularities in airline pricing, namely that fares monotonically increase with
flight occupancy and as the departure date nears. While an increasing tempo-
ral profile of fares is evidence for the use of APDs, the e↵ect of competition
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has not yet been studied directly in this context. Some of the above empirical
work only looks at di↵erences between routes with di↵erent market structures
at a descriptive level or studies potential moderating e↵ects of competition.
For example, Alderighi et al (2015) study whether market concentration is a
moderator of the e↵ect of available seats on the temporal profile of airline fares.
For our analysis, we collect a unique panel dataset of airline fare quotes for
more than 2,300 flights in the 100 busiest U.S. domestic routes based on the
number of yearly transported passengers reported by the Bureau of Transporta-
tion Statistics (BTS). This comprises a significant share of the U.S. domestic
market (approximately 40% of the total passengers transported). The dataset
allows us to track the listed prices of all carriers operating flights in those routes
for 95 days prior to the departure and additional information at the flight and
ticket level, such as the departure time, fare class and aircraft type. Our dataset
di↵ers from previous empirical research on airline price discrimination that uses
average quarterly data from the BTS (e.g., Borenstein and Rose, 1994; Gerardi
and Shapiro, 2009), but also from previously collected dynamic price data that
focuses on a single carrier or o↵ers variation in flights between but not within
routes (e.g., Escobari, 2012; Alderighi et al, 2015).
Since markets in our dataset (and the airline industry) are to a large extent
oligopolistic, it is arguably better to measure competition by looking at its
intensity while taking market structure as given3. The detailed structure of
our data allows us to develop a new measure of competition for which we
use the proximity (in departure time) of a given flight to its competitors to
estimate the intensity of competition between firms. This measure is inspired
3In the airline industry, the di↵erence between legacy and low-cost carrier competition is a
well-known example of a di↵erent intensity of competition for a given market structure. In
a recent empirical study of airline fares, Brueckner et al (2013) find, for example, that most
forms of legacy carrier competition have a weak e↵ect on average fares, while low-cost carrier
competition impacts fares dramatically.
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by the Hotelling model of spatial competition (Hotelling, 1929), where the
distance in space becomes equivalent to the distance in time between flights.
Measuring competition in this way has several advantages. First, conceptually,
it better captures interfirm rivalry and customer stealing motives that may lead
to an increase in APDs, which is the underlying mechanism in the models of
Gale (1993) and Mo¨ller and Watanabe (2016). Second, practically, directly
measuring competition by looking at the proximity to rivals eliminates the
need to make indirect inferences about the intensity of competition based on
the market structure (e.g., market concentration or number of firms).
Our empirical analysis exploits plausibly exogenous changes in flight sched-
ules (i.e. departure time changes or flight cancellations) during the booking
period to estimate the impact of competition on APDs and the temporal pro-
file of airline fares. These changes are arguably unrelated to carriers’ dynamic
pricing decisions but lead to shifts in the relative proximity of competing flights
in a day. This has an impact on the average temporal distance of flights (i.e. the
average distance in time of a given flight to all competing flights in a day), which
is our measure of competition. Furthermore, we analyse the temporal profile of
airline fares at the flight level, which allows us to control for route-specific (e.g.,
route size and airport or route dominance), carrier-specific (e.g., cost e ciency
and customer loyalty) and flight-specific (e.g., departure time preferences) time-
invariant characteristics by means of panel fixed e↵ect techniques. This way we
can capture a significant part of the unobserved heterogeneity in prices.
Our work contributes to multiple strands of literature. First, it builds on the
extensive theoretical literature on APDs in the dynamic pricing of perishable
goods under demand uncertainty (Gale and Holmes, 1992; Gale, 1993; Dana,
1998; 1999; Mo¨ller and Watanabe, 2010; 2016) to provide novel empirical evi-
dence of APDs increasing with the intensity of competition. Second, it extends
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the empirical literature on dynamic airline pricing by studying oligopolistic
markets and the e↵ect of competition on the temporal profile of airline prices
(Escobari, 2012; Lazarev, 2013; Alderighi et al, 2015; Williams, 2018). Fi-
nally, it has implications for the airline price discrimination literature, which
studies the e↵ect of competition on price dispersion using average prices and
finds mixed results (Borenstein and Rose, 1994; Gerardi and Shapiro, 2009;
Gaggero and Piga, 2011; Dai et al, 2014).
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 discusses
the relevant theoretical and empirical literature on APDs and the airline indus-
try. Section 4.3 discusses the data collection process and introduces our measure
of competition and the empirical methodology. Section 4.4 reports the empirical
results of the main and robustness analyses. Finally, Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Background
4.2.1 Advance purchase discounts
Prescott (1975) first developed a model of hotel competition to describe a com-
petitive equilibrium when homogeneous goods are perishable, aggregate de-
mand is uncertain and firms set prices before demand is realised. In this model,
which was later formalised by Eden (1990), firms sell goods at several prices,
so interfirm and intrafirm price dispersion arises in equilibrium. The Prescott
model and its extensions are still frequently used to describe price dispersion in
markets where prices vary over time, such as the airline, hotel and car rental in-
dustry. Dana (1998) extends the Prescott model and considers firms that o↵er
advance purchase discounts (APD) in a competitive market with heterogeneous
consumers and individual demand uncertainty. He shows that APDs may be
an optimal (intertemporal) price discrimination strategy for firms even in the
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absence of market power. The reason that price discrimination arises in equi-
librium is that consumers with relatively certain demands and lower valuations
have an incentive to purchase the good in advance because the presence of con-
sumers with higher valuations and uncertain demands increases the likelihood
of the former being rationed in the spot market4. In equilibrium, firms exploit
this heterogeneity in preferences and screen consumers based on their demand
uncertainty to reduce the costs of holding potentially unused inventory.
Existing literature on APDs also extends these findings from a competi-
tive market to a monopoly (Gale and Holmes, 1992; 1993; Dana, 1999; 2001;
Mo¨ller and Watanabe, 2010; Nocke et al, 2011). Similar to other price dis-
crimination practices, APDs may promote e ciency by increasing output in
markets with elastic demand and assist firms in covering large fixed costs. Gale
and Holmes (1992) examine the optimisation problems of a social planner and
an unregulated monopolist and find that APDs arise in both solutions and
can assist in the e cient allocation of fixed capacity. The authors also show
in a di↵erent paper that APDs are a profit-maximising pricing strategy be-
cause they can help airline monopolists divert demand from peak to o↵-peak
periods (Gale and Holmes, 1993). Mo¨ller and Watanabe (2010) show that
APDs are part of the monopolists optimal pricing strategy when consumers
face a positive risk of becoming rationed and provide conditions under which
APDs are rational to use in equilibrium. Two relevant conditions for the air-
line industry are that APDs are found to be profitable when monopolists can
implement capacity limits during the purchase period and when capacity is
relatively costly and must be chosen in advance.
4The term spot market is used in a similar way to Dana (1998) to di↵erentiate the immediate
purchase from the advance purchase market and is not necessarily related to a market clearing
situation.
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Previous theoretical work also compares the monopoly equilibrium to a sit-
uation with oligopolistic competition, which is relevant for our empirical anal-
ysis. These studies show that the use of APDs is a profitable pricing strategy
for both monopolists and oligopolists and suggest that the size of the discounts
is positively related to the intensity of competition. Gale and Holmes (1992)
develop a model that compares the use of APDs in an airline route with two
flights in the following situations: (i) both flights are operated by a profit-
maximising monopolist, (ii) both flights are operated by a welfare-maximising
social planner, and (iii) each one of the flights is operated by a non-cooperative
duopolist. They consider equilibria with and without capacity constraints and
show that duopolists always have an incentive to employ APDs because that
allows them to expand output. In the case of no capacity shortage, they find
that duopolists will o↵er APDs to compete for consumers with elastic demand,
while the monopoly and social planner equilibria do not involve APDs. Gale
(1993) provides further intuition for that result by comparing a non-cooperative
duopoly with a monopoly in a similar setting (i.e. multiple flights on a route
departing at di↵erent times in a day). He shows that competition to conquer
less time-sensitive travellers is stronger in an oligopoly compared to a monopoly.
As a result, prices at the lower-end of the fare distribution decrease with com-
petition, which implies that firms implement larger APDs. Mo¨ller and Watan-
abe (2016) also prove this by considering di↵erentiated products in a model of
oligopolistic competition with individual demand uncertainty. In their model,
firms o↵er APDs in equilibrium and these discounts are larger in the case of
oligopolistic competition compared to a monopoly. The intuition behind this
result is similar to Gale (1993), namely firms trying to capture customers in
advance and prevent losing them to their rival in the future. Finally, Dana
(1999) finds evidence for intrafirm price dispersion due to APDs in both the
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monopoly and oligopoly equilibrium and shows that price dispersion increases
as the market becomes more competitive, which is in accordance with patterns
documented in the airline industry (Borenstein and Rose, 1994; Stavins, 2001).
4.2.2 The airline industry
The airline industry provides a natural setting to examine the impact of com-
petition on APDs for several reasons. First, the assumptions in the models
of Gale and Holmes (1992; 1993), Gale (1993), Dana (1998; 1999) and Mo¨ller
and Watanabe (2016) are to a large extent satisfied in this context: (i) airline
prices are set in advance and tickets have a clear expiration date, changes and
cancellations are costly and resale is not possible (perishability), (ii) airlines
choose their capacity in advance and adjustment throughout the booking pe-
riod is relatively costly (high marginal cost of capacity), and (iii) customers
can be divided into two distinct categories with respect to their certainty to
fly and departure time preferences, i.e. leisure (business) passengers with a
relatively certain (uncertain) demand to fly and low (high) time sensitivity
(customer heterogeneity and individual demand uncertainty). Second, there is
robust empirical evidence of airlines using APDs in their pricing strategies and
APDs partly explain (together with the impact of available seats and revenue
management) the increasing temporal profile of fares documented in previous
literature (Alderighi et al, 2015; Williams, 2018). Third, while airlines com-
pete in oligopolistic settings, the e↵ect of competition on dynamic pricing and
APDs has not been previously studied empirically.
Moreover, studying the e↵ect of competition on airline price dispersion is
incomplete without taking into account the impact of APDs. An increase in
APDs due to more competition would partially contribute towards a positive
relationship between competition and price dispersion. This occurs since fares
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at the lower-end of the price distribution, usually o↵ered by carriers at the
beginning of the booking period, decrease as competition increases. Existing
empirical literature on the e↵ect of competition on airline price dispersion has
so far not explicitly considered the intertemporal dimension and APDs, mainly
due to the lack of available dynamic pricing data. This is a likely explanation
for the mixed results previously reported. For example, Borenstein and Rose
(1994) study price dispersion by using average price data and report substantial
variation in airline fares, which they interpret as indirect evidence for price
discrimination. The authors find that the dispersion in prices is higher on routes
with more competition or lower flight density. Stavins (2001) also finds that
price dispersion decreases with market concentration by using ticket restrictions
(e.g., Saturday-night stayovers or advance purchase requirements) as a proxy
for price discrimination. Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) study the e↵ect of carrier
entry on price dispersion by using a panel of average price data and provide
evidence of the opposite e↵ect, namely that price dispersion decreases with
competition. Gaggero and Piga (2011) also report a similar finding. These
authors argue that increased competition and a loss in market power hinder
the ability of firms to price discriminate between business and leisure travellers,
leading to lower fares at the higher-end of the price distribution.
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4.3 Data and methodology
4.3.1 Data collection
Our data was collected using a web scraper that extracted listed price data
of airline tickets from two online sources: (i) ITA Matrix, which is an airline
ticket price aggregator website and (ii) the o cial website of Southwest Air-
lines, since Southwest does not publish its fares on other platforms. The web
scraper was programmed to collect the cheapest available economy class ticket
prices for all departures of all carriers operating flights in the 100 busiest U.S.
domestic routes based on the number of yearly transported passengers in 2017,
as reported by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS)5. The data was
collected between July and October 2018 and all flights depart on Monday,
October 22nd, 2018. The web scraper collected data every day at the same time
starting from 95 days prior to the departure date and up until the day before
departure. The carriers in our dataset are Alaska, American, Delta, Frontier,
Hawaiian, JetBlue, Mokulele, Southwest, Spirit and United. Our final panel
dataset consists of 2,338 direct, non-stop, one-way flight departures operated
by those carriers in the 100 routes (origin and destination airport pairs) and
95 observations over time for each flight. In addition to the listed ticket price,
we also collected the following information: flight departure time, flight arrival
time, flight duration, fare class and operating aircraft6.
5A detailed list of all routes used in our sample can be found in the Appendix of this chapter.
6We also collected data for two more departure dates that we use in robustness analyses.
The data was collected using the procedure that is described in Section 4.3.1. The additional
departure dates are Monday, January 28th, 2019, and Thursday, January 31st, 2019. All
dates were selected so that they do not coincide with (or are close to) any public holidays or
other significant events.
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The structure of the collected data allows us to consistently examine the
e↵ect of competition on the temporal profile of fares and control for confounding
sources of variation in airline prices. First, by using one-way rather than round-
trip tickets, we control for the price variation resulting from ticket restrictions
such as Saturday-night stayovers, or minimum/maximum stay requirements.
Second, by only using direct, non-stop flights, we control for potential price
variation due to more complex itineraries that are not likely to be viewed as
perfect substitutes by consumers (e.g., connecting flights). Third, by restricting
tickets in our sample to the cheapest available economy class and excluding
business and first class tickets, we limit the available classes of fares and reduce
price variation due to cost-related reasons. Fourth, by recording fare class
information, we are able to control for potential price variation resulting from
tickets with a higher degree of flexibility that may not be comparable to the
(usually) inflexible APD tickets. Finally, selecting a fixed departure date limits
the variation in demand that may arise by, for example, comparing flights in
the same route that depart at di↵erent dates. A unique feature of our data is
that it combines information on all flights on the selected routes with a fixed
departure date, which implies that all carriers and flights in a given route are
exposed to the same demand shocks at every given point in the booking period.
4.3.2 Descriptive evidence of APDs increasing with competition
In this section, we provide descriptive evidence of the e↵ect of competition
on APDs by looking at the temporal profile of fares in routes with a di↵erent
market structure. Figure 4.1 plots the temporal profile of the average fare in
5 groups of routes, each with a di↵erent number of operating carriers. Figure
4.2 plots the average fare in 4 groups of routes with a di↵erent Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI). We observe that average fares exhibit an increasing
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Figure 4.1 Temporal profile of the average fare in routes with a di↵erent number of operating
carriers. Refer to the legend in the figure for information on the di↵erent groups.
temporal profile, with a relatively steady development until about 20 days be-
fore departure and a steep increase in the remaining days before departure.
Similar to previous empirical work in dynamic airline pricing, there is clear
evidence of carriers using APDs irrespective of the market structure. More-
over, an increase in competition appears to have a significant impact on the
size of those discounts. Prices in routes with more carriers and routes with
lower concentration, as measured by the HHI, are lower early in the booking
period (until about 20 days before departure). After that point fares begin to
converge and there is no clear ordering based on the market structure neither
for the number of carriers nor the HHI groups7. As a result, intertemporal
price dispersion appears to be increasing with competition.
7An exception in this classification is the lowest HHI group (0  HHI < 0.2). The average
price of that group remains significantly lower compared to the other HHI groups, also during
the final 20 days before departure.
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Figure 4.2 Temporal profile of the average fare in routes with a di↵erent Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI). Refer to the legend in the figure for information on the di↵erent
groups.
4.3.3 Measuring the intensity of competition
While the above evidence does provide some insight into the e↵ect of compe-
tition on APDs, a cross-sectional comparison of routes with a di↵erent market
structure is problematic in this context for two reasons. First, it is subject
to several confounding factors that could bias the analysis and are di cult to
measure, such as customer heterogeneity, departure time preferences and route-
specific carrier pricing strategies. A solution to this issue would be to perform
an analysis at the flight level in order to control for time-invariant route, carrier
and flight characteristics by means of panel fixed e↵ects techniques. However,
this is not possible with existing measures of competition, such as market struc-
ture indicators and concentration indices, because these are fixed at the route
level. Second, economic theory of oligopolistic competition and empirical ev-
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idence from the airline industry suggest that it may not always be correct to
assume there is a one-to-one relationship between the intensity of competition
and market structure or concentration8. As a result, using indicators of market
structure would only allow making indirect inferences about the intensity of
competition and may fail to capture the interfirm rivalry and customer steal-
ing motives that drive the e↵ect of competition on APDs in the models of
Gale (1993) and Mo¨ller and Watanabe (2016).
To address the above issues, we develop a new measure for the intensity
of competition by exploiting information on the departure time of each flight,
which is a unique feature of our dataset. The idea of this measure is based
on the Hotelling model of spatial competition (Hotelling, 1929), which we ex-
trapolate to the temporal dimension. Borenstein and Netz (1999) use a similar
application of the Hotelling model to airline flight departures to study the e↵ect
of competition on di↵erentiation. In the original Hotelling model, firms com-
pete in prices and must decide where to locate on a linear stretch with uniformly
distributed consumers. In this setting, firms face a trade-o↵ between locating
close to their competitors in order to steal customers and locating farther away
from their competitors in order to increase di↵erentiation and reduce price com-
petition. Di↵erent assumptions explored by the main theory and extensions of
the Hotelling model (e.g., Eaton and Lipsey, 1976; d’Aspremont et al, 1979;
Osborne and Pitchik, 1985; Anderson, 1987) cause either one of these forces to
dominate, leading to a location choice with minimum di↵erentiation and max-
imum price competition (i.e. close to competitors) or maximum di↵erentiation
and minimum price competition (i.e. far away from competitors).
8An example with di↵erent intensities of competition for a given market structure from the
theory of oligopolistic competition is discussed in Footnote 2. An example from the empirical
airline literature is discussed in Footnote 3.
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In our context, airline competition can be analysed using the spatial Hotelling
framework, where the location of each flight is equivalent to the time of depar-
ture in a 24-hour time frame and the distance to competitors is equivalent to
the temporal distance between flights in minutes. Consumers are not located
physically, but over time by having preferred departure times (Douglas and
Miller, 1974). In our application, we are not concerned with the location choice
of a particular firm but take that as given and use it to infer the intensity
of price competition with other firms. Location choice is not relevant in our
analysis, since airlines announce their schedules in advance of the booking pe-
riod and compete in prices given their predetermined choice. Once the booking
period has started, location choice is no longer a strategic variable for airlines
since intermediary changes are (prohibitively) costly9.
To construct our competition measure we calculate pairwise the temporal
distance of a given flight to all other flights on a route and then compute
the average of those distances, which we define as the average temporal dis-
tance (ATD) of a flight. This is di↵erent from Borenstein and Netz (1999),
which looks at flight density (i.e. whether flights are evenly distributed over
the day) by computing the average distance between flights. Our measure is
therefore a flight-level measure of the relative temporal proximity to compe-
tition. We assume that the intensity of competition monotonically increases
as the temporal distance to competing flights decreases. The advantage of
our setting is that airline departures within a day are relatively homogeneous
after controlling for departure time preferences and carrier specific unobserv-
ables (e.g., cost heterogeneity or customer loyalty). This implies that any re-
maining di↵erence in prices can be attributed to the e↵ect of competition,
which we can measure with the ATD.
9We further elaborate on the assumption that scheduling changes during the booking period
are prohibitively costly for airlines in Section 4.3.4.
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The average temporal distance (ATD) of a given flight i on a route k, is cal-
culated as follows:
ATDik =
1
n  1
n 1X
i=1
nX
j>1
min

| di   dj |, 24  | di   dj |
 
(4.1)
where n denotes the number of daily flight departures on the route, d denotes
the departure time and j denotes other flights on the route during the day10. An
example of the calculation of the ATD is given in Figure 4.3. In this example,
there are 5 flights on a route departing at 7am, 11am, 12pm, 4pm and 8pm. To
find the ATD of the early morning flight, we compute the temporal di↵erence
(in hours) of that flight with each one of the other departing flights on the
route (4, 5, 9 and 13 hours, respectively) and then calculate the average, which
is equal to 7.75 hours. This procedure is repeated for each one of the departing
flights on the route. The ATDs of the remaining flights in the example are
reported below the departure time of each flight in Figure 4.3.
The ATD measure in Equation 4.1 has a number of limitations. First, all
flight pairs are given equal weight in the calculation of the average. While it may
be reasonable to assume that all same-day flights on a route compete with each
other, it is not likely that they all compete to the same extent. For example, a
flight scheduled at 8am likely competes with other morning departures at 10am
and 11am but may not compete with evening departures scheduled at 7pm
and 9pm. Second, flights departing early in the morning or late in the evening
have significantly higher ATDs since they only face one-sided competition (i.e.
competition from flights later/earlier during the day, respectively). The ATDs
of flights departing in between those times are significantly lower on average
since they face two-sided competition (i.e. competition from both earlier and
10The number 24 appears in Equation 4.1 because this is the number of hours in a day.
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ER-ATD  1.30 (0.57) (0.66) (1.30) (1.48) 
Figure 4.3 Example of flight departures on a route for the calculation of the ATD, LR-ATD
and ER-ATD. The value of the respective measure for each flight is reported below each
departure time.
later flights)11. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that our data concerns
a specific departure date, which means we miss information on flights departing
on the previous and following day. This type of censoring is especially important
for the early morning and late evening flights. For example, a flight departing at
11:30pm on Monday, October 22nd likely competes with another flight departing
at 12:30am on Tuesday, October 23rd, which is not in our dataset.
We address these issues by adding weights to the calculation of the ATD.
These weights are designed in such a way that the distance to immediate
neighbours of a given flight becomes more important in the calculation of
the average12. First, we rank all competing flight departures based on their
11This should not be surprising since the ATD is designed to measure the temporal proximity
to competition. Early morning and late evening flights are further away from other competing
flights during the day, which will be captured by the measure. However, the problem in this
case is that calculating the ATD in Equation 4.1 leads to highly dispersed ATD values and
large outliers (i.e. the early morning and late evening flights) in the distribution of ATDs in
a particular route.
12Borenstein and Netz (1999) also look at two measures in which immediate neighbours be-
come more important in the calculation of their (route-level) measure of the average distance
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distance to a given flight in ascending order. This implies that the closest
competing flight departure is ranked first and the farthest competing flight de-
parture is ranked last13. In the example of Figure 4.3, flights are therefore
ranked as follows: 11am (1st), 12pm (2nd), 4pm (3rd) and 8pm (4th). Sec-
ond, we use one of the following weights for each departure time di↵erence
pair | di   dj | depending on the rank r:
Linear rank : max
⇥
0 , 1  ↵ · r ⇤ ↵2⇥0, 1⇤
Exponential rank :   r  2
⇥
0, 1
⇤
We define the following two ATD measures, which we use in our main and
robustness analyses: (i) the Linear Rank Average Temporal Distance mea-
sure (LR-ATD), which uses the linear weight, and (ii) the Exponential Rank
Average Temporal Distance measure (ER-ATD), which uses the exponential
weight. The parameters ↵ and   measure the extent to which same-day flight
departures compete with each other. When ↵ is near 0 (  is near 1) then all
same-day flight departures are assumed to compete equally and have a sim-
ilar weight in the calculation of the average. As ↵ is approaching 1 (  is
approaching 0), direct neighbours in departure time become increasingly more
important in the calculation of the average14.
between flights.
13In the case that several competing flights depart at the same time, they are all assigned
the same rank (and thus weight) in the calculation of the average.
14When ↵ = 0 or   = 1, all competing flights receive the same weight and the two measures
become equivalent to the ATD in Equation 4.1. In the extreme case when ↵ = 1 or   = 0,
all competing flights receive zero weight irrespective of their distance to a given flight. This
can be interpreted as flights only competing with other flights departing at the exact same
time during the day.
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We calculate below the LR-ATD and ER-ATD of the early morning flight
from the example in Figure 4.3, assuming that ↵ = 15 and   =
1
2 , respectively:
LR-ATD07:00 =
1
4

4
5
|7  11|+ 3
5
|7  12|+ 2
5
|7  16|+ 1
5
|7  20|
 
= 3.1
ER-ATD07:00 =
1
4

1
2
|7  11|+ 1
4
|7  12|+ 1
8
|7  16|+ 1
16
|7  20|
 
' 1.3
The LR-ATD and ER-ATD of all other flights in the example are also reported
under each departure time in Figure 4.3. The dispersion in ATDs is significantly
reduced as a result of the introduction of the weights.
Our measure is highly flexible and the introduction of weighting o↵ers many
possibilities for accurately measuring the intensity of competition. For example,
we can exclude flights of the same carrier from the calculation of the ATD of
a given flight (interfirm weighting). This is likely important since many routes
in our sample have a large number of daily departures but only a few operating
carriers. Not accounting for the fact that flights of the same carrier likely do not
compete with each other may erroneously give the impression that competition
is high when in fact it is not. Similarly, our measure can take strategic alliances
into account by excluding flights operated by alliance partners of a given carrier
from the calculation of the ATD (alliance weighting). Another option is to take
into account the type of competitor in the calculation of the ATD. For example,
previous literature in airline competition finds low-cost carrier competition to
have a dramatic impact on average fares in contrast to most forms of legacy
carrier competition, which is found to have weak e↵ects on fares (e.g., Brueckner
et al, 2013). Giving di↵erent weights to competing flights depending on the type
of competitor (e.g., legacy or low-cost carrier) would be a way to incorporate
that in the calculation of the ATD (competitor-type weighting).
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4.3.4 Empirical strategy
A. Changes in flight schedules
To perform an analysis at the flight level, we exploit plausibly exogenous
changes in flight schedules that occur during the booking period, such as de-
parture time changes and flight cancellations15. Scheduling changes that oc-
cur throughout the booking period are likely related to carrier or airport spe-
cific operational reasons (e.g., aircraft availability, network coordination or slot
availability) and are unlikely to be related to carrier pricing strategy deci-
sions. Rescheduling flight departures throughout the booking period is (pro-
hibitively) costly for carriers for many reasons, such as administrative costs for
dealing with passengers who have already booked a ticket, customer dissatis-
faction, and increased risk of cancellations and compensation claims. Figure
4.4 presents the frequency of changes in the ATD of a flight throughout the
booking period. A large number of changes is concentrated at the beginning
and the end of the booking period, but there is a su cient number of changes
occurring during the entire time span of our sample16. By definition, a change
in the schedule of one flight will alter the ATDs of all same-day flights on a
15The ATD measures are flight-level measures and will be constant in the time period of 95
days until departure in our sample when the relative position of competing flights does not
change. To ensure there is variation in ATD at the flight level, it is thus necessary that flights
change position (i.e. departure time) in the time span in which our data is collected. In this
case, this happens as a result of changes in the schedules of flights.
16Three types of events may cause the ATD of a given flight to change: (i) the departure
time of that flight or (at least) one of its competing flights changes, (ii) (at least) one of
its competing flights is cancelled, (iii) (at least) one of its competing flights is fully booked
(i.e. economy class tickets are no longer available). Since we observe the departure time
of a flight, we can distinguish changes in ATD due to departure time changes from flight
cancellations and fully booked flights. However, we can not distinguish flight cancellations
from fully booked flights because a flight would exit our dataset in both cases. Fully booked
flights are likely the reason for the large increase in the frequency of changes in the ATD
during the last 5 days before departure. Flight cancellations are likely random events and
thus not expected to be concentrated at a specific time during the booking period. We use all
three types of events in our main analyses and control for non-departure time related changes
in ATD in robustness analyses, which yield the same qualitative results.
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Figure 4.4 Frequency of changes in the average temporal distance (ATD) of flights through-
out the booking period. The changes in ATD are grouped into periods of 10 days.
route. As a result, the 321 changes in departure time that occur throughout
the booking period in our sample lead to many more exogenous shocks to our
measure of competition, which helps to identify the e↵ect of competition on the
temporal profile of fares and APDs17. The changes in departure time in our
sample are approximately 15 minutes on average and 95% of those departure
time changes is less or equal to an hour.
B. Main empirical specification
To study how airline prices change with competition during the booking period,
we estimate the following reduced-form pricing equation:
Ln(P)ikt = c+
T 1X
t=1
 1t BDt +
TX
t=1
 2t (LR-ATDikt ⇥ BDt) + ⌘ik + "ikt (4.2)
17Changes due to flight cancellations and fully booked flights are not included in this number.
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where i denotes a flight-carrier combination, k denotes a route, t denotes the
day of the booking period and T the total number of days during which we track
prices18. The dependent variable Ln(P)ikt is the logarithm of the listed price at
the route-carrier-flight level and competition is measured by LR-ATDikt (as in
Equation 4.2) or ER-ATDikt, which also vary at the route-carrier-flight level.
We use interfirm weighting and thus assume that same-day departures of the
same carrier do not compete with each other19. BDt is an indicator variable for
each day of the booking period (e.g., BD1 = 1 if t = 1 and is equal to 0 other-
wise). These indicator variables are used to model a baseline temporal profile of
fares20. We interact LR-ATDikt (or ER-ATDikt) with the booking day dummies
to allow the estimated e↵ect of competition on the temporal profile of fares to be
di↵erent throughout the booking period. Finally, term ⌘ik denotes the (route-
carrier-flight) fixed e↵ects, c is a constant term and "ikt is an error term. The
included fixed e↵ects allow us to control for time-invariant route, carrier and
flight characteristics that may a↵ect ticket prices. Route specific e↵ects include
the size and distance of a route, local population and income, and airport or
hub dominance at origin and destination. Carrier specific e↵ects include brand
loyalty, carrier type (e.g., legacy or low-cost) and cost structure. Flight spe-
cific e↵ects include operating aircraft and load factor e ciency, and customer
preferences with respect to a given departure time. Departure time preferences
are important to take into account as they may impact the demand for a par-
ticular flight. While a flight that is positioned far away from competitors may
experience less direct price competition, the lack of neighbouring flight depar-
18We start tracking prices 95 days prior to the departure, which implies that t2{1, 2, . . . , 95}
and T = 95.
19We further assume that ↵ = 15 and   =
1
2 for the calculation of the LR-ATD and ER-ATD,
respectively. We change the values of ↵ and   in robustness analyses and find the same
qualitative results.
20This approach is similar to previous empirical work in airline dynamic pricing, such as
Escobari (2012) and Alderighi et al (2015).
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tures may also indicate an unpopular departure time. This confounding e↵ect
is controlled for in our analysis since our coe cients are estimated by using the
variation at the flight level, i.e. holding departure time preferences constant.
Another challenge in the dynamic pricing context is taking into account the
e↵ect of available seats on fares. Prices in the airline industry are simultaneously
determined by fares responding to both time to departure and available seats
at the moment of purchase (Alderighi et al, 2015; Williams, 2018). To control
for the e↵ect of available seats on fares, real-time capacity data at the flight
level would be necessary. However, available capacity data is carrier sensitive
information and is to our knowledge not possible to obtain, especially for a
large sample of routes, carriers and flight departures that would be required
for the analysis of competition. Previous research has relied on online seat
maps to estimate available seats at any given point in time (e.g., Escobari 2012,
Alderighi et al, 2015; Williams, 2018). This approach has two drawbacks. First,
collecting seat map data for many routes and flights is cumbersome and costly
as the information is only available through paid airline global distribution
systems, such as Amadeus or SABRE. Second, and more importantly, seat map
data is not likely to be a good indicator of real-time available flight capacity21.
The reason is that carriers nowadays commonly charge an additional fee for an
advance seat selection. As a result, many travellers select their seats during
check-in, i.e. only a couple of days to hours before the flight departure. This
type of measurement error likely leads to a systematic overestimation of the
number of available seats throughout the booking period.
In our analysis, controlling for the e↵ect of available capacity on fares is less
important. Since the identification of the e↵ect of competition on dynamic pric-
ing and APDs is based on plausibly exogenous changes in flight schedules, it is
21The issue that online seat maps may not accurately represent real-time flight loads and
lead to a measurement error is also acknowledged by Williams (2018).
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arguably su cient to ensure that these changes are not also related to changes
in the availability of seats. An example of this would be carriers changing the
departure time of a flight in order to use a bigger or smaller aircraft, which
would also a↵ect the number of available seats. To ensure that changes in
schedules are not related to changes in aircraft and the available capacity, we
extend Equation 4.2 with two types of control variables: (i) aircraft-type fixed
e↵ects, and (ii) a (route-carrier-flight level) indicator variable for changes in
operating aircraft that occur during the booking period. Finally, to further
capture the e↵ect of available capacity on fares, we include fare class fixed ef-
fects in Equation 4.2 to control for the lowest available fare class at a given
day during the booking period22. The available fare class is related to the
number of available seats due to fencing, i.e. booking limits that airlines im-
plement as a result of revenue management practices, but can also help con-
trol for ticket heterogeneity since it likely captures some of the variation in
prices due to ticket restrictions and flexibility.
22We create three fare class groups for economy tickets in our dataset: Economy Low, Econ-
omy Medium and Economy High. Each carrier’s fare classes (in most cases more than 10)
are then allocated to those groups based on information about ticket flexibility (e.g., whether
tickets can be changed), ticket restrictions (e.g., whether ticket cancellations are refundable)
and ticket privileges (e.g., whether tickets o↵er additional frequent flyer points) from each
carrier’s website. This information is not publicly available for three carriers in our sample:
Frontier, Mokulele and Spirit.
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4.4 Empirical analysis
4.4.1 Main results
Table 4.1 presents the results of our main analysis on the e↵ect of competi-
tion on the dynamic pricing of airlines23. To facilitate the interpretation of
the estimated coe cients, we normalise the LR-ATD (ER-ATD) with interfirm
weighting that is used in our analyses. Since the dependent variable is the
logarithm of the listed price of a given flight, we can interpret coe cients as
percentage changes in price. The variables reported in Table 4.1 are the inter-
action terms of the LR-ATD (ER-ATD) with the booking day dummy variables
(BD). Instead of using a dummy variable for each day of the booking period,
we arrange days into 10 booking day subperiods. This allows us to reduce noise
and estimate the e↵ect of the LR-ATD (ER-ATD) on prices more e ciently,
since scheduling changes, which are necessary for the identification, may not
take place on every single day of the booking period. All booking day subpe-
riods consist of 10 days, except from the last subperiod that consists of 6 days
(refer to Table 4.1 for the exact composition of the booking day subperiods).
All specifications in Table 4.1 also include the booking day dummy variables
(BD), which implies that the LR-ATD (ER-ATD) interaction coe cients mea-
sure the additional e↵ect of competition at a given point in time during the
booking period. Finally, we gradually introduce the control variables discussed
in Section 4.3.4. The first specification reports the results of our baseline model
(Equation 4.2), the second specification includes the aircraft type fixed e↵ects
and the indicators for changes in operating aircraft during the booking period,
and the third specification also includes the fare class controls.
23You may refer to Table 4.6 in the Appendix of this chapter for summary statistics on the
variables used in the main and robustness analyses.
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Table 1: Add title and legend. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 LR-ATD ER-ATD LR-ATD ER-ATD LR-ATD ER-ATD 
95 – 86 days 0.448*** 0.406*** 0.444*** 0.402*** 0.460*** 0.408*** 
 (0.155) (0.151) (0.154) (0.151) (0.140) (0.132) 
85 – 76 days  0.462*** 0.419*** 0.459*** 0.416*** 0.475*** 0.423*** 
 (0.155) (0.152) (0.155) (0.151) (0.141) (0.133) 
75 – 66 days 0.499*** 0.457*** 0.496*** 0.454*** 0.537*** 0.487*** 
 (0.153) (0.149) (0.152) (0.149) (0.139) (0.130) 
65 – 56 days 0.525*** 0.488*** 0.523*** 0.487*** 0.559*** 0.515*** 
 (0.151) (0.147) (0.150) (0.147) (0.138) (0.131) 
55 – 46 days 0.479*** 0.440*** 0.476*** 0.438*** 0.509*** 0.469*** 
 (0.150) (0.147) (0.150) (0.147) (0.137) (0.130) 
45 – 36 days 0.418*** 0.380*** 0.415*** 0.377*** 0.446*** 0.406*** 
 (0.148) (0.145) (0.147) (0.144) (0.134) (0.126) 
35 – 26 days 0.373*** 0.327** 0.370*** 0.324** 0.396*** 0.345*** 
 (0.143) (0.138) (0.143) (0.137) (0.130) (0.120) 
25 – 16 days 0.316** 0.271* 0.313** 0.268* 0.341** 0.290** 
 (0.149) (0.148) (0.149) (0.148) (0.135) (0.129) 
15 – 6 days 0.175 0.149 0.172 0.146 0.212 0.183 
 (0.155) (0.156) (0.154) (0.156) (0.139) (0.136) 
6 – 0 days 0.0821 0.0740 0.0795 0.0719 0.0636 0.0396 
 (0.160) (0.163) (0.160) (0.163) (0.146) (0.143) 
Control variables       
Route-flight FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Aircraft changes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fare class No No No No Yes Yes 
Observations 220,557 220,557 220,557 220,557 220,557 220,557 
R-Squared 0.534 0.533 0.535 0.534 0.592 0.591 
Number of flights 2,338 2,338 2,338 2,338 2,338 2,338 
Tabl 4.1 Main results on the e↵ect of competition on dynamic airline pricing. The reported
coe cients are interactions of the LR-ATD and ER-ATD with the booking day subperiod
dummies. FE denotes the fixed e↵ects. Flight-level clustered standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
The estimated coe cients are similar across specifications for both the LR-
ATD and the ER-ATD. We therefore use the output of the third specification,
which includes all control variables, to interpret the estimated coe cients. The
coe cients of the LR-ATD (ER-ATD) interactions are found to be positive
and significant in the first 8 booking day subperiods, i.e. until approximately
two weeks before departure. This implies that flights facing less competition
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(higher temporal distance) exhibit higher prices during that period compared
to flights facing more competition (lower temporal distance). The coe cients
of the last two booking day subperiods are estimated much closer to zero and
are not statistically significant, suggesting that prices are similar in the last two
weeks before departure irrespective of competition24. We interpret these find-
ings as evidence for larger APDs in more competitive settings. The estimated
di↵erence in APDs is not only statistically but also economically significant.
For example, the estimated coe cient of the LR-ATD between 55 and 46 days
before departure is equal to 0.523. An increase in LR-ATD from 0 (maximum
intensity of competition) to 1 (minimum intensity of competition) would thus
increase prices by approximately 52%. The normalised LR-ATD with inter-
firm weighting has a mean of approximately 0.11 and a standard deviation of
approximately 0.10 in our sample. A one standard deviation increase in LR-
ATD (i.e. decrease in the intensity of competition) would therefore increase
listed prices by approximately 5.2%.
The estimated coe cients of the LR-ATD (ER-ATD) interactions exhibit
an inverse U-shaped temporal pattern. This can be seen in Figure 4.5, in
which we plot the estimated coe cients of the LR-ATD interactions together
with 95% confidence intervals. The coe cients reach a peak during the fourth
booking day subperiod (65-56 days before departure), after which point they
start to decrease. This gives rise to non-monotonic temporal profiles of fares
for certain values of the LR-ATD (ER-ATD). Figure 4.6 plots the estimated
temporal profile of fares when LR-ATD is 0 (which is equivalent to the base-
line temporal profile of fares without the additional e↵ect of competition) and
LR-ATD is 1 (minimum intensity of competition). The coe cients are esti-
24The included control variables in the second and third specification yield statistically signifi-
cant coe cients. However, the estimated coe cients for the LR-ATD (ER-ATD) interactions
do not significantly di↵er across specifications. This suggests that scheduling changes are not
likely related to changes in aircraft, which could also have an e↵ect on available seats.
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Figure 4.5 Plot of the estimated coe cients and 95% confidence intervals for the interaction
terms of the LR-ATD with the booking day subperiod dummies.
mated using the first day of the booking period in our dataset as the reference
category25. The baseline temporal profile of fares we estimate (LR-ATD = 0)
is similar to previous empirical literature (Escobari and Gan, 2007; Escobari,
2012; Alderighi et al, 2015); prices are relatively flat at the beginning of the
booking period, sharply increase during the final weeks before departure and
monotonically increase throughout the booking period. However, the estimated
temporal profile of fares for minimum intensity of competition (LR-ATD = 1)
is non-monotonic. Prices exhibit a decreasing trend between approximately 60
and 25 days to departure, after which point they begin to (sharply) increase.
Similar U-shaped price dynamics are also reported in previous empirical liter-
ature on the dynamic pricing of airlines (Escobari and Gan, 2007; Bilotkach
et al, 2010; Alderighi et al, 2015).
25The first day of the booking period is 95 days before the departure date. This means that
the estimated coe cients can be interpreted as percentage di↵erences in price with respect
to that date.
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Figure 4.6 Estimated temporal profile of fares with and without the additional e↵ect of
competition. The temporal profile of fares is the result of estimating Equation 4.2 including
the control variables described in Section 4.3.4. The reference category is the first day of the
booking period.
A decreasing pattern in the dynamic pricing of fares is attributed to the de-
clining option value of unsold seats as the departure date approaches (Gallego
and van Ryzin, 1994; Bitran and Mondschein, 1997). This simply reflects the
trade-o↵ that airlines face when waiting for customers with a higher willing-
ness to pay but less certain demands at the risk of having unsold seats at the
time of departure. Our findings suggest that decreasing patterns in fares are
more prominent when the intensity of competition is low. The framework on
APDs o↵ers a potential explanation, since firms that o↵er smaller APDs may
also face a greater risk of having unsold seats at the time of departure. This
would occur if planes fill up slower compared to a situation in which firms com-
pete (by means of larger APDs) to capture consumers with certain demands
who are willing to purchase early. Firms o↵ering smaller APDs may there-
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fore have incentives to decrease fares in the middle of the booking period to
attract price-sensitive consumers who would not book their flights very early
in advance due to high demand uncertainty.
4.4.2 Additional analyses
A. Carrier type analysis
To further explore the e↵ect of competition on dynamic airline pricing and
APDs, we run an additional specification that takes into account the type of
carrier. We distinguish between two types of carriers, namely legacy carriers
(NLCs) and low-cost carriers (LCCs)26. NLCs di↵er from LCCs in many as-
pects, such as network type and operating cost structure27. Previous literature
finds significant di↵erences in the strategic behaviour of the two carrier types
and the resulting competitive outcomes (e.g., Goolsbee and Syverson, 2008;
Brueckner et al, 2013), but has not yet studied the e↵ect of competition on
their dynamic pricing strategies28. To incorporate the type of carrier in our
analysis, we interact the booking day dummy variables and the LR-ATD inter-
actions (i.e. the terms BDt and LR-ATDikt⇥BDt in Equation 4.2, respectively)
with a dummy variable indicating whether a certain carrier is a low-cost carrier
(LCC = 1 if a carrier is low-cost and 0 otherwise). The temporal profile of fares
and the additional e↵ect of competition are therefore estimated separately per
carrier type. This implies that the LR-ATD interaction coe cients can be in-
26The legacy carriers in our sample are: Alaska, American, Delta, Hawaiian, Mokulele and
United. The low-cost carriers in our sample are: Frontier, JetBlue, Southwest and Spirit.
27Legacy carriers usually operate hub-and-spoke networks, in which one (or multiple) airport
hubs are connected to all points in the network (i.e. the spokes) by direct flights. This implies
that passengers travelling between two spokes will have to take a connecting flight through
the hub. Low-cost carriers usually operate point-to-point networks, in which all points in the
network are connected with each other by direct flights.
28Alderighi et al (2015) study the e↵ect of capacity utilisation on the dynamic pricing of a
European low-cost carrier (Ryanair), but do not have any data on legacy or other low-cost
carriers to study potential di↵erences in pricing strategies between the two carrier types.
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Table 2: Add title and legend. 
 
 (1) (2) 
LR-ATD All carriers Legacy Low-cost 
95 – 86 days 0.460*** 0.409*** 0.423 
 (0.140) (0.138) (0.682) 
85 – 76 days  0.475*** 0.415*** 0.395 
 (0.141) (0.138) (0.676) 
75 – 66 days 0.537*** 0.483*** 0.366 
 (0.139) (0.136) (0.674) 
65 – 56 days 0.559*** 0.507*** 0.441 
 (0.138) (0.135) (0.676) 
55 – 46 days 0.509*** 0.461*** 0.543 
 (0.137) (0.134) (0.684) 
45 – 36 days 0.446*** 0.441*** 0.543 
 (0.134) (0.130) (0.679) 
35 – 26 days 0.396*** 0.440*** 0.365 
 (0.130) (0.127) (0.674) 
25 – 16 days 0.341** 0.383*** 0.597 
 (0.135) (0.131) (0.683) 
15 – 6 days 0.212 0.258* 0.675 
 (0.139) (0.136) (0.641) 
6 – 0 days 0.0636 0.104 0.804 
 (0.146) (0.145) (0.627) 
Control variables    
Route-flight FE  Yes Yes 
Aircraft changes Yes Yes 
Fare class Yes Yes 
Observations 220,557 220,557 
R-Squared 0.534 0.606 
Number of flights 2,338 2,338 
Table 4.2 Carrier type analysis on the e↵ect of competition on dynamic airline pricing.
The reported coe cients are interactions of the LR-ATD with the booking day subperiod
dummies. FE denotes the fixed e↵ects. Flight-level clustered standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
terpreted as the additional e↵ect of competition on each carrier type’s prices at
a given point in time during the booking period. The results of the carrier type
specification are presented in Table 4.2. The first column reports the results
of our main specification to facilitate comparison, while the second and third
column report the estimated coe cients of the LR-ATD interactions for legacy
and low-cost carriers, respectively. The estimated coe cients for legacy carriers
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are similar in direction and magnitude to the results of our main specification,
so interpretation remains the same as in Section 4.4.1. However, the estimated
coe cients of the LR-ATD interactions for low-cost carriers are positive but
statistically insignificant. The estimated standard errors in the third column
are significantly higher compared to the first and second column, which sug-
gests large di↵erences in the employed dynamic pricing strategies of low-cost
carriers29. Our carrier type analysis thus reveals that the e↵ect of competition
on the temporal profile of airline fares and APDs discussed in Section 4.4.1 is
purely driven by the dynamic pricing strategies of legacy carriers.
B. Alternative values of ↵ and  
As described in Section 4.3.3, parameters ↵ and   measure the extent to which
same-day flight departures compete with each other. In our main results, we
assume that ↵ = 0.2 and   = 0.5 to calculate the weights of the LR-ATD
and ER-ATD, respectively. We rerun our main specification (Equation 4.2
including the aircraft-type fixed e↵ects, indicators for changes in aircraft during
the booking period and fare class fixed e↵ects) for di↵erent values of ↵ and  
to test the robustness of our main results. The results of those robustness
analyses are reported in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. Table 4.3 reports the LR-ATD
interaction coe cients for ↵ equal to 0.1, 0.2 (main results), 0.3, 0.4 and 0.5.
The specifications in this table yield the same qualitative results as our main
analysis. Parameter  2[ 0 , 1 ] is by construction better to use in order to test
our assumption that all same-day flight departures are not likely to compete
in the same way30. We rerun the main specification and let   approach 1,
29In line with previous literature on the Southwest e↵ect (Windle and Dresner, 1995; 1997;
Goolsbee and Syverson, 2008), we also run a specification where we separate Southwest from
other low-cost carriers. This specification yields the same qualitative results as Table 4.2.
30Note that for ↵   0.5 flights with a rank r   2 will all receive zero weight in the calculation
of the LR-ATD. The calculated LR-ATDs are thus similar above that value of ↵, which is
not a problem when using the exponential weight  .
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Table 3: Add title and legend. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LR-ATD α = 0.1 α = 0.2 α = 0.3 α = 0.4 α = 0.5 
95 – 86 days 0.364** 0.460*** 0.389*** 0.353*** 0.339*** 
 (0.146) (0.140) (0.129) (0.122) (0.115) 
85 – 76 days 0.376** 0.475*** 0.403*** 0.366*** 0.351*** 
 (0.146) (0.141) (0.130) (0.122) (0.115) 
75 – 66 days 0.427*** 0.537*** 0.469*** 0.432*** 0.409*** 
 (0.145) (0.139) (0.128) (0.119) (0.111) 
65 – 56 days 0.450*** 0.559*** 0.495*** 0.457*** 0.432*** 
 (0.144) (0.138) (0.127) (0.119) (0.112) 
55 – 46 days 0.417*** 0.509*** 0.443*** 0.411*** 0.398*** 
 (0.143) (0.137) (0.126) (0.118) (0.112) 
45 – 36 days 0.344** 0.446*** 0.389*** 0.366*** 0.366*** 
 (0.141) (0.134) (0.121) (0.113) (0.107) 
35 – 26 days 0.307** 0.396*** 0.332*** 0.304*** 0.298*** 
 (0.139) (0.130) (0.115) (0.105) (0.0975) 
25 – 16 days 0.255* 0.341** 0.280** 0.255** 0.258** 
 (0.142) (0.135) (0.124) (0.117) (0.114) 
15 – 6 days 0.230 0.212 0.146 0.143 0.168 
 (0.145) (0.139) (0.131) (0.127) (0.126) 
6 – 0 days 0.183 0.0636 -0.0310 -0.0313 0.000808 
 (0.148) (0.146) (0.139) (0.136) (0.135) 
Control variables      
Route-flight FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Aircraft changes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fare class Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 220,557 220,557 220,557 220,557 220,557 
R-Squared 0.591 0.592 0.591 0.591 0.590 
Number of flights 2,338 2,338 2,338 2,338 2,338 
Table 4.3 Robustness analyses of the main specification for di↵erent values of ↵. The re-
ported coe cients are interactions of the LR-ATD with the booking day subperiod dummies.
FE denotes the fixed e↵ects. Flight-level clustered standard errors are reported in parenthe-
ses. Significance levels are indicated by: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
which would imply that all same-day flight departures receive the same weight
in the calculation of the average temporal distance and are therefore assumed
to compete equally. Table 4.4 reports the ER-ATD interaction coe cients for
  equal to 0.2, 0.4, 0.5 (main results), 0.6 and 0.8. For   < 0.8 we find the
same qualitative results as in our main analysis31. For     0.8, the estimated
31The estimated coe cients for    0.2 are smaller in magnitude compared to the results
of our main specification with   = 0.5, but still significantly di↵erent from 0. As   is
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Table 4: Add title and legend. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ER-ATD β = 0.2 β = 0.4 β = 0.5 β = 0.6 β = 0.8 
95 – 86 days 0.318*** 0.387*** 0.408*** 0.403*** 0.212 
 (0.108) (0.125) (0.132) (0.138) (0.143) 
85 – 76 days 0.331*** 0.403*** 0.423*** 0.417*** 0.213 
 (0.108) (0.125) (0.133) (0.139) (0.144) 
75 – 66 days 0.380*** 0.465*** 0.487*** 0.480*** 0.265* 
 (0.105) (0.123) (0.130) (0.137) (0.142) 
65 – 56 days 0.404*** 0.493*** 0.515*** 0.508*** 0.297** 
 (0.106) (0.124) (0.131) (0.136) (0.142) 
55 – 46 days 0.371*** 0.448*** 0.469*** 0.463*** 0.267* 
 (0.107) (0.123) (0.130) (0.135) (0.140) 
45 – 36 days 0.346*** 0.396*** 0.406*** 0.393*** 0.193 
 (0.104) (0.119) (0.126) (0.132) (0.138) 
35 – 26 days 0.276*** 0.330*** 0.345*** 0.340*** 0.169 
 (0.0946) (0.112) (0.120) (0.127) (0.135) 
25 – 16 days 0.239** 0.279** 0.290** 0.283** 0.128 
 (0.112) (0.124) (0.129) (0.134) (0.139) 
15 – 6 days 0.146 0.165 0.183 0.200 0.144 
 (0.124) (0.132) (0.136) (0.139) (0.143) 
6 – 0 days -0.0163 0.00324 0.0396 0.0869 0.145 
 (0.133) (0.140) (0.143) (0.146) (0.148) 
Control variables      
Route-flight FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Aircraft changes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fare class Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 220,557 220,557 220,557 220,557 220,557 
R-Squared 0.591 0.591 0.591 0.591 0.591 
Number of flights 2,338 2,338 2,338 2,338 2,338 
Table 4.4 Robustness analyses of the main specification for di↵erent values of  . The re-
ported coe cients are interactions of the ER-ATD with the booking day subperiod dummies.
FE denotes the fixed e↵ects. Flight-level clustered standard errors are reported in parenthe-
ses. Significance levels are indicated by: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
coe cients of the ER-ATD interactions are significantly lower in magnitude
and are found to be statistically insignificant. This confirms our expectation
approaching 0, direct neighbours in departure time become increasingly more important in
the calculation of the average. In the extreme case when   = 0, all competing flights with
a di↵erent departure time receive zero weight irrespective of their distance to a given flight.
Flights are thus assumed to be competing only with other flights departing at the exact
same time during the day. This underestimates the true intensity of competition, which
likely explains why the estimated coe cients of the ER-ATD interactions are smaller in
magnitude.
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that same-day flight departures are not likely to be competing equally and that
weights that prioritise direct neighbours in the calculation of the average are
important in order to measure the intensity of competition correctly32.
C. Alternative departure dates
We collect booking period data for two more departure dates and replicate our
main analysis to check the robustness of the main results. The data for the
additional departure dates was also collected using the procedure that is de-
scribed in Section 4.3.1. The additional departure dates are Monday, January
28th, 2019 and Thursday, January 31st, 2019. These dates were selected so that
they do not coincide with (or are close to) any public holidays or other signifi-
cant events, which is also the case with the departure date in our main analysis,
Monday, October 22nd, 2018. The LR-ATD (ER-ATD) interaction coe cients
from the di↵erent departure date specifications are reported in Table 4.5. All
specifications yield the same qualitative results. These results are also similar
to the ones in our main analysis. The main di↵erence with respect to the e↵ect
of competition on APDs is that the LR-ATD (ER-ATD) interactions in the
specifications in Table 4.5 are positive and significant up until the 9th booking
day subperiod, i.e. approximately a week before departure (in contrast to ap-
proximately two weeks before departure in our main analysis). The estimated
coe cients are comparable in relative magnitude to the ones in our main anal-
ysis. The reason that the coe cients are estimated larger in absolute terms is
that the LR-ATD (ER-ATD) has a smaller range in the two additional samples
(refer to Table 4.6 in the Appendix of this chapter for summary statistics). Fur-
thermore, changes in flight departures, which is the source of our identification,
32The estimated coe cient of the ER-ATD interaction with the fourth booking day subperiod
(65-56 days before departure) is the only coe cient that is statistically significant at the 5%
level for   = 0.8. The estimated coe cients of the ER-ATD interactions for   = 0.9 are
found to be much closer to 0 and are all statistically insignificant.
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Table 5: Add title and legend. 
 
 28th January 2019 31st January 2019 
 LR-ATD ER-ATD LR-ATD ER-ATD 
95 – 86 days 0.719** 0.478* 0.665*** 0.499*** 
 (0.296) (0.260) (0.159) (0.174) 
85 – 76 days  0.791*** 0.576** 0.593*** 0.415** 
 (0.298) (0.263) (0.159) (0.174) 
75 – 66 days 0.770*** 0.546** 0.535*** 0.336* 
 (0.298) (0.264) (0.159) (0.174) 
65 – 56 days 0.805*** 0.595** 0.594*** 0.413** 
 (0.298) (0.263) (0.157) (0.170) 
55 – 46 days 0.832*** 0.631** 0.624*** 0.451*** 
 (0.297) (0.261) (0.156) (0.168) 
45 – 36 days 0.775*** 0.555** 0.701*** 0.540*** 
 (0.297) (0.262) (0.157) (0.168) 
35 – 26 days 0.855*** 0.646** 0.837*** 0.697*** 
 (0.298) (0.265) (0.158) (0.171) 
25 – 16 days 0.983*** 0.804*** 0.931*** 0.823*** 
 (0.299) (0.267) (0.155) (0.167) 
15 – 6 days 0.772*** 0.571** 0.712*** 0.571*** 
 (0.293) (0.258) (0.150) (0.161) 
6 – 0 days 0.175 -0.114 0.178 -0.0388 
 (0.280) (0.239) (0.134) (0.133) 
Control variables     
Route-flight FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Aircraft changes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fare class Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 196,954 196,954 196,359 196,359 
R-Squared 0.587 0.587 0.535 0.535 
Number of flights 2,219 2,219 2,215 2,215 
Table 4.5 Robustness alyses of the main specification for di↵erent departure dates. The
reported coe cients are interactions of the LR-ATD and ER-ATD with the booking day
subperiod dummies. FE denotes the fixed e↵ects. Flight-level clustered standard errors are
reported in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1.
are also smaller in these samples. In the samples of Monday, January 28th, 2019
and Thursday, January 31st, 2019, changes in departure time are approximately
10 minutes on average (15 minutes in the main sample) and 95% of those de-
parture time changes is less or equal to 35 minutes (1 hour in the main sample).
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4.5 Conclusion
This chapter builds on the extensive theoretical literature on APDs in the
dynamic pricing of perishable goods under demand uncertainty to test the
hypothesis that the discounts o↵ered by firms increase with the intensity of
competition. Both the descriptive and econometric evidence from a sample of
airline fare quotes provide strong support for this theoretical prediction. Flights
facing more competition consistently exhibit lower prices than flights facing less
competition in the period from about 3 months to 2 weeks before the flight de-
parture. In the final two weeks before departure, prices are similar regardless of
the intensity of competition. The e↵ect of competition on APDs is economically
significant; airline fare quotes increase by approximately 5.2% for a one stan-
dard deviation decrease in the intensity of competition based on our measure of
temporal proximity to rivals. This indicates that competition is an important
determinant of the temporal profile of airline fares. Our carrier-type analysis
suggests that these results are likely driven by the dynamic pricing of legacy car-
riers. There is insu cient econometric evidence to conclude that competition
also has an e↵ect on the temporal profile of fares of low-cost carriers.
Our results suggest that airline price dispersion increases with the inten-
sity of competition. Price dispersion is greater when there is more competition
because fares decrease at the beginning of the booking period (due to larger
APDs), while fares towards the end of the booking period remain the same.
We therefore find no evidence of firms extracting more surplus from consumers
with more inelastic demands (last-minute bookers) when there is less competi-
tion, which would be the prediction of textbook theory on price discrimination.
These findings suggest that the analysis of the e↵ect of competition on air-
line price discrimination is incomplete without considering the intertemporal
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dimension and APDs. This may explain the mixed results in previous litera-
ture on airline price dispersion that has studied the e↵ect of competition by
using average price data (Borenstein and Rose, 1994; Stavins, 2001; Gerardi
and Shapiro, 2009; Dai et al, 2014).
A practical implication that follows from our analysis is that the relative
position of flights with respect to competitors can have significant impact on
the employed dynamic pricing strategies. Flights that are relatively far from
competitors are likely to enjoy some benefits from being alone, which are re-
flected by the premium these firms are able to charge during the beginning of
the booking period. Although the location of flights is predetermined in our
analysis, airlines are able to choose their departure times to a certain extent in
the long term. Our results therefore highlight the importance of taking into ac-
count the relative proximity of flights to competition during the slot allocation
process. Our average temporal distance measure may assist in keeping that in
check. This is especially important in settings where carriers could potentially
exercise a lot of influence to secure a favourable outcome, such as their hubs
or airports in which their presence is dominant.
Despite the potential benefits for airlines from the lack of competition, the
e↵ect on total welfare is di cult to determine in this setting. For example,
Mo¨ller and Watanabe (2016) show that the aggregate e↵ect of competition
can also be negative under certain conditions in an oligopolistic setting, due
to a mismatch between consumer preferences and product characteristics (i.e.
consumers having to make purchases without full knowledge of their prefer-
ences). Drawing conclusions with respect to total welfare is thus out of the
scope of this paper and is left for future research.
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4.6 Appendix
Table 4.6 presents summary statistics for the standardised LR-ATD and ER-
ATD with interfirm weighting used in the main and robustness analyses. Table
4.7 describes the routes (origin and destination airport pairs) for which the
data was collected. These are the 100 biggest U.S. domestic routes based on
the number of yearly transported passengers in 2017, as reported by the Bureau
of Transportation Statistics (BTS). The routes are presented in order of size.
 
 Mean St. dev. Min Max 
LR-ATD     
22nd October 2018 0.109 0.102 0 1 
28th January 2019 0.092 0.088 0 1 
31st January 2019 0.095 0.092 0 1 
ER-ATD     
22nd October 2018 0.095 0.087 0 1 
28th January 2019 0.076 0.070 0 1 
31st January 2019 0.079 0.074 0 1 
Table 4.6 Summary statistics for the standardised LR-ATD and ER-ATD with interfirm
weighting used in the main analysis with departure date the 22nd of October 2018 and the
robustness analyses with departure dates the 28th and 31st of January 2019.
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 Origin airport Destination airport 
1. Los Angeles International (LAX) San Francisco International (SFO) 
2.  San Francisco International (SFO) Los Angeles International (LAX) 
3. Los Angeles International (LAX) New York John F. Kennedy (JFK) 
4. New York John F. Kennedy (JFK) Los Angeles International (LAX) 
5 New York LaGuardia (LGA) Chicago O'Hare International (ORD) 
6. Chicago O'Hare International (ORD) New York LaGuardia (LGA) 
7. Los Angeles International (LAX) Chicago O'Hare International (ORD) 
8.  Chicago O'Hare International (ORD) Los Angeles International (LAX) 
9. Las Vegas International (LAS) Los Angeles International (LAX) 
10. Los Angeles International (LAX) Seattle–Tacoma International (SEA) 
11. Orlando International (MCO) Atlanta Hartsfield–Jackson (ATL) 
12. Atlanta Hartsfield–Jackson (ATL) Orlando International (MCO) 
13. Seattle–Tacoma International (SEA) Los Angeles International (LAX) 
14. Los Angeles International (LAX) Las Vegas International (LAS) 
15. Denver International (DEN) Los Angeles International (LAX) 
16. Los Angeles International (LAX) Denver International (DEN) 
17. San Francisco International (SFO) Chicago O'Hare International (ORD) 
18. Fort Lauderdale Hollywood (FLL) Atlanta Hartsfield–Jackson (ATL) 
19. Chicago O'Hare International (ORD) San Francisco International (SFO) 
20. Atlanta Hartsfield–Jackson (ATL) New York LaGuardia (LGA) 
21. New York LaGuardia (LGA) Atlanta Hartsfield–Jackson (ATL) 
22. Atlanta Hartsfield–Jackson (ATL) Fort Lauderdale Hollywood (FLL) 
23. Seattle–Tacoma International (SEA) San Francisco International (SFO) 
24. San Francisco International (SFO) Seattle–Tacoma International (SEA) 
25. Atlanta Hartsfield–Jackson (ATL) Los Angeles International (LAX) 
26. Los Angeles International (LAX) Atlanta Hartsfield–Jackson (ATL) 
27. Las Vegas International (LAS) San Francisco International (SFO) 
28. Honolulu International (HNL) Los Angeles International (LAX) 
29. Los Angeles International (LAX) Honolulu International (HNL) 
30. San Francisco International (SFO) Las Vegas International (LAS) 
31. Denver International (DEN) Phoenix International (PHX) 
32. Dallas Fort Worth (DFW) Los Angeles International (LAX) 
33. Tampa International (TPA) Atlanta Hartsfield–Jackson (ATL) 
34. Phoenix International (PHX) Denver International (DEN) 
35. Los Angeles International (LAX) Dallas Fort Worth (DFW) 
36. Denver International (DEN) San Francisco International (SFO) 
37. Atlanta Hartsfield–Jackson (ATL) Tampa International (TPA) 
38. New York John F. Kennedy (JFK) San Francisco International (SFO) 
39. San Francisco International (SFO) New York John F. Kennedy (JFK) 
40. Kahului Airport (OGG) Honolulu International (HNL) 
 
 
 
  
   
Table 4.7 (1/3) Description of the routes (origin and destination airport pairs) for which the
data was collected. These are the 100 biggest U.S. domestic routes based on the number of
yearly transported passengers in 2017, as reported by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics
(BTS). The routes are presented in order of size. These routes capture a significant share of
the U.S. domestic market, comprising approximately 40% of the total passengers transported
in 2017.
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 Origin airport Destination airport 
41. New York Newark (EWR) Orlando International (MCO) 
42. Honolulu International (HNL) Kahului Airport (OGG) 
43. Denver International (DEN) Las Vegas International (LAS) 
44. Chicago O'Hare International (ORD) Denver International (DEN) 
45. Dallas Fort Worth (DFW) Chicago O'Hare International (ORD) 
46. Orlando International (MCO) New York Newark (EWR) 
47. Las Vegas International (LAS) Denver International (DEN) 
48. San Francisco International (SFO) Denver International (DEN) 
49. Chicago O'Hare International (ORD) Dallas Fort Worth (DFW) 
50. Denver International (DEN) Chicago O'Hare International (ORD) 
51. San Francisco International (SFO) New York Newark (EWR) 
52. Seattle–Tacoma International (SEA) Anchorage Ted Stevens (ANC) 
53. Chicago O'Hare International (ORD) Boston Logan International (BOS) 
54. Anchorage Ted Stevens (ANC) Seattle–Tacoma International (SEA) 
55. Atlanta Hartsfield–Jackson (ATL) Boston Logan International (BOS) 
56. Boston Logan International (BOS) Chicago O'Hare International (ORD) 
57. New York Newark (EWR) San Francisco International (SFO) 
58. Boston Logan International (BOS) Atlanta Hartsfield–Jackson (ATL) 
59. Chicago O'Hare International (ORD) Minneapolis Saint Paul (MSP) 
60. Minneapolis Saint Paul (MSP) Chicago O'Hare International (ORD) 
61. Atlanta Hartsfield–Jackson (ATL) Washington National (DCA) 
62. Denver International (DEN) Seattle–Tacoma International (SEA) 
63. Washington National (DCA) Atlanta Hartsfield–Jackson (ATL) 
64. Seattle–Tacoma International (SEA) Denver International (DEN) 
65. Chicago O'Hare International (ORD) Atlanta Hartsfield–Jackson (ATL) 
66. Atlanta Hartsfield–Jackson (ATL) Dallas Fort Worth (DFW) 
67. Atlanta Hartsfield–Jackson (ATL) Chicago O'Hare International (ORD) 
68. Dallas Fort Worth (DFW) Atlanta Hartsfield–Jackson (ATL) 
69 Atlanta Hartsfield–Jackson (ATL) Denver International (DEN) 
70. San Diego International (SAN) San Francisco International (SFO) 
71. Las Vegas International (LAS) Seattle–Tacoma International (SEA) 
72. San Francisco International (SFO) San Diego International (SAN) 
73. Salt Lake City International (SLC) Denver International (DEN) 
74. Denver International (DEN) Atlanta Hartsfield–Jackson (ATL) 
75. Minneapolis Saint Paul (MSP) Denver International (DEN) 
76. Fort Lauderdale Hollywood (FLL) New York Newark (EWR) 
77. Seattle–Tacoma International (SEA) Las Vegas International (LAS) 
78. Denver International (DEN) Minneapolis Saint Paul (MSP) 
79. New York Newark (EWR) Fort Lauderdale Hollywood (FLL) 
80. Phoenix International (PHX) Los Angeles International (LAX) 
 
 
 
  
Table 4.7 (2/3) Description of the routes (origin and destination airport pairs) for which the
data was collected. These are the 100 biggest U.S. domestic routes based on the number of
yearly transported passengers in 2017, as reported by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics
(BTS). The routes are presented in order of size. These routes capture a significant share of
the U.S. domestic market, comprising approximately 40% of the total passengers transported
in 2017.
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 Origin airport Destination airport 
81. Atlanta Hartsfield–Jackson (ATL) Baltimore Washington (BWI) 
82. Los Angeles International (LAX) New York Newark (EWR) 
83. Baltimore Washington (BWI) Atlanta Hartsfield–Jackson (ATL) 
84. Denver International (DEN) Dallas Fort Worth (DFW) 
85. Dallas Fort Worth (DFW) Denver International (DEN) 
86. Los Angeles International (LAX) Phoenix International (PHX) 
87. Denver International (DEN) Salt Lake City International (SLC) 
88. Miami International (MIA) New York LaGuardia (LGA) 
89. Phoenix International (PHX) Chicago O'Hare International (ORD) 
90. Chicago O'Hare International (ORD) Phoenix International (PHX) 
91. Phoenix International (PHX) Seattle–Tacoma International (SEA) 
92. Atlanta Hartsfield–Jackson (ATL) Detroit Metropolitan (DTW) 
93. Seattle–Tacoma International (SEA) Phoenix International (PHX) 
94. New York LaGuardia (LGA) Miami International (MIA) 
95. New York Newark (EWR) Los Angeles International (LAX) 
96. Detroit Metropolitan (DTW) Atlanta Hartsfield–Jackson (ATL) 
97. Atlanta Hartsfield–Jackson (ATL) Philadelphia International (PHL) 
98. Chicago O'Hare International (ORD) Washington National (DCA) 
99. Philadelphia International (PHL) Atlanta Hartsfield–Jackson (ATL) 
100. Washington National (DCA) Chicago O'Hare International (ORD) 
 
Table 4.7 (3/3) Description of the routes (origin and destination airport pairs) for which the
data was collected. These are the 100 biggest U.S. domestic routes based on the number of
yearly transported passengers in 2017, as reported by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics
(BTS). The routes are presented in order of size. These routes capture a significant share of
the U.S. domestic market, comprising approximately 40% of the total passengers transported
in 2017.
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Summary and conclusions
This thesis consists of three empirical studies that examine the relationship
between di↵erent forms of rivalry in monopoly and oligopoly airline markets
and the resulting market price outcomes. The ultimate goal of this work is to
empirically distinguish the concept of competition from the market structure,
which is often conceived as a combination of the number of firms present in
a market and their relative market share or dominance. These studies build
on economic theory of imperfect competition to determine the incentives for
rivalry in each context and in turn develop a measure of the intensity of com-
petition in order to study its e↵ect on market price outcomes. A large part of
the thesis focuses on forms and instruments of rivalry that firms may deploy
to maintain or expand their market dominance and restrain competition. I
therefore study the dynamics of both competitive and plausibly anticompet-
itive behaviour in the airline industry.
Chapter 2 studies competition as a dynamic process of rivalry by examining
within-market changes in structure due to firm entry and exit in U.S. airline
markets. Distinguishing market structures based on the competitive history of
a given market allows me to accurately measure the intensity of competition in
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each context and to identify firm engagement in two types of anticompetitive
behaviour, i.e. entry deterrence and tacit collusion. Using panel data from
the U.S. airline industry, I find that duopolies with a quiet life price signifi-
cantly higher than duopolies that come about by entry in monopoly. I also find
that monopolies with a quiet life price significantly lower than monopolies that
come about by exit in duopoly (but still significantly higher than both types
of duopoly). The price di↵erences are economically significant in both cases
and provide an estimate of the price premium that consumers likely pay as a
result of (tacit) collusion in duopoly and entry deterrence in monopoly. The
findings reveal the presence of significant price heterogeneity between homoge-
neous good markets that are seemingly identical when viewed in terms of their
market structure. This in turn implies that changes in market concentration
and market power do not always go hand in hand. The findings of Chapter 2
have important implications for empirical work, since they suggest that indi-
cators of market structure are likely imperfect predictors of market power and
may thus lead to incorrect inferences when employed to empirically study the
e↵ect of competition on price outcomes. The findings of Chapter 2 are also
significant from a policy perspective as they provide robust econometric evi-
dence of (tacit) collusion being likely to be deployed in duopoly markets with a
quiet life and the omnipresence of entry deterring strategies in monopolies with
a quiet life. The econometric analysis further suggests that consumers in the
airline industry are likely to benefit significantly (in the form of lower prices)
by the encouragement of firm entry and a tighter control of mergers.
Chapter 3 continues the study of changes in market structure and focuses on
the post-entry response of incumbent firms with the goal to distinguish compet-
itive from plausibly anticompetitive (i.e. predatory) behaviour. The extensive
ex-post analysis of 256 instances of entry in monopoly in the U.S. airline in-
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dustry provides evidence of behaviour that is consistent with predation, i.e.
engagement in short-term irrational actions that e↵ectively lead to competitor
exit, restoration of monopoly power and increased future profits. The novelty
of this study in the empirical examination of predation is to put forward an
identification framework that relies solely on capacity and not on the tradi-
tional comparison of price and cost, but also to investigate and empirically
test predation determinants. The econometric results show that incumbent
airlines who increase capacity after entry are more likely to eliminate rivals,
restore their monopoly position and exploit market power by raising prices
after the exit of their rival. These findings are significant from a policy per-
spective since they suggest that predation not only takes place but has also
been successful in the U.S. airline industry. This is alarming for an industry
in which concentration significantly increased in recent years as a result of a
series of mergers that reduced the number of U.S. legacy carriers. Further-
more, studying the motives of predation reveals that engagement in predatory
tactics is likely related to the extent to which a market is saturated with re-
spect to capacity before the entry takes place. This suggests that predation
may be related to engagement in anticompetitive behaviour before the entry
occurs (e.g., limit pricing). A trade-o↵ between pre- and post-entry responses
suggests that predation may be path dependent and thus less likely to occur
when the incumbent attempted to deter entry by preemption. The economet-
ric analysis in Chapter 3 develops a measure of expected pre-entry capacity
based on exogenous market characteristics, which can help to identify markets
where predation is more likely to occur in practice.
Finally, Chapter 4 studies the impact of the intensity of competition on price
outcomes by taking market structure as given instead of looking at changes in
the market structure. This empirical study builds on the extensive theoretical
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literature on advance purchase discounts (APDs) in the dynamic pricing of
perishable goods under demand uncertainty to test the hypothesis that the
discounts o↵ered by firms to consumers who purchase tickets in advance increase
with the intensity of competition. I develop a new measure of competition for
which I use the proximity (in departure time) of a given flight to its competitors
to infer the intensity of competition. I then estimate the impact of competition
on APDs and the dynamic pricing of airlines by exploiting plausibly exogenous
changes in the flight schedules of airlines that occur during the booking period.
Both the descriptive and econometric evidence from a sample of airline fare
quotes provide strong support for the theoretical prediction that APDs are
larger when the intensity of competition is higher. This result is driven by
the airlines’ incentive to capture consumers with more certain demands who
are willing to purchase early and to prevent losing them to their rivals in the
future. An analysis per carrier type further suggests that the result is likely
driven by the dynamic pricing of legacy carriers, while there is insu cient
econometric evidence to conclude that competition also has an e↵ect on the
dynamic pricing of low-cost carriers. The results of Chapter 4 also suggest that
airline price dispersion likely increases with the intensity of competition. Price
dispersion is greater when there is more competition because fares decrease at
the beginning of the booking period (due to larger APDs), while fares towards
the end of the booking period remain the same. I therefore find no evidence
of firms extracting more surplus from consumers with more inelastic demands
(last-minute bookers) when there is less competition. These findings suggest
that analysing the e↵ect of competition on airline price discrimination is likely
incomplete without considering the intertemporal dimension and APDs. From
a policy perspective, the finding that airlines are able to charge a price premium
when being alone highlights the importance of taking into account the relative
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proximity of flights to competition during the slot allocation process. This is
especially important in settings where airlines could potentially exercise a lot
of influence to secure a favourable outcome, such as their hubs or airports in
which their presence is dominant. The measure of competition that is developed
in this chapter may assist in the practical implementation of the proposed
regulation of the slot allocation process.
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Dutch summary
Dit proefschrift bestaat uit drie empirische studies die de relatie onderzoeken
tussen verschillende vormen van concurrentie en prijsvariatie in de luchtvaartin-
dustrie. Het primaire doel van dit onderzoek is om het concept van con-
currentie empirisch te onderscheiden van marktstructuur, waarbij marktstruc-
tuur vaak wordt opgevat als een combinatie van het aantal bedrijven in een
markt en hun relatieve marktaandeel of dominantie. De empirische studies
passen inzichten uit de theorie van imperfecte concurrentie toe om te verklaren
hoe bedrijven strategisch omgaan met marktrivaliteit en om een nieuwe con-
currentiemaat te ontwikkelen die gebruikt kan worden om de intensiteit van
concurrentie op prijzen te bestuderen. Dit proefschrift richt zich tevens op
het analyseren van bedrijfsstrategien gericht op concurrentiebeperking en het
behouden of uitbreiden van marktdominantie. Derhalve wordt in dit proef-
schrift de dynamiek van zowel competitief als mogelijk anticompetitief gedrag
in de luchtvaartindustrie bestudeerd.
Hoofdstuk 2 bestudeert concurrentie als een dynamisch proces van rivaliteit,
door het analyseren van veranderingen in marktstructuur als gevolg van toe-
treding en uittreding over tijd. Door het analyseren van de veranderingen in
marktstructuur kan de daadwerkelijke intensiteit van marktconcurrentie wor-
den gemeten. Dit maakt het mogelijk om twee soorten anticompetitief gedrag
143
Nederlandse samenvatting
empirisch te identificeren, namelijk het afschrikken van toetreders door on-
geoorloofd prijszettingsgedrag en stilzwijgende collusie. Gebruikmakend van
paneldata van de luchtvaartsector in de VS vind ik dat duopolies die sta-
biel zijn over de tijd significant hogere prijzen hanteren dan duopolies die zijn
ontstaan door toetreding van een nieuwe speler tot een (voormalig) monopo-
lie. Bovendien vind ik dat monopolies die stabiel zijn over de tijd significant
lagere prijzen hanteren dan monopolies die zijn ontstaan door uittreding uit
een duopolie (al zijn deze prijzen alsnog significant hoger dan bij de verschil-
lende soorten duopolies). De prijsverschillen zijn in beide gevallen economisch
significant en kunnen worden genterpreteerd als een prijspremie die betaald
wordt door de consument als gevolg van anticompetitief gedrag. Deze studie
laat een significante heterogeniteit in prijzen zien tussen markten met homo-
gene producten die identiek lijken wat betreft marktstructuur. Tevens blijkt
dat veranderingen in marktconcentratie en marktmacht niet altijd samengaan.
De bevindingen van Hoofdstuk 2 hebben belangrijke implicaties voor ander
empirisch werk, omdat ze suggereren dat indicatoren van marktstructuur im-
perfecte voorspellers van marktmacht zijn. Dat zou tot onjuiste conclusies
kunnen leiden wanneer het e↵ect van concurrentie op marktprijzen empirisch
wordt bestudeerd. De bevindingen van Hoofdstuk 2 zijn ook belangrijk va-
nuit een beleidsperspectief, omdat ze aantonen dat (stilzwijgende) collusie en
strategien die streven naar afschrikking van toetreders zich mogelijk afspelen
in, respectievelijk, duopolies en monopolies die stabiel zijn over tijd. De analyse
suggereert tevens dat consumenten in de luchtvaartsector substantieel zouden
kunnen profiteren (in de vorm van lagere prijzen) van het aanmoedigen van
toetreding en een strengere controle op bedrijfsfusies.
Hoofdstuk 3 zet het onderzoek naar veranderingen in de marktstructuur
voort en richt zich op de reactie van gevestigde bedrijven op de toetreding van
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een nieuw bedrijf in een markt, met als doel een competitieve van een mogelijk
anticompetitieve reactie te onderscheiden. De uitgebreide ex-post analyse van
256 gevallen van toetreding tot een monopolie in de Amerikaanse luchtvaartin-
dustrie levert bewijs op voor gedrag dat consistent is met predatie (oftewel
roofprijzen), dat wil zeggen betrokkenheid bij irrationele acties op de korte ter-
mijn die leiden tot uittreding van de concurrent, herstel van de monopolistische
marktmacht en verhoogde langetermijnwinst. De noviteit van deze studie is om
een identificatiekader te presenteren dat uitsluitend is gebaseerd op capaciteit
en niet op de conventionele vergelijking van prijs met (marginale) kosten. Daar-
naast biedt de studie de mogelijkheid om determinanten van predatie empirisch
te toetsen. De resultaten tonen aan dat gevestigde luchtvaartmaatschappijen
die hun capaciteit vergroten na toetreding door een nieuwe concurrent, meer
kans maken om deze concurrent uit de markt te drukken en hun monopo-
liepositie te herstellen (door prijzen weer te verhogen nadat uittreding heeft
plaatsgevonden). Deze bevindingen suggereren niet alleen dat predatie ver-
moedelijk plaats heeft gevonden, maar ook dat het succesvol is geweest. Dit is
alarmerend voor een industrie waarin de marktconcentratie de afgelopen jaren
sterk is toegenomen als gevolg van een reeks fusies. Bovendien blijkt dat be-
trokkenheid bij predatie mogelijk gerelateerd is aan de mate waarin de markt-
capaciteit verzadigd is voordat toetreding plaatsvindt. Dit suggereert een mo-
gelijk verband tussen betrokkenheid bij predatie en anticompetitief gedrag vo´o´r
eventuele toetreding (bijvoorbeeld limit pricing). Op basis van de strategische
reacties vo´o´r en na toetreding rijst het vermoeden dat predatie padafhanke-
lijk is en dat de kans op predatie kleiner is wanneer het gevestigde bedrijf een
toetreder al eerder probeerde af te schrikken. Met dit gegeven is in Hoofd-
stuk 3 een maat ontwikkeld die de verwachte capaciteit vo´o´r toetreding schat
op basis van exogene marktkarakteristieken. Hiermee kunnen markten worden
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gedentificeerd waar de betrokkenheid bij predatie waarschijnlijker is.
Ten slotte wordt in Hoofdstuk 4 het e↵ect van concurrentie op ticketprijzen
bestudeerd zonder te kijken naar veranderingen in de marktstructuur, maar
door marktstructuur als gegeven te beschouwen. Deze empirische studie bouwt
voort op de uitgebreide theoretische literatuur over advance purchase discounts
(APDs), oftewel prijskortingen die bedrijven aanbieden aan consumenten voor
het vooraf aanscha↵en van een vergankelijk product met een onzekere vraag
en een dynamische prijsstelling. In dit hoofdstuk toets ik de hypothese dat
deze korting toeneemt met de mate van concurrentie. Daarvoor ontwikkel ik
een nieuwe concurrentiemaat die de nabijheid (in vertrektijd) van een bepaalde
vlucht weergeeft ten opzichte van concurrerende vluchten in dezelfde markt.
Vervolgens schat ik de impact van concurrentie op APDs en de dynamische pri-
jsstelling door gebruik te maken van exogene wijzigingen in de vertrektijden die
zich tijdens de boekingsperiode voordoen. De econometrische analyse onderste-
unt de theoretische voorspelling dat APDs groter zijn als de concurrentie hoger
wordt. Deze uitkomst laat zien dat luchtvaartmaatschappijen consumenten
proberen te verleiden om vooraf tickets te boeken en zo klantverlies aan de
concurrentie te voorkomen. Een nadere analyse naar bedrijfstype suggereert
dat dit resultaat geldt voor gevestigde luchtvaartmaatschappijen (legacy carri-
ers), terwijl er onvoldoende bewijs is dat concurrentie ook een e↵ect heeft op
de dynamische prijsstelling van prijsvechters (low-cost carriers). Verder sug-
gereren de resultaten dat de spreiding van marktprijzen toeneemt met de mate
van concurrentie. De prijsspreiding is groter als er meer concurrentie is, om-
dat vliegtickets aan het begin van de boekingsperiode goedkoper zijn (vanwege
de grotere APDs), terwijl de tarieven van vliegtickets tegen het einde van de
boekingsperiode gelijk blijven. Een analyse van het e↵ect van concurrentie op
prijsdiscriminatie in de luchtvaartsector is daarom mogelijk onvolledig als er
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geen rekening wordt gehouden met de intertemporele dimensie en APDs. Va-
nuit een beleidsperspectief benadrukken deze bevindingen het belang van de
nabijheid van vluchten ten opzichte van de concurrentie tijdens het slottoewi-
jzingsproces. Dat is vooral belangrijk in situaties waarin luchtvaartmaatschap-
pijen veel invloed zouden kunnen uitoefenen, zoals in een specifieke hub of een
luchthaven waar ze een dominante marktpositie hebben.
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